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Title VII Arbitration
Patrick 0. Gudridget
Supreme Court decisions establish two separate lines of analysis concerning whether arbitrationagreements should pre-empt judicial remedies
for parties already covered by employment and labor legislation. First, in
cases like Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Corp., the Supreme Court espouses a
proceduralanalysis: the Court considers the extent to which the arbitration
procedures reflect judicial processes. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver and
its successors, on the other hand, the Court examines whether the applicable statutes explicitly pre-empt the arbitrationagreement. This article argues that neither approach is helpful. Rather, 'courts should consider
whether the relevant statute appliesstandards derived essentiallyfrom "inside" the institutions the statutes regulate or from "outside" those institutions. Arbitration, ProfessorGudridge argues, is plainly appropriateunder
statutes which reveal an "inside" orientation,and not appropriate under
statutes with an "outside" orientation. The author uses the 1991 Civil
Rights Act to reach conclusions concerning the applicabilityof arbitration
agreements in the Title VII context. This amendment added a right to injunctive relief in the "mixed motive" Title VII action. The author uses a
constitutionalanalysis of the 1991 amendment as a startingpointfor thinking about arbitrationwithin Title VII generally. ProfessorGudridge argues
that this analysis reveals the focus of Title VII actions has shifted to an
"outside" orientation. Title VII actions, therefore, are best solved through
litigative, rather than arbitralprocedures.
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Arbitration, it is said, provides employers with a means to block
aggrieved employees from resorting to courts to obtain the full range of
remedies, most notably jury awards of compensatory and punitive damages,
that the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1991 added to the enforcement
mechanisms previously incorporated in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.1 To be sure, the ability of employers to condition jobs on employee
acceptance of arbitration procedures as alternatives to adjudication is
limited to some degree. In the now relatively unusual cases in which
employees and employers enter into collective bargaining agreements
recognized and protected by the Labor Management Relations Act, the
United States Supreme Court held -in the famous case of Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver2 that arbitration arrangements do not prevent employees
from resorting to litigation to enforce Title VII. But for most employees,
Gardner-Denveris beside the point. The Supreme Court, ruling in 1991 in
Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,3 has held that suits arising under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act are pre-empted by arbitration
agreements covering statutory claims, at least in cases in which such
agreements fall within the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act. The United
1.
2.

See, e.g., N.Y. Times, March 18, 1994, § A, p.1, Col. 6.
415 U.S. 36 (1974).

3.

500 U.S. 20 (1991).

19951

TITLE VII ARBITRATION

States courts of appeals are so far unanimous in their view that Gilmer more
or less automatically governs in cases arising under Title VII as well.'
I think that the courts of appeals are wrong: arbitration agreements
both outside and inside collective bargaining should not be understood to
bar litigation of Title VII claims. But I also think that the Supreme Court
decided Gilmer correctly. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, the motivation for
employer arbitration requirements, is also the key to deciphering the
differences between ADEA and Title VII claims.
The argument is complicated.
Gilmer is not, within the terms of Justice White's majority opinion, an
ADEA case as such-we will see that ADEA statutory language played
only a peripheral role in the Gilmer analysis. Rather, as the opinion reads,
Gilmer is one in a sequence of decisions dealing with arbitration of a
variety of statutory claims. This sequence is notably cross-cutting. 5 One
line of cases began in 1974 with Gardner-Denver. These decisions
conclude that employees seemingly obliged by collective bargaining
agreements to resort to grievance arbitration are nonetheless free to litigate
de novo, even in the wake of adverse arbitral rulings, in order to enforce
statutory rights arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6
the Fair Labor Standards Act, 7 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983,8 and the Federal
Employers Liability Act.9 Starting with its Mitsubishit° decision in 1985,
however, the Supreme Court has also held that parties to contracts with
arbitration clauses reaching matters falling within the scope of federal
antitrust or securities laws are limited to arbitral remedies in those statutory
4. See, e.g., Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1440-41 (9th Cir. 1994); Bender v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229
(5th Cir. 1991); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991). For disagreement
carefully couched in a discussion of waiver, see Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 1994 WL 705260 (9th Cir.
1994). These decisions, although they came in cases arising outside collective bargaining contexts,
might seem to some to invite reconsideration of Gardner-Denver as well. Why should employees
already benefiting from union representation also possess rights to litigate not shared by unorganized
colleagues? The question of the relative significance of legally-protected collective bargaining
institutions and independently guaranteed workplace rights is a matter of considerable current debate.
See, e.g., Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between
Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective BargainingSystem, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 575,
636-38 (1992) (fragility of independent rights in absence of collective bargaining); Charles Fried,
Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections on the CurrentState of Labor Law and
its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1027-29 (1984) (importance of workplace rights guaranteed
independently of collective bargaining outcomes). At minimum, it might be thought, the GardnerDenver line is no longer relevant outside the collective bargaining context.
5. Richard Shell puts the point less diplomatically: "The Supreme Court has spoken out of both
sides of its mouth regarding the arbitration of claims arising under federal statutes." Richard Shell,
ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When Is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate
Substitute" for the Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REv. 509, 510 (1990).
6. See, e.g., Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 59-60.
7. See, e.g., Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
8. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
9. See, e.g., Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557 (1987).
10. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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actions absent extraordinary circumstances.'" Gilmer, according to the
Court, resembled Mitsubishi and its progeny. An employee of a securities
industry firm who was not represented by a union was blocked from
pursuing litigation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
and left to press his grievance within an industry-established arbitration
system. 12
Justice White, writing for seven Justices, depicted Gilmer as a straightforward case, an occasion for repeating conclusions that the Court had
worked out earlier. As a summing up, though, White's opinion is notably
subversive.' 3 We will see in the first parts of this essay that Gilmer's
formulations simply do not work. Despite its recurring references to earlier
opinions, Gilmer fashions no satisfactory synthesis. If anything, White's
opinion accentuates the conflict in the Supreme Court's prior decisions,
unsettling analysis of not only the matter at hand, but also the Court's
earlier work. Neither the Mitsubishi nor the Gardner-Denversequence of
opinions provides useful tools for reaching decisions. In order to draw
conclusions about the role of arbitration in the ADEA and Title VII settings,
I think, we are better off putting aside the Supreme Court's approaches, and
substituting a very different framework for analysis.
The question, on one view, might be seen as initially inviting a rather
general procedural analysis, an investigation of the differing characteristics
of arbitral and litigative proceedings; only after this effort would it make
sense to assess the significance of relevant differences, if any, in light of the
features of particular statutory causes of action.' 4 There is also, however, a
second, more formal approach. Statutory provisions ordinarily limit the
reach of otherwise binding agreements unless statutes themselves provide to
11. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (securities
action); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (same); Mitsubishi Motors
Corp., 473 U.S. 614 (antitrust action).
12. Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that "nothing herein contained shall apply to
contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1970). In Gilmer, the Supreme Court held that
this statutory exclusion had no bearing on the case because the pertinent arbitration agreement was not
alleged to be part of Gilmer's employment agreement per se, but rather part of "Gilmer's securities
registration application, which is a contract with the securities-exchanges, not with [the employer]." 500
U.S. at 25. Especially since Gilmer, federal courts have disagreed concerning the breadth of the FAA
exclusion-whether it addresses only the employment contracts of transportation workers, or the
contracts of all workers whose efforts affect interstate commerce. See Crawford v. West Jersey Health
Sys., 847 F. Supp. 1232, 1240-42 (D. N.J. 1994) (collecting cases).
13. Commentators discussing arbitration of ADEA claims before Gilmer divided on whether, in
this context, arbitration should be treated as preemptive. Compare Shell, supra note 5, at 572 (not
preemptive) and Comment, Overcoming the Presumption of Arbitrability of ADEA Claims: The
Triumph of Substantive Over Procedural Values in Nicholson v. CPC International, Inc., 138 U. PA. L.
Rev. 1817 (1990) (same) with Note, Agreements to Arbitrate Claims Under the Age Discriminationin
Employment Act, 104 HARV. L. REv. 568 (1990) (preemptive).
14. See, e.g., Shell, supra note 5, at 517-40, 562-65 (differences in labor arbitration and
commercial arbitration processes suggest that the question of the arbitrability of ERISA claims turns
importantly on which arbitral process is used).
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the contrary. t5 Arbitration clauses, from this perspective, are no different
from any other agreement term; the underlying question is one which
should be resolved by construing the pertinent statute. But there is rarely
only one pertinent enactment.' 6 The Federal Arbitration Act, in the case of
commercial dealings, and section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act, in the case of collective bargaining agreements, in general oblige
courts to respect arbitration agreements.17 From the point of view of
statutory interpretation, therefore, the status of arbitration agreements
depends upon how courts reconcile seemingly conflicting statutes-on the
one hand, the Arbitration Act and section 301; on the other, various statutes
supplying the basis for rights of action.
Both of these approaches figure in Supreme Court opinions. Although
in form they frame the analysis in terms emphasizing the consistency of
arbitration with statutory objectives, Gilmer and the Mitsubishi cases in fact
emphasize a procedural analysis minimizing the differences between
arbitration and litigation. The Gardner-Denver decisions tend to draw
conclusions based on the nature of the statutory actions at issue, albeit in a
rather abstract and formulaic way. This essay, by contrast, proposes to
investigate statutory actions more closely, developing a distinction between
the ways in which actions characterize the institutions they address and
regulate. On this view, some statutory actions reveal an "inside"
orientation, a concern to hold institutions to their own norms. Other
statutes show an "outside" emphasis, bringing external norms to bear to
reconstitute, in part, regulated institutions. This distinction, which I think is
capable of considerable elaboration in the contexts of particular statutes,
yields alternate views of the arbitration of statutory claims. Simply put,
arbitration is plainly noncontroversial in cases of "inside" statutes, and
plainly troubling in cases of "outside" statutes.
The ADEA and Title VII, I argue, fall on opposite sides of this divide.
Both statutes recognize multiple causes of action; the two statutory sets of
actions are usually understood to be strongly similar. The 1991 Civil
Rights Act, however, importantly changed the Title VII mixed-motive suit
by adding a right to injunctive relief in circumstances that previously would
have suggested no need for any remedy whatsoever. The effect of this
supplement, we will see, shifts the focus of the mixed-motive action from
inside to outside. Because the mixed-motive suit is difficult to separate out
from other Title VH actions at any stage procedurally early enough to make
arbitration a relevant option, the changed character of the mixed-motive
15. See, e.g., Norfolk & Western v. American Train Dispatchers, 499 U.S. 117, 131 (1991).
16. Even in the case of an arbitration agreement grounded in the common law of contract, there is
always a question, prior to enforcing statutory rights, as to whether the statute, within its own terms,
works to oust (or rather respect) common law values. Choice of law becomes, implicitly, a part of the
process of statutory construction.
17. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq.; 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a) (West 1978).
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action, now plainly an inappropriate subject for arbitration, keeps the other
Title VII suits within the litigative mode also.
The significance of the alteration of the mixed-motive suit is not easy
to see from the face of the 1991 Act. I bring to bear, however, a perhaps
unusual investigative device. Constitutional law, I think, can be understood
as an ultimate language of legislation: on this view, it is the success or
failure of efforts to restate congressional action within constitutional
vocabularies that determines legislative validity. In the case of the 1991
Act's revision of the mixed-motive suit, the pertinent constitutional terms
are those of the Article III case or controversy requirement. I use those
terms first to identify the constitutionally difficult aspect of the 1991
addition-a congressional grant of standing on its face not easy to square
with recent Supreme Court decisions. Close scrutiny of this difficulty,
however, shows analyses of the absence of mootness to be more pertinent.
As a consequence, it is not just that the reconceived Article III question
suggests a resolution affirming the constitutionality of the congressional
action. A window on the origins of the 1991 change also opens. It
becomes apparent that the revision of the mixed-motive suit reintroduces
into Title VII jurisprudence a point of view strongly evident in the early
Title VII caselaw; a perspective that originally derived precisely from
constitutional mootness doctrines. It is this point of view, now incorporated
in the mixed-motive action, that discloses the external emphasis
inconsistent with arbitral disposition.
Because the Supreme Court has understood the question of arbitration
of statutory claims to cut across particular statutory domains, analysis of
ADEA and Title VII issues cannot be left to stand alone without at least
some consideration of the significance of the discussion V'is-A-vis other
statutory actions-in particular those the Court has already judged to be
appropriate or inappropriate for arbitration. I briefly sketch this extension
of my argument in the first appendix to this article. A second appendix
considers the salience of the perspective I develop here in the contexts of
state statutory causes of action potentially preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act or section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act; I
also consider the interaction of arbitration and federal administrative causes
of action.
I
GIMER AS SUBVERSIVE

As Justice White saw the case, Gilmer turned on whether arbitration of
claims arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
"would be inconsistent with the statutory framework and purposes of the
ADEA."
18.

8

This rather general inquiry, however, quickly narrowed:

Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27.
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It is true that arbitration focuses on specific disputes between the parties
involved. The same can be said, however, of judicial resolution of claims.
Both of these dispute resolution mechanisms nonetheless also can further
broad social purposes. "[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum the9 statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function."'
Thus, the particular objectives of the ADEA were only briefly the focus of
attention. 20 Attention shifted, rather, to the features of the arbitral process,
to determine whether any obstacles were present that would frustrate an
individual seeking to "effectively

. .

. vindicate" a statutory cause of ac-

tion.2" The would-be litigant in Gilmer in fact raised "a host of challenges
to the adequacy of arbitration procedures." 2 2 Arbitration panels might be
biased; discovery was more restricted in scope than that afforded in federal
courts; arbiters were not required to issue written opinions, restricting both
public knowledge and appellate review; arbitration procedures provided no
means for parties to obtain broad equitable relief or to pursue class
actions. 23
But these worries, earlier decisions of the Court suggested, might be
discounted. "[G]eneralized attacks on arbitration" were no substitute for
actually "showing" the existence of a problem. 24 The burden was squarely
on the critic to demonstrate that in fact particular arbitration "provisions are
inadequate." 25 Thus, it was not enough to allege the possibility of bias.
Given that the applicable arbitration rules "provide protections against biased panels" and that the Federal Arbitration Act authorizes courts to overturn arbitral decisions in cases of" 'evident partiality or corruption,' "some
more specific showing was necessary. 26 Similarly, complaints about dis-

covery, to be persuasive, supposed a direct demonstration that the actual
discovery provisions in place are inadequate to allow claimants a "fair opportunity to present their claims." 2 7 Criticism of a lack of any requirement
19. Id. at 27-28 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637).
20. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 27.
21. Justice White briefly discussed the impact of arbitration on EEOC enforcement of the ADEA,
noting that EEOC action was not tied to private litigation, and that the ADEA required the agency to
pursue informal methods of dispute resolution as well as litigation, suggestive perhaps of statutory flexibility with respect to enforcement modes. See id. at 28-29. These observations, however, were not
treated as decisive in the case.
22. Id. at 30.
23. See id. at 30-32.
24. Id. at 30, 31. Accord, e.g., McMahon, 482 U.S. at 231-32; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 634. The
Court's distinction between "generalized attacks" and "actual showings" was also brought to bear in
Justice White's brief dismissal of plaintiff's claim that the arbitration agreement was an unconscionable
manifestation of unequal bargaining power. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33. This argument, like the
more procedural objections, had also been addressed in earlier cases. See, e.g., McMahon, 482 U.S. at
226; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627.
25. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
26. Id. at 30.
27. See id. at 31.
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for written opinions was simply wrong: the relevant arbitral procedures "do
require that all arbitration awards be in writing, and that the awards contain
the names of the parties, a summary of the issues in controversy, and a
description of the award issued."2 8 Even the supposed failure of arbitration
to provide for broad class or equitable relief foundered in the face of analysis of the details of the actual arbitral rules at issue-the "rules applicable
here do not restrict the types of relief an arbitrator may award, but merely
refer to 'damages and/or other relief.' "29
Plaintiff was left only with his invocation of the collective bargaining
cases, in which the existence of arbitration procedures had been repeatedly
held not to bar litigation of federal statutory claims. Justice White saw
several distinctions:
First, those cases did not involve the issue of the enforceability of an
agreement to arbitrate statutory claims. Rather, they involved the quite different issue whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims. Since the employees there had
not agreed to arbitrate their statutory claims, and the labor arbitrators were
not authorized to resolve such claims, arbitration in those cases understandably was held not to preclude subsequent statutory actions. Second ....the
claimants there were represented by their unions in the arbitration proceedings. An important concern therefore was the tension between collective
representation and individual statutory rights, a concern not applicable to
the present case. Finally, those cases were not decided under the [Federal
Arbitration Act], which
...
30

reflects a "liberal federal policy favoring arbi-

tration agreements."
Short work, but on close inspection, I think, troubling.
A.

Plasticity and the Absent Standpoint Within a Process-BasedModel
of Arbitration

Initially, the problem lies in the interaction of two assumptions that
play important parts in shaping Justice White's opinion. Neither assumption is, on its face, surprising. Indeed, many readers of Gilmer might regard
both presuppositions as obviously appropriate, needing neither defense nor
explicit statement.
First, Justice White by and large supposes that the question of the propriety of arbitration is one that implicates some sense we have of a "right"
process that cuts across fields of substantive law. It is as though we can
argue about process without too often looking to the policies or judgments
or aspirations that organize any one particular statutory cause of action;
some model of "right" process is usually already available, ordinarily pre28. Id. at 31-32.
29. Id. at 32. Arbitration rules adopted by securities exchanges and approved by the SEC since
Gilmer have exempted claims associated with class action litigation from the reach of exchange-mandated arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Rule 12(d)(3), NASD Code of Arb. Proc. (1994).
30. Id. at 35 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625).
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empting the need for an action-specific inquiry. Thus, in Gilmer, the
ADEA itself figures prominently only around the edges of the analysis.
Second, White also takes for granted and, in its specific manifestations
in the case at hand, repeatedly exploits a particular feature of arbitral process-its plasticity; its potential in the face of the wishes of drafters of
arbitration contracts or providers of arbitral services to take the desired procedural form.3 The plaintiff in Gilmer seemed to suppose that the exercise
of this freedom would, at least sometimes, result in proceedings differing
substantially from federal litigative modes with respect to independence,
thoroughness, articulateness, and breadth of relief. Justice White, however,
emphasized that arbitration in the securities industry was not a matter of
case-by-case improvisation. Designers of securities arbitration chose to
cast a general form, along lines in pertinent respects closely mimicking judicial process. Plaintiff's fears were beside the point. In the earlier cases,
the Supreme Court had noted a similarly familiar and therefore reassuring
standardization.3 2
31. "The important characteristic of an arbitration clause is that ... the parties control their own
destiny. They generally are free to construct any arbitration edifice desired." Edward Brunet, Arbitration and ConstitutionalRights, 71 N.C. L. REv. 81, 103 (1992); see, e.g., Keating v. Superior Court, 183
Cal. Rptr. 360 (Cal. 1982) (class action arbitration); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 596 A.2d 860
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (same). This phenomenon was explicitly noted in Mitsubishi in the context of a
challenge to the capacity of arbitral procedures to resolve complex issues:
[Aldaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration. The anticipated subject
matter of the dispute may be taken into account when the arbitrators are appointed, and arbitral
rules typically provide for the participation of experts either employed by the parties or appointed by the tribunal.... We decline to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral
body conducting a proceeding will be unable or unwilling to retain competent, conscientious,
and impartial arbitrators.
Id. at 633, 634. "There is no federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules;
the federal policy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agreements
to arbitrate." Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Trustees of Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476 (1989)
(state arbitration act allowing stay of arbitral proceedings not preempted by Federal Arbitration Act).
Thus, in Haviland v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 947 F.2d 601 (2d Cir. 1991), for example, a Second Circuit
panel held that securities industry arbitration agreements rendered the claim of the plaintiff against one
defendant partnership to be arbitral and the plaintiff's claim against the other defendant partnership to
be not arbitral even though both claims arose out of the same transaction and the same individual
partners constituted both partnerships. The agreements, and not some generally applicable judicial policy favoring arbitration, governed even in the face of procedural mish-mash: "[T]he purpose of the
Arbitration Act is 'to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other contracts, but not more so
.... " Id. .at 605 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 478); see also, e.g., Clark v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, 924 F.2d 550, 554-56 (4th Cir. 1991) (attempting to analyze in contractual terms arbitration
agreements drafted to conform with now repealed SEC requirements); Wiepking v. Prudential-Bache
Securities, Inc., 940 F.2d 996, 998-99 (6th Cir. 1991) (collecting cases); Higgins v. Superior Court, 1
Cal. Rptr. 2d 57, 63 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1991).
32. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, may be the most pertinent of these precursors. Also addressing
securities industry arbitration procedures, Justice O'Connor in that case responded to doubts expressed
by plaintiffs about the adequacy of arbitral process by emphasizing the oversight role of the SEC in
insuring "that arbitration procedures adequately protect statutory rights." Id. at 234; but see id. at 26166 (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part) (doubting efficacy of SEC oversight). See also Mitsubishi, 473
U.S. at 633-34 (describing approaches "typically" or "frequently" or "expected" to be followed in international arbitration proceedings); Note, supra note 13, at 583-86 (endorsing arbitration of ADEA claims
but calling on Congress to authorize the EEOC to standardize procedures).
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At this point the problem becomes apparent: The full significance of
imitation is difficult to assess. Perhaps Gilmer and its predecessors validate
only fixed arbitration schemes that closely fit the judicial model. But how
closely? Unless the Supreme Court means to require a one-to-one matching
of arbitration and federal civil procedure, there must be some way of gauging the significance of divergences. Moreover, Justice White, like Justices
in the Supreme Court's earlier decisions, not only noted the existence of
standardized arbitration procedures, but restricted his discussion to a consideration of these procedures on their face. Gilmer thus does not address
the question of how courts should respond when particular arbitral tribunals
depart from what seem to be their own rules-a question that may arise
repeatedly, reinforcing the need for a plausible analysis of variance.3 3 It is
clear, however, that to the extent that arbitral procedures are a matter of
drafter's choice, and not simply given, analysis of proper arbitral procedures cannot begin with a model of arbitration itself.
In fact, if arbitration has no necessary form, or at least not one pitched
in familiarly procedural terms, there are no benchmarks by which to evaluate particular arbitration agreements. 34 We might think that there exists
some sense of the essentials of judicial process, and that this sense might be
brought to bear in evaluating arbitral proceedings. It is not clear, however,
how relevant judicial norms really are in the arbitral setting. Ideas of due

33. Courts that do not attempt to identify the procedures governing arbitration, of course, never
reach this issue. See, e.g., Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 684-85 (11th Cir. 1992). The Federal Arbitration Act authorizes courts to vacate arbitral awards if "arbitrators were guilty of misconduct" because of
procedural rulings "by which the rights of any party may have been prejudiced." 9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a)(3)
(West Supp. 1994). What is "misconduct"? Some federal courts of appeals have held that courts may
vacate arbitral awards revealing a "manifest disregard of the law" vis-k-vis governing federal statutes.
See, e.g., Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6 (lst Cir. 1990); Merrill Lynch v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930
(2d Cir. 1986). A similar standard might structure judicial review of arbitral procedural "misconduct."
But what is "manifest disregard"? If courts are not to smuggle back in models of "right process," the
only defensible approach may be one that conditions judicial intervention on the "pristine clarity" of
pertinent statutes or rules. See id. at 933. Judicial reversal of arbitral ruling would then become highly
unusual, at least in the absence of strong systems of statutory interpretation, and the force of the
Supreme Court's invocation of rules regulating arbitral process would correspondingly diminish. In itsapproach in this regard, the Court is caught in a dilemma: its justification for deference to arbitration
supposes that arbitration conforms in practice to the procedural rules that legitimate it, but close judicial
review seeking to guarantee conformity threatens the autonomy of arbitration, and its status as a mode of
dispute resolution independent of adjudication.
34. "It is impossible . . . to consider the relative merits of arbitration and adjudication in the
abstract. Arbitration has no unique procedural aspects, and the two processes are frequently indistinguishable." Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916, 931-32
(1979). The subversive effect of the plasticity of arbitral process is plainly visible in Professor Shell's
analysis, which requires a clear distinction between commercial arbitration and collective bargaining
arbitration, but which (because of Shell's revealing carefulness), is repeatedly punctuated with qualifications like "usually," "frequently," and "typically," see Shell, supra note 5, at 531-34, as well as cautionary notes (e.g., that "[more research is needed on the question of just what role formal law plays in
commercial arbitrator decision making"). Id. at 532 n,155.
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process are one source of inner coherence for adjudicative forms. 35 But the
ways that we think about due process seem to be decisively bound up with
the status of courts as imposed institutions, emphasizing and responding to
notions of judicial process as involuntary or forced, with respect to both
forms and consequences. 36 The problem here is not simply "state action"
language in constitutional texts. Ideas of due process take as given, treat as
the condition of their relevance, some prior infringement of individual autonomy, however characterized. It is this infringement that is the pertinent
imposition; absent this infringement, there is nothing for due process norms
to grasp. Agreements by individuals to forego due process, it would seem,
cannot be analyzed in due process terms. Such agreements are expressions
of individual choice, exercises rather than infringements of individual autonomy. This line of argument, therefore, suggests that due process notions
are beside the point for purposes of analyzing arbitral procedures which are
quintessential consensual artifacts.3 7
I do not mean to suggest that what counts as individual choice is not
itself often, perhaps always, a complex question. Nor do I wish to deny that
we often defer or displace the question of what is individual choice by engaging in an analysis strikingly similar to usual due process investigations.38 In practice, we may frequently embrace agnosticism and in effect
argue that, even if certain consequences were imposed rather than voluntarily faced, the end-results are nonetheless justifiable.3 9 But this equivocation has its price, at least in the context of considering arbitral procedures.
Perhaps end results are reasonable, and thus may be treated as though they
were agreed to whether or not they really were, because the individual bur35. See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, Toward a FunctionalApproachfor Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 440, 452 (1986).
36. See Henry M. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic,66 HARv. L. REV. 1362, 1371-74 (1953).
37. But see Edward L. Rubin, Toward a General Theory of Waiver, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 478,
536-41 (1981). Rubin proposes a "functional equivalence" standard for judging waivers of rights; in the
case of waivers of rights to adjudicative process, due process (he argues) defines functional equivalence.
Rubin admits, however, that due process is not literally relevant: "the proposed standard is simply being
advanced as a means of guiding judicial discretion, rather than as a constitutional command." Id. at 543.
Perhaps the functional equivalence standard is better understood in equal protection terms:
From the perspective of the individual, waiver represents an alternative, informal interaction
that the state encourages by its enforcement of the waiver. Consequently, the state should be
expected to provide the same level of protection for the individual when he chooses that
alternative.
Id. at 537. "Same level," obviously enough, is not self-defining; at this level, the analysis is necessarily
incomplete.
38. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 1174, 1245-48 (1983). It is also sometimes the case, of course, that discussions of individual
choice are plainly disguised discussions of the merits of particular choices. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co.
V. Lai, -

F.3d -

(9th Cir. 1994).

39. See, e.g., D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 186-87 (1972); see also Newton v.
Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 394 (1987) (fact that "benefits of the agreement" to defendant "are obvious" one
reason why agreement to drop civil suit in return for dismissal of criminal charges is not coerced).

220

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

[Vol. 16:209

dened by the agreement shares in the benefit that the burden produces, or
because the burden is offset by some benefit conferred upon another individual who would have been burdened otherwise. But where burdens take
the form of some procedural disadvantage, as in the case of a shift from
adjudicative procedures to nonconforming arbitral modes, if the inquiry is
not to become a judgment about whether procedural deficits are either reflections of the contours of substantive entitlements or offset by skews in
substantive rules (an option ruled out by Justice White's first working assumption)," then procedural deficits must be either understood as costs of
gains shared by all or as matched by disadvantages to the opposing party
created by other variances. But both of these latter judgments are relative
to judicial process.4 1 This is clear in the case of collective benefits like
speed or simplicity. In the case of offsetting burdens, there must also be
some measure of offset and, if it is not obtained by referring to substantive
entitlements, the other obvious resource is again the judicial model.
B.

Gilmer and Gardner-Denver as Opposed Absolutes

In any event, Justice White is inconsistent. At one important point in
his opinion, his analysis ignores rather than underscores the plasticity of
arbitral process. I refer here to the passage in Gilmer distinguishing the
collective bargaining cases. This omission reveals the artifice latent in
White's attempt to reconcile the Supreme Court's prior arbitration decisions. More significantly, it also calls attention to the uneasy coexistence of
those decisions, their juxtaposition of two modes of approach, pointing
across the board to opposite conclusions.
White suggested three grounds for treating the case at hand as different
from cases like Gardner-Denver,but two of his three arguments are obviously makeweights. It is difficult to see the difference, for example, between an explicit agreement to arbitrate statutory claims and an agreement
to arbitrate contract-based claims if contract terms directly implicate issues
also addressed by statute." As far as subsequent litigation is concerned,
notions of collateral estoppel ought to be no less relevant than ideas of
merger and bar.43 Justice White's assertion that the Federal Arbitration Act
is somehow more liberal than the Labor Managment Relations Act in its
treatment of arbitration is equally hard to accept. The Steelworkers Tril40. But see E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudging and the Evolution of Procedure,53 U. CH. L.
REV. 306, 327-28 (1986).

41.
42.

See McGovern, supra note 35, at 455-56; Rubin, supra note 36, at 557.
But see David E. Feller, Relationship of the Agreement to External Law, in LABOR ARBmIRATOR DEVELOPMENT 33-54 (C. Barraca, A. Miller & M. Zimry eds., 1983).
43. In any case, if "same transaction" is the key to determining the applicability of res judicata
notions, differences in statutory and contractual terminology may make little difference. See Richard
Shell, Res Judicataand CollateralEstoppel Effects of Commercial Arbitration, 35 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
623, 642-45 (1988).
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ogy, 4 the Supreme Court's founding formulation of LMRA arbitration policy, is not usually understood as evidencing hostility to arbitration.4 5
in framing the modem Arbitration Act stanIndeed, the Mitsubishi Court,
46
Steelworkers.
dard, cited
Gilmer raises a more important issue, however, insofar as its majority
opinion explains the Gardner-Denver cases by invoking "the tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights."4 7 Unions,
as bargaining agents, may possess interests that in particular cases diverge
from those of individual employees pressing grievances; as a result, in perhaps difficult to detect ways, union case administration might be affected or
arbitral attitudes changed. Arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement thus undeniably raises a possibility of conflict of interest not
present in arbitrations outside the collective bargaining context which come
under the Federal Arbitration Act.4 8 Such conflict becomes a matter of less
concern if individual employees remain free to litigate statutory claims
notwithstanding the results of prior arbitrations.4 9 How significant is the
conflict of interest problem? Plainly, some arbitration schemes are more
vulnerable than others. Changes in the process of selecting arbiters, for
example the introduction of an element of randomness into the method of
choice, or recognition of the right of a grievant to go to arbitration even
over the objection of the bargaining representative, might considerably reduce the risk of bias. Even absent such revisions of usual grievance procedures, we may conclude that, if the availability of a superseding judicial
action in cases of "evident partiality or corruption" is sufficient in Arbitration Act cases, the well-developed duty of fair representation action is a
more than adequate LMRA analog.5 0 Thus, the same sensitivity to the flex44. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Warrier & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)
(§ 301 of the LMRA authorizes judges to enforce arbitration agreements).
45. E.g., Lividas v. Bradshaw, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 2077 (1994); Katherine Van Wezel
Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1529 (1981) ("Lincoln
Mills and the Steelworkers Trilogy established a federal common law of labor relations in which voluntary arbitration was made the primary institution for the resolution of disputes between management and
labor.").
46. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626 (citing Steelworkers, 363 U.S. at 582-83, as supporting Arbitration Act bias in favor of arbitration).
47. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
48. This is not to say that conflict of interest concerns are irrelevant in arbitral proceedings outside
collective bargaining; conflicts of interest, however, may be easier to minimize. See Shell, supra note 5,
at 538 (discussing procedures addressing conflicts of interest in securities litigation).
49. See Bernard Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Overlapping and Conflicting Remedies for Employment Discrimination,39 U. CI. L. REv. 30, 43-46 (1971).
50. See, e.g., ALPA v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 68 (1991) (duty of fair representation governs contract negotiation as well as administration); Teamsters v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565-70 (1990) (fair representation suit analogous to breach of trust and malpractice actions); Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 424
U.S. 554, 567 (1976) (breach of duty of fair representation by union restores employee right to enforce
employment contract through litigation).

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

222

[Vol. 16:209

ibility of arbitral process that the Gilmer Court displayed in dealing with
arbitration outside the LMRA, if brought to bear in assessing the place of
arbitration within the collective bargaining context, points in the same direction: the possibility of deficiencies in the arbitral process is not a decisive ground justifying the independence of statutory actions. It is important
to be clear about the implications of all this: Justice White's failure to distinguish satisfactorily the Gardner-Denverline does not suggest that Gilmer
itself is necessarily wrongly decided. Perhaps the collective bargaining
cases themselves need to be reconsidered-upon close inspection, perhaps
collective bargaining grievance arbitration is really no different and is in
important respects equally plastic, and thus ought to be treated just like
arbitral procedures coming within the scope of the Arbitration Act.
Interestingly in this regard, we may note that Gardner-Denverand its
successors treat conflict of interest as only a minor theme. Justices writing
for the Supreme Court in these cases tended to place less emphasis on process in the abstract, but instead stressed the implications of fixed statutory
entitlements. The pertinent statutes, it was said, were sources of "substantive protection . . . independent of the employer's obligations under its

collective-bargaining agreement,""1 "devolv[ing] on [employees] as individual workers, not as members of a collective organization." 5 2 As such,
they were outside the reach of "majoritarian processes" 53 with respect to
either outright waiver or procedural or substantive redefinition. And it was
precisely because these entitlements were statutory in origin that arbitration
was not the equivalent of adjudication. Arbiters possessed a "specialized
competence" concerning "the law of the shop, not the law of the land,"5 4
and thus arbitration was not "an adequate substitute for judicial proceedings"5 5 in view of the "complex mixed questions of fact and law" 56 and
"public law concepts" 57 that statutory questions would require arbiters to
confront.
Once again, it is hard to see any limits on relevance, any stopping
point short of universal application. All statutes serving as bases for causes
of action, except the LMRA, are sources of rights strongly independent of
collective bargaining and therefore, it would seem, entitlements capable of
assertion even in the face of contrary arbitration. Again excepting the
LMRA, all statutes in the process of construction and enforcement generate
mixed questions of law and fact, and require in this process some reference
to public law concepts. Arbiters, it should follow, always lack the tools to
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 565 (1987).
Barentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981).
Gardner-Denver,415 U.S. at 51.
Id. at 57.
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289 (1984).
Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743.
Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57.
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adjudicate statutory claims.58 In the Gardner-Denver opinions, as in Gilmer, the analysis in effect crosses the line, and appears to group cases that
the actual pattern of Supreme Court results dictates that we see as different.
II
ARBITRATION AND STATUTORY PROMINENCE

Standing alone, the terse formulations about statutes and arbitration
that I extracted from the Gardner-Denvercases are obviously vulnerable to
challenge. Statutory "substantive protection" almost always amounts to at
most a qualified entitlement. Federal statutes are not only sources of claims
but also defenses-direct and indirect, substantive and procedural. Close
reading of Title VII, for example, yields considerable uncertainty about precisely what has been conferred, about whether it makes sense to characterize statutory provisions as conferring "rights" or imposing "duties" as
usually understood. To be sure, a statutory scheme may carry a bias, skew
results across the total set of cases in favor of either plaintiffs or defendants;
sometimes this skew, or rather its justification, may be controversial-as
Title Vil's history illustrates. But the relevant perspective is no longer that
of the individual litigant. The idea of rights or entitlements therefore loses
salience; simple oppositions of individual and group, or minority and majority, are less apparent. Similarly, the idea that arbiters cannot manage
public law concepts or mixed questions of law and fact triggers immediate
suspicion. The assertion is not absolute, of course: only relative to judges.
The origin of the confidence necessary to draw such clear conclusions is
difficult to discern, however. Presumably some judges are better at statutory work than some arbiters, and some arbiters are better than some judges.
There may be a pattern in the distribution of competencies, but absent some
sort of empirical study, don't we need a reason for thinking so?
Legal theorists have called attention to the role of judges as participants in the process of generating public norms, as elaborators of, and
therefore contributors to, the building up of constitutional, statutory, administrative, or common law language.59 Several features of the adjudicative
office seem to make possible or enhance the exercise of this role. These
include: the status of judges as public officials, the public selection and
confirmation process, the definite duration of judicial office; the responsibility of judges to explain in writing their decisions and thus to open up
their decisions to criticism by other judges, other officials, and the public at
58. See also Shell, supra note 5, at 560 (invocation of remedial purpose of ERISA "proves too
much" insofar as "public interest goals of nearly all federal laws arguably justify restrictions on the
enforcement of the FAA.").
59. See, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 585, 592-617 (1983);
Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2,
9-10, 12-14 (1979); see also Judith Resnik, Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405,
417-20 (1987) (role of adjudication in fixing social norms).
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large; and the involvement of judges in deciding cases across a range of
topics, and thus their education as to the spectrum of public concerns. Parts
of modem civil procedure are relevant also: not simply the techniques for
managing multi-party and class litigation, but also the freedom often afforded for wide-ranging discovery, and the choreography of pretrial motion
practice-its stylized, alternating law/fact emphasis, its use of simplifying
hypotheses which seem precisely designed to foster an external, contextstripping perspective. These last procedural accompaniments, of course, are
not exclusively properties of adjudication. As we have seen, contract-based
arbitration possesses an essential plasticity that makes possible incorporation of parts, or perhaps all, of judicial process within the arbitral setting.
At bottom, therefore, if there is any basis for clearly distinguishing judges
and arbiters, it must be the public status of judges."
Owen Fiss has formulated one view of the per se public status of
judges: "Adjudication is more likely to do justice than ...arbitration ... or

any other contrivance of ADR, precisely because it vests the power of the
state in individuals who act as trustees for the public, who are highly visible, and who are committed to reason."6 I see no reason to assume that
arbiters are not committed to reason, and I am not sure in what sense judges
generally are highly visible. Instead, I would emphasize a version of Fiss'
first point, call attention to the role that individuals who become judges
perform as marked participants in an articulated official politics cutting
across the range of social concerns. There are two parts to this formulation.
The first emphasizes the process through which judges acquire office.
Judges, whether popularly elected or appointed and confirmed by elected
officials, are named and initially educated to the requirements of their role
in settings that model the maelstrom of politics generally, the conflict of
constituency and counter-constituency. 6 2 The experience of appointment,
in this respect, prefigures an important part of the work of judging per se.
This is the second point. The maelstrom recurs: Formally, sources of law
are irreducibly multiple, overlapping, and competing in their claims to organize each other; 63 normatively, an analogous welter presents itself. Nonstate institutions (e.g., organizations, associations, congregations, cultures,
customs, etc.) compete to inform commitments originating and -enacted
through governmental processes, commitments which in turn assert
60. See Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedurein Decline, 53 U. CMI. L. REV. 494,
545-46 (1986).
61. Owen Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1673 (1985).
62. The politics of judicial nomination has been elaborately addressed, most recently in commentary concerning the significance of President Reagan's unsuccessful nomination of Robert Bork to the
United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Essays on the Supreme CourtAppointment Process, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1146 (1988).

63.
(1983).

See Patrick Gudridge, The Persistence of Classical Style, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 663, 686-98
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supremacy for themselves." Judges, having avoided or otherwise navigated the storms of appointment politics, often face the task of resolving, or
otherwise managing, the formal and normative conflicts of American law,
conflicts expressive of political struggles present and past.65 It is this responsibility that we link with the office - or rather, by office we mean
precisely the opportunity and obligation to undertake this responsibility repeatedly. It is repetition, judging again and again, typically across the wide
range of cases, that we conceive as constitutive of status.66
We are likely to attribute to holders of judicial office, therefore, a
sense of the overall, to presuppose in reading their work some sort of gen64. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative,
97 HARv.L. REv. 4 (1983); Louis L. Jaffe, Law Making by PrivateGroups, 51 HARV. L. REv. 201
(1937).
65. Professor Seidman, contrasting judges with legislators and executive officials, argues that
courts "are the most private of our public institutions," and points to the judicial appointment process as
reinforcing this tendency: "The selection process imposes some public check on the type of people who
become judges, yet leaves judges free of prior, publicly coerced commitments that might interfere with
the expression of private values in deciding future cases." Louis Michael Seidman, PublicPrincipleand
Private Choice: The Uneasy Casefor a Boundary MaintenanceTheory of Constitutional Law, 96 YALE
L.J. 1006, 1047 (1987). In part, Seidman's perspective is simply part of a different project. He sees the
working agenda of constitutional law as a never-resolved effort to build into government institutions
appropriate combinations of respect for universal and personal or private concerns or values. See id. at
1019-29, 1042-46. Judges introduce into government the private dimension, at the same time as they
characterize the public. See also Paul Kahn, Independence and Responsibility in the Judicial Role, in
TRANSION To DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 83-84 (I. Stotzky ed., 1993) (judges as both citizens and
state actors). I might agree with this thesis, at least as Seidman frames it; no particular conclusion seems
to follow concerning whether adjudication and arbitration are similarly or differently situated as
processes for mediating different sorts of values. But there is also a real difference, I think. Seidman
sees the judicial appointment process as protecting judicial freedom because of the level of generality
custom requires that scrutiny adopt-an airy inquiry into "general competence" and "judicial philosophy." See Seidman, supra, at 1047-48. It is all momentary theater without lasting significance. It
seems to me, however, that if the process is seen as beginning with executive selection of judges, and if
the difficulty candidates might encounter in speaking the appropriate language is acknowledged, it is
harder to regard the process of appointment as without extended significance for judges. In particular,
the business of attempted reconciliation that Seidman sees as the ultimate judicial task in my view
plainly begins at the point the potential judge first contemplates the risks of the appointment/confirmation process. This difference is significant: Professor Seidman's account represents abstract formulations as tending towards emptiness not only in considering judicial appointment but also in assessing the
significance of legal texts and judicial formulations in the process of adjudication per se. See id. at
1049-52. In the end, this view (he recognizes) turns back on itself, undermining the persuasiveness of
his own abstract effort. See id. at 1053-57. An alternative approach, consistent with the initial view of
the judicial appointment process as more politically-charged and thus as requiring more attention to the
jurisprudential tasks involved in maneuvering through that process, might also represent interpretations
of legal texts or other judicial formulations as similarly harder-won, as always contestable but (like the
language needed to be spoken for confirmation) as themselves media for "real" work, whether adjudicative or academic, thereby assuming a more concrete focus and putting to the side the paradox of selfcritical abstraction.
66. It is not necessary to argue, therefore, that because arbiters are selected by the parties themselves arbiters are tainted in ways that judges are not. Compare Getman, supra note 34, at 927-31 (party
selection of collective bargaining agreement arbiters increases sensitivity to interests of parties and thus
furthers use of arbitration to fill out details of bargaining agreements) with Kahn, supra note 65, at 85
(political processes for appointing judges increase the likelihood that views of judges will be congruent
with those of the community at large).
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eral orientation, to regard this stance as indeed prerogative. 67 In the case of
arbiters we may allow that some similar disposition is certainly possible,
plasticity promises this much, but we do not similarly presume it.6" Against
this backdrop, the appropriateness of arbitration depends upon the assumptions that interpreters make about the subject of the inquiry a statute triggers. If legislation is understood as evaluating particular situations in light
of the context within which parties ordinarily deal, litigation and arbitration
appear to be close substitutes. Any predisposition to see the overall more
likely possessed by judges than arbiters is irrelevant. 69 There is thus no
reason to refuse enforcement of an arbitration clause or deny the arbitration
judgment preclusive effect.70 If legislation, however, is understood to high67. There is a risk, of course, of over-stating and thus misstating the official dimensions of adjudication. A traditional argument has it that judges meet their duties best if they resist the idea of seeing
themselves as elaborators or contributors. On this view, the development of legal norms figures as a byproduct of judicial attention to dispute resolution, to resolution of the case at hand as presented from the
perspective of the immediate parties involved. Elaboration becomes a cumulative or aggregate phenomenon; its warrant of reliability is the justness of each contributing decision, precisely as a response to a
particular dispute. Adjudication from this perspective looks more like arbitration as collective bargaining theorists see it-preoccupied with the nuances of context, fact/equity sensitive, exploratory of norms
implicit in the particular setting. It is necessary, thus, to acknowledge adjudicative duality-the possibility that sometimes the corollary of office, the public calling to jurisprudence, is especially salient, and
that sometimes it is not, that sometimes also the demands of the individual setting prevail. See Jerome
K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 424, 433 (1986). As we will see shortly, the approach to arbitration of statutory claims that
I am in the course of developing readily accommodates adjudicative duality.
68. Perhaps arbitration, as theorists of collective bargaining suggest, is best understood as a means
of elaborating a single body of law; in the labor context, for example, formally the bargaining agreement
and substantively the "law of the shop"-hence the sometime hostility, from the labor arbitration perspective at least, to "bringing in" statutory norms in the course of grievance proceedings. See, e.g.,
Feller, supra note 42; Lewis B. Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators: Observationson the Scope of Judicial
Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 289 (1980); Bernard D. Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Discrimination: The Parties' Process and the Public's Purposes,43 U. CHI. L. REV. 724, 731, 734 (1976). It is
not necessary, of course, to frame a strong theory of the "law of the shop" in order to justify arbitration
as a means of enforcing collective bargaining agreements; alternate approaches, however, tend to call
attention to virtues suggesting similarities between arbitration and adjudication. See, e.g., Getman,
supra note 34, at 918-22. But even if we reject this view as a characterization of arbitration generally
and even if we see arbitration (at the other extreme) as simply a means for parties to obtain the benefits
of adjudication at the time and place of their own choosing, with process customized to fit their needs,
there remains a sense (perhaps inescapable given its consensual origin) that arbitration separates out the
individual case or cases. A sense of arbitration as somehow preoccupied with particular settings is
common even in writing outside the collective bargaining sphere, both academic, see, e.g., Fiss, supra
note 59, at 30-31, and judicial, see, e.g., Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 828 F.2d 826, 829 (D.C. Cir.
1987) ("arbitration will be governed by procedures specifically tailored to the context from which the
agreement to arbitrate arises, and will be conducted by arbitrators who are expert in the norms and
practices of the relevant industry"). At the least, there is no special emphasis on connections.
69. See also supra note 67.
70. A similar analysis informs United Paperworkers Int'l v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 42-45
(1987), a collective bargaining case. There, the Supreme Court held that a federal district court could
not invoke an asserted public policy against drug use on the job as justification for overturning an
arbiter's decision reinstating the employee. The policy was not "properly framed," id. at 43, insofar as
the district court made no effort to associate its concerns with particular statutory or common law commitments, instead seemingly relying only on "general considerations of supposed public interests," id.
at 44 (quoting W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983) (quoting
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light features of a situation independent of, or obscured by, the usual terms
parties treat as structuring their interaction, adjudication becomes the preferred choice. It is the better medium for conducting a suitably distanced
investigation. It is not just that litigation may illuminate features of a situation that an arbitration might miss or mislabel as nonproblematic. 7 1 Legislation, in these cases at least, precisely evokes, and may be understood to
bring to bear, the perspective that we hold to be distinctly adjudicative.72
The right question for purposes of assessing the appropriateness of arbitration, I would argue, is thus not whether statutory rights can be described as in some sense independent, or as assuring minimum guarantees.
Every statute recognizing a private cause of action, whether explicitly or
implicitly, might be so characterized. Rather, the relevant issue concerns
the nature of the grievance that statutory remedies permit an individual to
raise. Some statutes ultimately work to reinforce norms originating within
the institutions or practices they address. It is a defense to a statutory action
to show that challenged conduct is in fact ordinary practice, a constituent
part of the routines that in toto define the enterprise. The statute at bottom
is simply a guarantee of conventional practice; it provides a remedy for
inconsistent or aberrant behavior.73 Other statutes do not privilege conventional practice in this way but rather fix the legality of suspect conduct
entirely through reference to criteria the statute itself describes-criteria
which may not be at all natural within the frame of reference of affected
Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)). Moreover, the trial court's conclusions turned at
least as much on specific factual inferences, thus falling within purview of the arbiter and not the court.
See Misco, 484 U.S. at 44-45.
71. A version of this concern is plainly evident in the New York Court of Appeals decision Corcoran v. Ardra Ins. Co., 566 N.Y. Supp. 2d 575 (1990), holding that while it was "the policy in New York
to encourage resolution of disputes through arbitration" the state superintendent of insurance, acting as
liquidator, could not be obliged to honor a prior agreement of the insolvent insurer to arbitrate particular
disputes:
Arbitrators are private individuals, selected by the contracting parties to resolve matters important only to them. They have no public responsibility and they should not be in a position
to decide matters affecting insureds and third-party claimants after the contracting party has
failed to do so. Resolution of such disputes is a matter solely for the Superintendent, subject
to judicial oversight, acting in the public interest.
Id. at 579. The point of this passage is not bias per se (although there is a faint implication) but point of
view-the need to assure a properly general perspective.
72. It is in these cases that Owen Fiss's formulation seems most on point: "Civil litigation is an
institutional arrangement for using state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals."
Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1089 (1984).
73. The notion of "conventional practice" means to encompass a wide range of ways of characterizing institutions or practices, including (for example) conceptions of practices as "immanent reality," as
simply irreducibly correct ways of acting (possessing the force of fact) for individuals engaged in the
practice, see, e.g., Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudenceof the Uniform Commercial Code,
27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 624-25 (1975); or (more familiarly) as arrangements of reasonable means to ends
built up from a sense of an organization's primary objectives, see, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342 (1987); Turner v. Sefley, 482 U.S. 98 (1987). The pertinent theory of the constituent parts
of organizations and practices may vary from statute to statute; it is enough for present purposes to see
the family resemblance that the "inside" metaphor emphasizes.
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individuals or institutions. This is not to say that such statutory criteria are
in some sense mechanical; the distinction is not, necessarily, that of rules
and standards, or categories and balances. Rather, the question is one of
origins: Are statutory criteria the same criteria as those ordinarily used by
individuals or institutions? Or rather, does a statutory action require a
plaintiff to develop some sort of systematic critique, a view from outside as
it were, bringing to bear not the institution's own norms, but those legislatively and judicially defined as society's at large?74

To be sure, the distinction between types of statutes that I draw here is
no more air-tight than any other. Readers of statutes may disagree strongly
about their orientation. But the relative ease with which we can conceive of
this disagreement highlights the fundamental usefulness of the distinction I
draw-especially vis-A-vis the Supreme Court's present approaches. It
links the question of arbitration to issues central within any regime of statutory interpretation, issues no regime can avoid confronting, and therefore
issues likely to present themselves within as rich a field of resources as
possible for working through to conclusion."
74. Cf. Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARM. L. REV. 1337, 1355-56
(1972) (arguing that state statutes regulating in terms similar to those descriptive of collective bargaining
institutions should be seen as preempted but that state statutes framed more generally ought to be applicable in labor contexts also). It would be a mistake, certainly, to think that statutory structures are
unequivocal in their implications. Reading involves a range of choices. Among these is a characterization of (what we may think of as) the perspective or orientation particular statutes afford, the locationinside or outside-from which statutory language or interpretive glosses view the institutions or practices that the statute addresses.
75. The key, I think, lies in treating the arbitration issue as at bottom a question about statutes.
Approaches that find their fundamentals elsewhere tend to either stop short or conclude too broadly once
analysis turns to particular statutory contexts. Thus, Edward Morgan emphasizes Kantian notions of
individual autonomy and corrective justice as the basis for an inquiry into whether rights at issue "are
conceivable as intrinsic to interacting personalties" or rather "instrumentally ... further some policy
extrinsic to the contractual relationship at issue." Edward Morgan, Contract Theory and the Sources of
Rights: An Approach to the Arbitrability Question, 60 So. CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1076, 1074 (1987);
accord Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 491-92 (1981). Morgan concedes, however, that "a single legal
claim might encompass a distributive task together with a corrective purpose." Id. at 1080; see id. 107681. As a result, he concludes by endorsing procedural solutions (like the "permeation" doctrine) which
sidestep rather than confront the "complex splicing of characteristics," id. at 1080; see id. 1080-81,
albeit in ways that within procedural terms themselves appear to be ad hoc. See Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc. v. Byrd, 105 S. Ct. 1238 (1985); Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization ofArbitrationLaw, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1340, 1351 (1985) ("intertwining" doctrine). Professor
Sterk also acknowledged the problem of overlap, see Sterk, supra, at 519 n.137, 541, 543; his solution
looked to false conflicts, cases in which resolution of disputes between the parties also addressed the
interests of third parties, thus permitting arbitration; in cases of actual conflict, however, where (in his
terms) "third party" concerns remained distinct, Sterk's analysis left no alternative but to reject arbitration-for example, in antitrust and securities cases, see id. 506, 519.
Interestingly, a similar difficulty is implicit in an otherwise rather different suggestion made by
Owen Fiss:
Of course, some disputes may not threaten or otherwise implicate a public value. All the
disputants may, for example, acknowledge the norms and confine their dispute to the interpretation of the words of the contract or the price of a bumper. Such disputes may wind their way
into court, and judges may spend time on these purely private disputes-private because only
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The preceding sketch, I think, supplies terms that make possible a discussion of the ADEA and Title VII that persuasively differentiates the two
statutes for purposes of suggesting that ADEA arbitration is proper and Title VII arbitration is not. I begin by formulating accounts of the principal
ADEA causes of action. Title VII causes of action are, at first glance, open
to alternative characterizations either consistent or inconsistent with these
ADEA accounts. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, for all relevant purposes,
addresses Title VII but not the ADEA. I consider therefore whether or not
any provisions in the 1991 Act help resolve interpretation of the Title VII
suits. For my purposes, it turns out, the pertinent change is an adjustment
of the mixed-motive cause of action providing for equitable relief in cases
in which compensatory relief would not lie. The importance of this provision does not derive from the significance it assumed in legislative debate-within the congressional setting, it was relevant only at the margin.
Rather, its importance becomes visible only when viewed constitutionally.
Statutory authorization of injunctive relief in circumstances in which an individual can show no personal loss triggering compensatory remedies
seems to raise Article III case or controversy questions given recent
the interests and behavior of the immediate parties to the dispute are at issue. That seems,
however, an extravagant use of public resources, and thus it seems quite appropriate for those
disputes to be handled not by courts, but by arbitrators....
Fiss, supra note 59, at 30. The point is not simply the artificiality of the distinction drawn between the
"purely private" and the "public." See also Ernest J. Weinreb, Adjudication and Public Values: Fiss's
Critique of Corrective Justice, 39 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 8-11 (1989) (Fiss fails to see the "public aspect of
corrective justice"). Plainly, all disputes showing up in court have public implications in the sense that
they involve reference at some level to norms framed as though they were generally applicable (e.g.,
promises should be kept) and claimed to possess some sort of public origin (if only custom). See Kahn,
supra note 65, at 75 ("The courtroom transforms the private into the public"). This is especially the case
with respect to all disputes where parties treat statutes as pertinent. More importantly for present purposes, Fiss also separates disputes in which norms are not in question and those in which norms are in
controversy, a separation of a piece with his larger effort to categorize lawsuits on the basis of whether
they accept or challenge organizational structures. Fiss, supra note 59, at 17-31. This bright line is also
obviously controversial: organizations, it may be, are constituted by repetition, and thus all departures
from norms also count as (proposed) revisions of norms-organizational shape (and thus norms) are on
this view always in question. See generally A. GIDDENS, THE CoNsTrrroN OF SocIErY (1984). The
relevant question is whether enforcement of a particular norm is justified as a repetition, as a reinforcement of the prevailing organizational shape; or rather, whether enforcement is justified for reasons other
than repetition, grounds independent of the existing organizational pattern. If notions like "public" and
"private" are useful-my use of "inside" and "outside" here is in part an effort to sidestep this question-it is not because they define separate categories, but rather function as tendencies open to emphasis or de-emphasis in the process of fixing the approach taken by given legal materials in dealing with
given institutions. At bottom, the deficiency in Fiss's categories lies in their tendency to treat questions
of construction as already (or elsewhere) resolved, and therefore (in this respect like Morgan's approach) to provide little help in the construction process itself. (It is important to remember, of course,
that it was precisely within the context of a contest of emphases that Fiss wrote, criticizing a (stillpresent) tendency in the Supreme Court to minimize the public dimension.)

230

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

[Vol. 16:209

Supreme Court decisions. Case or controversy doctrines, however, are multiple, and coexist complicatedly. The 1991 Act at first glance seems to
present a standing question; but it also might be understood as a legislative
variant on familiar judicial responses to suggestions of mootness. This second view suggests a reading of the Act grounded in Article III and therefore
constitutional. It also illuminates an important dimension of the mixedmotive action itself. The same mootness analysis provided a starting point
for early judicial opinions defining the Title VII cause of action. This starting point, finally, returns us to the distinctions that I have just drawn. It
becomes apparent that the mixed-motive action fixes an external perspective in the Title VII setting even while retaining an internal orientation in
the ADEA context. Arbitrability analysis adjusts accordingly.
A. Age DiscriminationCauses of Action: A First Model for Title VII
Private causes of action under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act readily sort into three familiar categories.7 6 The discriminatory treatment action organizes claims of age discrimination in cases in which there
is no direct evidence of bias. Rather, the adversely affected employee or
job applicant alleges facts concerning her or his age, her or his apparent job
qualifications, and adverse employer conduct-taken together, these allegations suggest, as matter of circumstantial evidence, a prima facie case of
discrimination. The employer typically responds by asserting a reason unrelated to the plaintiff's age that would explain the challenged action. It
then becomes the burden of the plaintiff to show that this reason is a pretext
or sham not fitting the case-in this way, the plaintiff revives the inference
of age bias as the employer's underlying motive.7 7 The mixed-motive suit
addresses cases in which there is direct evidence of age bias on the part of
at least some employer representatives who have acted contrary to plaintiff's interests. Given direct proof, the employer assumes the obligation to
establish that the adverse action would have occurred in any event, for reasons unrelated to age bias. Finally, a willful discrimination action, entitling
a plaintiff to liquidated damages up to double damages, supposes not only
proof by a plaintiff of an injurious act motivated by age bias, but also proof
76. See ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION §§ 102.40-102.42,
103.52 (1994). Categorization of causes of action is useful for analytic purposes. It must be
remembered, however, that in practice particular suits may display aspects of two or even all three of the
actions, and that the nature of a suit may not become clear until its conclusion. Thus, a lawsuit understood by the parties to be an action of one type may ultimately be seen by judges as a version of another,
and evaluated within the latter framework. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742
(1993), discussed at note 206, infra.
77. The inquiry is framed as a choice between two motivations-a discriminatory animus or the
asserted business reason. See, e.g., Alphin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 940 F.2d 1497, 1502 (1Ilth Cir.
1991). If the asserted business reason loses credibility, the plausibility of the discriminatory explanation
correspondingly increases.
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by a plaintiff of, at minimum, reckless disregard by the employer of legal
prohibitions against age discrimination.7 8
The case law depicts the discriminatory treatment suit as, at bottom,
testing the good faith of employer explanations.7 9 More often than not, the
key to decision is the question of pretext. In framing standards for guiding
inquiry in the various individual cases, courts repeatedly emphasize that the
goal is not to determine whether the reasons that the employer has advanced
are persuasive from the perspective of an independent observer."' Courts
do not, it is often said, sit for the purpose of second-guessing business decisions." Rather, judges organize an effort to reconstruct the employer's
point of view, attempt to determine whether the offered reason for action is
the sort of reason that, in the circumstances at issue, the employer might
have treated as in fact a reason for action. 2 Plaintiffs find themselves at a
considerable disadvantage, thus, if employers show that proffered reasons
emerged as a result of routine company procedures, whether in the form of
78. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(b) (West 1985) (cross-reference limiting liquidated damages to double
damages); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 (1985). See also text infra at notes
90-94.
79. See Timm v. Mead Corp., 32 F.3d 273, 275 (7th Cir. 1994); Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (1 1th Cir. 1991). Ordinarily, it is enough that the employee show that the reason
asserted by the employer to explain adverse action is implausible, and therefore "pretextual"; it is not
usually necessary that the employee also show directly that age was the determining factor in the employer's decision. See, e.g., Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 783 (3rd Cir. 1994); Valenteck
Kisco, Inc. v. Williams, 964 F.2d 723 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.LW. 3401 (1992). See also
note 206 infra (discussing Hicks).
80. See, e.g., Gustovich v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 972 F.2d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 1992); Fallis
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743, 747 (10th Cir. 1991).
81. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct.
1267 (1992); Hawkins v. Ceco Corp., 883 F.2d 977, 980 n.2 (11 th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 935
(1990).
82.
No matter how medieval a firm's practices, no matter how high-handed its decisional
process, no matter how mistaken the firm's managers, the ADEA does not interfere ....
Rather, our inquiry is limited to whether the employer gave an honest explanation of its
behavior.
Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1365 (7th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marks
omitted). See Billet v. Cigna Corp., 940 F.2d 812, 825 (3rd Cir. 1991) ("what matters is the perception
of the decision maker"); Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470. This is not (or at least not necessarily) a simple
exercise in apologetics. The employer's proffered reasons are not taken at face value; rather, the court
tests those reasons against what it otherwise knows about the employer's ways of doing business, see,
e.g., Stein v. National City Bank, 942 F.2d 1062, 1066 (6th Cir. 1991); it may turn out, therefore, that
the employer's attempt to explain challenged acts is false relative to what seems to be the firm's actual
practice. What is taken as given, however, is this actual practice. There is no inquiry as to whether the
firm was in some sense obliged to adopt its chosen modes of organization. See Alphin, 940 F.2d at 1501
("Sears' business judgment-its decision to restructure its management program-does not concern
us"). In many cases, the "given" of existing practice is so taken for granted that the court finds explicit
discussion unnecessary, simply treating existing practice as the background against which the narrative
of the particular case unfolds. See, e.g., Bay v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 936 F.2d 112, 117 (2d
Cir. 1991) (employee's "different concept" of job in question "fully justified" employer's refusal to
promote); Billet, 940 F.2d at 818-22; Wheeler v. McKinley Enters., 937 F.2d 1158, 1160 (6th Cir.
1991); Fallis, 944 F.2d at 745-46.
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periodic reviews or as a result of complaints following apparent violations
of company rules of conduct expressly communicated by the employer in
advance of the particular acts in question.83 Precedent by itself may create
problems for the plaintiff, if it is clear that the reasons the employer asserts
in the case at hand plainly motivated employer conduct in other circumstances in which there was no suggestion of age bias. 4 Conversely, plaintiffs are most likely to prevail if the reasons that employers offer in
litigation appear not to advance any business objective pertinent to the activities falling within a litigating employee's job description, 5 or if the
proffered reasons appear to be ad hoc, evident improvisation, without prece86
dent within a defendant firm.
The mixed-motive suit refines and intensifies scrutiny of employer
practices. Even so, within the setting of this action as well, the jurisprudential beginning and end remains the description of those practices, as they
actually figure within the particular enterprise, rather than a reconceptualization and thus ultimately a judicially directed reconstruction of the organization. Direct evidence typically consists of statements clearly suggestive
of age bias by individuals who were in some way part of the process
through which an employer discharged or otherwise adversely treated an
employee. Courts treat this evidence as raising a question as to whether the
nondiscriminatory reasons an employer invokes are, in truth, operationally
relevant within the business-whether in fact such reasons shape business
decisions.8 7 Defendants are able to meet their burden in mixed-motive
cases, for example, by showing that individuals manifesting bias are not, by
83. See, e.g., Timm, 32 F.3d at 274-75; Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 933 F.2d 187, 189,
192 (2d Cir. 1991); Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 233, 235 (4th Cir. 1991);
Danielson v. City of Lorain, 938 F.2d 681,684-85 (6th Cir. 1991). This is not to say that company rules
must necessarily be reduced to writing. See Stein, 942 F.2d at 1065 (enough that "policy was reliably
communicated by the employer to its employees and that it was consistently enforced").
84. See, e.g., Fallis, 944 F.2d at 745.
85. See Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co., 941 F.2d 1416, 1421-22 (10th Cir. 1991).
86. See, e.g., Williams v. Valentec Kisco, Inc., 964 F.2d 723, 726-27 (8th Cir. 1992) (supervisor
acted "arbitrarily" in dismissing older employee for conduct not prohibited in company manuals and
usually permitted); Acrey v. American Sheep Industry Ass'n, 981 F.2d 1569, 1574 (10th Cir. 1992)
("management prematurely concluded plaintiff was not capable of functioning within the merged ASI
organization"); Christie v. Foremost Ins. Co., 785 F.2d 584, 586-87 (7th Cir. 1986) (reduction in force
policy not known by manager making termination decision). See also Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank of
Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir. 1991) (pretext might be shown if evidence that job requirement
"was disingenuous or inconsistently applied," or that decisionmaker "could and should have investigated
... application objectively or more thoroughly," or that testimony of fellow employees as to applicant's
qualities "was inconsistent") (dictum), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2995 (1992). Evidence of other acts of
age discrimination figures in the discriminatory treatment suit as another means of undermining the
"reality" of the reason defendant offers to explain its action in the particular case-there is a suggestion
of an alternative pattern, illegal motivations, competing with defendant's account. See, e.g., Phillip v.
ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 945 F.2d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 81 (1992).
87. See, e.g., Kirschner v. Comptroller of N.Y., 973 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1992); Ostrowski v.
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Companies, 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992)
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themselves, in a position to act decisively.8 8 Bias, we are made to see, is
epiphenomenal. Plainly, such proof is not easy. If a prejudiced individual
possesses discretion to decide whether or not to initiate a discharge process,
for example, even if reviewers dutifully apply settled, nondiscriminatory
company norms, a showing of possible selective prosecution by the biased
initiator may be enough to justify liability.8 9 The employer is more likely
to prevail if supervising individuals proceed collegially rather than in sequence, or if sorting of employees involves an initial and essentially automatic reference to some prior record or other measure of employee
performance which is treated as objective within the firm.
The willfulness suit takes the mixed-motive action one step further.
The plaintiff must now demonstrate not simply a gap in the defendant's
organizational structure, a space within which an individual's bias is free to
motivate adverse action. In addition, it must appear that this opening is in
some sense deliberate, or at least a result of reckless indifference to statutory concerns. Sometimes age discrimination is express company policy
and willfulness is therefore apparent.9" In other cases, however, age appears
to figure in employer decision-making "on an ad hoc, informal basis rather
than through a formal policy."9 The formal test of willfulness is the same
in both cases.92 Inevitably, however, in the latter cases, judicial scrutiny of
employer decision-making structures is more searching, and at least sometimes, judicial expectations regarding plaintiff's proof are higher. Successful willfulness suits, for example, have turned on showings that the
individuals immediately responsible for the challenged acts are also the ultimate superiors and are themselves motivated by age bias;93 or proofs that
the possibility of age-biased conduct of subordinates was known to individuals with power to close off the opportunity for discriminatory decisionmaking, but who nonetheless did nothing.9 4
Against the backdrop of this account, arbitration appears to be an altogether appropriate means of resolving ADEA claims. Each of the three
88. See, e.g., Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 779 (3rd Cir. 1994).
89. See Glover v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 981 F.2d 388, 392 (8th Cir. 1992) (reviewers lacked
personal knowledge of plaintiff), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1647 (1994).
90. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 128 (1985).
91. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 1709 (1993).
92. See id. at 1710.
93. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Puerto Rico Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 718, 722 (lst Cir. 1994); Biggins v.
Hazen Paper Co., 953 F.2d 1405, 1410-12 (1st Cir. 1992), vacated on other grounds, 113 S.Ct. 1701
(1993); Ramirez v. Allright Parking El Paso, Inc., 970 F.2d 1372, 1374, 1378 (5th Cir. 1992); Brown v.
Stites Concrete, Inc., 994 F.2d 553, 557 (8th Cir. 1993) (en banc); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.,
836 F.2d 1544, 1548 (10th Cir. 1988).
94. It is not enough, for example, if supervisors review discharge papers prepared by an individual
who has triggered complaints about age bias, and satisfy themselves that the reasons stated in those
papers conform on their face with company policy. If the supervisors do not explore the possibility of a
motivating age bias, if they acquiesce without questioning the suspect initiator, double damages liability
may follow for the employer. See Tennes v. Massachusetts Dept. of Revenue, 944 F.2d 372, 380-81
(7th Cir. 1991).

234

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

[Vol. 16:209

actions takes an employer's practices as the field of investigation, comparing the case at hand with usual behavior, and frames its particular decisive
benchmarks in terms of possible results of the comparison. Each of the
three actions, thus, orients itself, and in the process finds its working normative resources, within the institution whose acts are subject to challenge.
Do the same conclusions follow with respect to arbitration of Title VII
claims? The ADEA actions, it is often said, are mimics of Title VII suits. 95
The United States Supreme Court first worked out the mechanics of both
the discriminatory treatment and mixed-motive causes in Title VII cases. 96
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 adds to Title VII a willfulness action similar
to the ADEA cause. 97

B.

Implications of the DisparateImpact and HarassmentSuits

There is, however, at least one Title VII suit that may differ in kind:
The well-known disparate impact action, associated with the Supreme
Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,98 does not tie analysis to
description of employer practices as they appear from within the firm, but
rather attempts to judge such practices from an independent perspective.
The initial burden on plaintiff to show adverse impact focuses on effect, on
whether employer conduct, however rationalized, has the consequence of
disproportionately disadvantaging employees grouped by race, gender, religion, or national origin. A plaintiff who succeeds in making this showing
puts the onus on the employer to prove business necessity, to establish not
simply that the challenged practice was one way of accomplishing business
goals, but, given appropriate showings by plaintiff, that there were no other
available alternatives. 99 Both halves of this suit, thus, plainly distance litigation, by defining languages of investigation that substitute for, rather than
use, modes of description in use inside the firm." ° As a result, within the
terms of the analysis of this essay, arbitration is not a satisfactory substitute
for adjudication for purposes of evaluating disparate impact claims: the
Gardner-Denveracknowledgement of freedom to litigate follows. There is
some question as to whether the ADEA recognizes disparate impact
claims; t ' in any event such actions are extremely rare within the universe
95. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc., 469 U.S. at 121. But see Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,
584 (1978).
96. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (discriminatory
treatment suit); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (mixed-motive suit).
97. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1072-74 (1991).
98. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
99. See LARSON & LARSON, supra note 76, at chs. 14-15.
100. This "distancing" effect is easiest to see in testing cases. See, e.g., Guardians Assoc. of N.Y.
City v. Civil Serv., 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980). See also Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
499 U.S. 187, 200-04 (1991) (similar characterization of BFOQ defense).
101. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, t13 S. Ct. 1701, 1706 (U.S. April 20, 1993) (noting that
question is unresolved); id. at 1710 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing authority for proposition that impact suits are not proper under ADEA).
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of age discrimination suits. Thus, setting ADEA and Title VII impact litigation apart would limit only slightly the reach of the Gilmer decision with
respect to ADEA litigation in both collective bargaining and non-collective
bargaining cases. But in truth, although important, disparate impact cases
are not especially frequent in the Title VII setting either. An assimilation of
ADEA and Title VII disparate treatment, mixed-motive, and willfulness actions, inside and outside collective bargaining, would leave Gardner-Denver with a severely restricted domain.
Perhaps we should reconsider the conclusion that the disparate treatment, mixed-motive, and willfulness actions simply take as given ordinary
practices within a firm. There is a sense in which this proposition is obviously false. The Title VII sexual harassment suit, for example, is a version
of a mixed-motive action. Plaintiff alleges she (or he) was subject to different treatment as an employee because of gender through the medium of
sexually charged communications, gestures, or contacts by other individuals
within the firm, for example." 2 The employer attempts to show that such
behavior in and of itself had no work related consequences, sometimes because the incidents in question were not accurately depicted in plaintiff's
account, and sometimes because effective remedies were available within
the firm that plaintiff successfully utilized or chose not to pursue. 103 Underlying this action, clearly enough, is an assumption that there exists a normal
work environment, prior to and independent of sexual politics, which plaintiffs may rightly demand.'" This normalcy is also pretty obviously a fictional construct: a workplace free of all sexual interaction whatsoever,
while not impossible, would seem to be not at all easy to maintain. But
equally obviously, we may readily conclude that the image of such a chaste
environment, as the defining element of the Title VII action, serves a useful
purpose. It marks sexual encounters on the job as legally at risk, at least if
there is any coercive edge, and thus parries that edge, by putting the target
of sexual gestures in a position to endanger and thus regulate the encounter. 10 5 The existence of the action, in short, changes the sexual dynamic of
the workplace-more modestly, it is best understood as an attempt at such
change. Certainly, the emphasis in sexual harassment cases on the existence, or non-existence, of in-house remedies is of a piece with this reform
interpretation: provision of such remedies affords employers a way to escape liability that may work to reduce the number of unwelcome encounters, but will in any event certainly label aggressive sex motivated
102. See ABIGAIL C. MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 1:05 (1993).
103. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 968 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 1992) (first offense generates "its most serious form of reprimand" by employer; subsequent harassment not reported to employer); Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970 F.2d 178, 184-85 (6th Cir. 1992) ("adequate and effective"
response).
104. See Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Powerand the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings,65 So. CALIF. L. REV. 1283, 1291-99 (1992).
105. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REv. 813, 860 (1991).
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conduct as out of bounds, as potentially risky business on the job. Arguably, not only the otherwise beset employee but also the employer benefits.
The end result, presumably, is greater attention to the task at hand.
But something like the same points might be made about the full range
of discriminatory treatment, mixed-motive, and willfulness actions. In all
cases, the image of the normal work environment is artificial. No one believes that work rules can, or should, entirely displace individual discretion;
the possibility of biased acts is part and parcel of what is ordinarily the case.
The effective aim of all employment discrimination actions, thus, cannot be
to return firms to some previous perfect state. Rather, the point must be the
affirmative management of tendencies-the threat of litigation adds an incentive for employers to monitor discretion and to increase the coverage of
workrules; it (re)categorizes bias and biased acts as not customary and indeed as potentially dangerous for perpetrators; it legitimates and reinforces
the resolve of employees who are likely subjects of biased conduct. In
short, Title VH and ADEA suits result in revisions in the organization of
firms within the terms of employer and employee experience. The gap between the disparate impact suit and other employment discrimination actions therefore seems to narrow. Is it now Gilmer whose domain shrinks (to
nothing)? But statutory actions whose impact on prior patterns is itself figured or acknowledged in statutory language or judicial glosses remain importantly distinct within the superset of all statutory actions likely to
provoke adaptive responses. Only these former actions make their effect
itself, in some way or another, a topic or theme explicitly part of the process
of statutory elaboration, and thus subject to express control within that process. 1° 6 Only these actions, therefore, publicize their own enforcement, and
take into account and thus attempt to regulate at least some consequences of
their enforcement in the course of framing statutory norms, and thus
squarely implicate, as a matter of process, politically significant differences
dividing adjudicative and arbitral institutions. Accordingly, if disparate
treatment, mixed-motive, and willfulness claims are not appropriate candi106. For example, the remarks President Bush offered in connection with his signing of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 catch the methodological point precisely in discussing the disparate impact suitwhatever the substantive merits of the statutory analysis:
It is regrettable that enactment of these worthwhile measures has been substantially delayed by
controversies over other proposals. S. 1745 resolves the most significant of these controversies, involving the law of "disparate impact," with provisions designed to avoid creating incentives for employers to adopt quotas or unfair preferences. It is extremely important that the
statute be properly interpreted-by executive branch officials, by the courts, and by America's
employers-so that no incentives to engage in such illegal conduct are created. [ 1 ... Opinions by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Byron White have explained the safeguards
against quotas and preferential treatment that have been included in the jurisprudence of disparate impact. S. 1745 codifies this theory of discrimination.... [But its] change in the burden
of proof means it is especially important to ensure that all the legislation's other safeguards
against unfair application of disparate impact law are carefully observed.
Statement of President George Bush upon signing S. 1745, 27 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 1701
(Nov. 25, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 768-69 (Volume 2, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.).
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dates for arbitral enforcement, it can only be because of some feature of
these actions we have not yet identified that provides a structure for reflection, a way of modeling and therefore managing statutory impact.
C. The Relevance of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
In this regard, it is worthwhile to consider the Civil Rights Act of
1991.107 Except for one provision of little present relevance, the Act does
not address ADEA matters.'10 If the 1991 Act alters our perception of Title
VII civil remedies, therefore, a basis might be at hand for treating differently arbitration of Title VII and ADEA claims. At first glance, of course,
this latest civil rights act is hard to see as transformative. In form, the statute is a series of detailed elaborations of provisions originating in prior
legislation; in substance, as both statutory language and legislative history
make clear, the 1991 Act repeatedly addresses recent Supreme Court decisions, and its various adjustments purportedly restore prior law.' 0 9 Nonetheless, codification alone may, for present purposes, itself work a
significant change in law. Judicial language initially framed to restate statutory obligations in terms capturing more precisely the circumstances of
cases arising under Title VII, and thus ambiguously mixing judicial reactions to both statutory ideas and the dynamics of individual settings, becomes after codification a further projection of statutory norms, a more
detailed legislative modeling of conditions requiring legal revision. Potentially at least, a further publicization of the statutory jurisprudence follows.
Ironically, the provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 that is most
straightforwardly on point raises no questions at all about the significance
of codification. Section 118 declares: "Where appropriate and to the extent
authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, mediation,
factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes
arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended by this title."" The language here is obviously hortatory, as demonstrated by the
choice of words like "encouraged" and "to the extent authorized by law."
Legislative history is consistent."'
107. Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.A.).
108. See id. at § 115 (amending ADEA to provide for suit by aggrieved individual within 90 days
of receipt of notice that EEOC has terminated proceedings).
109. The Act is usually depicted as so much the product of compromise as to be altogether ambiguous in its implications. E.g. Robert Belton, The Unfinished Agenda of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45
RuTGERS L. REv. 921, 924-25 (1993).
110. Pub. L. 102-166, supra note 107.
111. The conference committee report on the 1990 version of the bill that would become the 1991
Act observed the following concerning a provision identical in all pertinent respects to section 118:
The Conferees emphasize .. .that the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is
intended to supplement not supplant, the remedies provided by Title VH. Thus, for example,
the Conferees believe that any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in
the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an employment contract, does not pre-
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Other parts of the Act, however, purport to be more decisive. Section
105 recedes from the Wards Cove description t2 of the order of proof in
disparate impact suits. Notwithstanding ambiguities that leave unclear the
precise degree to which the legislation reinstates the original format of the
impact suit, it is evident that the Act codifies the external perspective of the
action, its ultimate focus on "business necessity" as a defense framed in
terms other than a simple reference to a defendant's own standard practice." 3 Thus, after passage of the 1991 Act, as was the case within the
traditional Title VII jurisprudence, the disparate impact action appears as a
poor candidate for arbitral processing.
Section 102 adds to Title VII in certain cases an authorization of compensatory and punitive damages, although limited in some respects, in the
event that plaintiffs prove intentional discrimination; the same section confers a right to a jury trial in suits seeking compensatory or punitive damages. A jury trial right per se does not render a suit inappropriate for
Nor, obviously enough, does an allowance of comarbitral disposition.'
pensation for injury, even noneconomic injury. Neither of necessity reveals
a focus on the public dimensions of these suits. Punitive damage awards,
by contrast, are quintessential means of signaling strong public commitments." 15 Particular statutory schemes may define the amount of awards in
clude the affected person from seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of Title VII.
This view is consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver ....The Conferees do not intend this Section to be used to preclude rights
and remedies that would otherwise be available.
S. CoNF. REP. No. 2104, 101st Cong, 2nd sess., reprinted in CONG. REc. H8048, H8050 (daily ed. Sept.
26, 1990). In the 1991 debate in the House of Representatives, Representative Hyde invoked Gilmer as
establishing that "there is no reason to disfavor the use of such [arbitral] forums," and stated that the
statutory provision "encourages the use of... binding arbitration" in cases in which "the parties knowingly and voluntarily elect" such decision-making. See 137 CONG. REC. H9548 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991);
see also 137 CoNG. REc. S15,478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dole) (identical remarks).
But in the same debate, Representative Edwards echoed the views of the conference report of the preceding year, adding that "[n]o approval whatsoever is intended of the Supreme Court's recent [Gilmer]
decision .. " 137 CONG. REc. H9530 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
112. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-61 (1989).
113. See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity Standard, 106 HARV. L. REV.
896, 910-13 (1993). The 1991 Act's identification of less discriminatory alternatives as one (perhaps
decisive) factor in judging liability given disparate impact is strong additional support (whatever the
precise content of the LDA inquiry) for the proposition that the perspective the Act makes relevant in
disparate impact cases is one which tests a firm's usual practices against an external standard. See
generally Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Less DiscriminatoryAlternatives in Disparate Impact
Litigation, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1621 (1993). If Professor Belton's reading of the 1991 Act as codifying
the BFOQ standard prevails, the external perspective would be especially apparent. See Belton, supra
note 109, at 930-39; Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
114. See Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994).
115. "It is a well-established principle of the common law, that ... a jury may inflict what are
called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his
offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff." Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 363, 371 (1852). Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991), holds that due
process requires that punitive damages awards be made within a legal framework designed to assure that
such awards are not "greater than reasonably necessary to punish and deter," id. at 1046; such "rational

19951

TITLE VII ARBITRATION

advance, through a formula that, for example, doubles or triples compensatory damages. Such schemes do not make the process of enforcement itself
a setting for gauging public concerns; the relevant judgments are already
made, encoded in the liability rules as such, and as easily implemented
therefore by an arbiter as by a judge and jury. But sections 102(b)(3)(A) (D) set a sequence of ceilings for combinations of noneconomic damages
and punitive damages, leaving full specification for case-by-case determination. A hard-to-answer question emerges: Is this space for individual calibrations of public concern large enough to mark arbitration as an inapposite
process in cases in which plaintiffs seek punitive damages for Title VII
violations?
6 The
Fortunately, it is not necessary to answer this question directly. 11
Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not limit its review and revision of Title VII
causes of action to confirmation of the structure of the impact suit and provision for the new punitive damages action; the Act also adjusts, and in the
process seemingly recharacterizes the mixed-motive suit, a close cousin of
the punitive damages action. We will ultimately see that it is this change, at
first glance minor, that makes all the difference for purposes of assessing
Title VH arbitration.
The Act revises the mixed-motive action in two ways. Section 107(a)
requires a plaintiff to show that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
decisionmaking," id. at 1044, absent legislative limits on punitive damages might of necessity dictate
scrutiny of the details of defendant's particular conduct-a "meaningful individualized assessment of
appropriate deterrence and retribution," id.-but the touchstone remains "civil wrongdoing" and not
simply the equities as between plaintiff and defendant, id.; see id. 1045. "A decision to punish a
tortfeasor by means of an exaction of exemplary damages is an exercise of state power .. " Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 2342 (1994) (Oregon rule drastically limiting appellate review of
jury punitive damages awards violates due process); see also TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993) (overlap of plurality and individual opinions indicating that
grossly excessive punitive damages would violate due process).
116. Lower federal courts presently treat arbitration of punitive damages claims as simply another
issue to be resolved by assessing the breadth of the arbitration agreement. See, e.g., Kerr-McGee Refining Corp. v. M/T Triumph, 924 F.2d 467, 470 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 81 (1991); Fahnestock
& Co., Inc. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 521 (2d Cir.) (Mahoney, J., dissenting in part) (collecting cases),
cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 380 (1991). Cases enforcing state law restrictions on punitive damages emphasize the consent of the parties to be governed by state law, see, e.g., Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 948 F.2d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 1991), or (if agreements are silent) the artifact of diversity jurisdiction
requirements obliging federal courts to set aside the Federal Arbitration Act, see Fahnestock, 935 F.2d at
518. In Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court rationalized this approach on the ground that punitive damages
questions are principally questions of remedy, and therefore properly seen as within individual control
(and thus contractual negotiation) even if public interests are also implicated. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S.
at 634-36. Read strongly, this argument would justify arbitration of all statutory claims, insofar as the
purpose of all private litigation is always remedial in some sense. But if the argument is not pushed to
this extreme, it may be understood as raising the question of the relationship of liability rules and
remedial rules. In Mitsubishi, the inquiries with respect to liability were appropriate for arbitration; the
only question was whether the remedy standing alone barred this conclusion. In other circumstances, if
liability investigations were ill-suited for arbitration, it might follow that the relative priority of public
and private dimensions with respect to remedy would shift. In yet other cases, if the status of liability
rules was unclear, it might be that the details of remedial process could decide the arbitral question.
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was "a motivating factor" for purposes of a challenged employer act, codifying Justice Brennan's formulation in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, and

thus apparently receding from Justice O'Connor's "direct evidence" requirement stated in the same case."' More significantly, section 107(b)
changes the effect of a showing by defendant that it "would have taken the
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor"; rather
than defeating liability in toto, as Hopkins posited,'" 8 this showing now
merely limits the relief available to plaintiffs. A court "may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief ... and attorney's fees and costs ... directly
attributable ... to the pursuit of ... [the] claim,"" 9 but "shall not award

damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring,
promotion, or payment . *,,2o

For purposes of determining whether the 1991 Act affects the arbitrability of mixed-motive suits, it is useful initially to explore in some detail
the nature of the residual declaratory/injunctive relief that section 107(b)
authorizes.' 2' Legislative history, while limited, indicates that the Act
means to adopt the approach followed chiefly by the Eighth and Ninth Circuits of the United States Court of Appeals prior to the Supreme Court
decision in Hopkins.t 22 Unfortunately for present purposes, the cited courts
of appeals opinions are not especially revealing-grounded most obviously
in an analysis of Title VII statutory language that, while plausible, was
117. Compare, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (Brennan, J.) (plurality
opinion), with e.g., id. at 278 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment). Justice O'Connor's version presumably posed a more difficult task for plaintiffs; some courts, however, have used the two formulations
interchangeably. See, e.g., Bums v. Gadsden State Community College, 908 F.2d 1512, 1518 (11 th Cir.
1990) ("plaintiff has presented direct evidence that her gender played a motivating part in the defendants' decision to refuse to hire her"). It is not clear that courts perceive the 1991 Act as rejecting the
direct evidence test. See Note, Despite the Smoke, There is No Gun: Direct Evidence Requirements in
Mixed-Motives Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 STAN. L. REV. 959, 970-78
(1994) (reviewing caselaw).
118. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 244 & n.10 (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor explicitly
concurring in the judgment). Justice White
agreed with Justice Brennan. See id. at 261 (O'Connor, J.,
implicitly concurred. See id. at 258-61 (White, J., concurring in the judgment). The Supreme Court's
conclusion in Hopkins paralleled the results reached in Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274, 287 (1977), dealing with the significance of mixed motives for constitutional claims, and NLRB v.
Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 401-02 (1983), addressing proof of unfair labor
practices.
119. § 107(b)(3)(i), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1994).
120. id. at § (3)(ii), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1994).
121. For present purposes, I treat declaratory and injunctive relief as interchangeable. See generally Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1971).
122. See Testimony of William T. Coleman, Jr., Before the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources, February 23, 1990, reprinted in CoNo. REc. S9352-54 & n.67 (July 10, 1990); id. at
S9348 (Sen. Simon introducing testimony into record and characterizing Coleman as "[tihe most powerful witness"). Literally, of course, this legislative history refers to the 1990 bill ultimately vetoed by
President Bush. Secretary Coleman's analysis, however, appears to be equally relevant in considering
the similar language of the 1991 Act. CompareCivil Rights Act of 1990, H. CONF. REP. No. 856, 101st
Cong, 2nd sess., § 5, reprinted in 136 CONG. REc. H9552 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1990) with Pub. L. No.
102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075-76 (Nov. 21, 1991).
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hardly mandatory, as Justice Brennan's discussion and the opinions of other
circuit courts showed. 123 We must proceed, therefore, somewhat speculatively. In a sense, it is as though the Act posits a separate action, permitting
a court to enjoin a defendant simply upon a showing by plaintiff that "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor" for a challenged employment practice. If the defendant "would have taken the same
action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor," what purpose
does such a court order serve? Perhaps the plaintiff becomes a private attor25
ney general. 124 Following the pattern of several other federal statutes,
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, it may be said, confers the right to seek injunctive relief not because plaintiff is injured in her or his individual capacity as a current, former, or would-be employee, but because the plaintiff, in
effect representing the public at large, proclaims an interest in law enforcement per se.
This reading has the virtue of explaining why section 107(a)'s capacious reference to "any employment practice" seems to treat as interchangeable plaintiffs in very different circumstances-those who were never
employed by defendant, those who are no longer employed, and those who
remain employed but frustrated in seeking advancement. 26 The idea of a
Title VII private attorney general, however, also poses difficulties. The
123. The most elaborate discussion favoring provision of the injunctive remedy occurred in Bibbs
v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1321-24 (8th Cir. 1985). Other cases seemingly treated the result as easily
reached. See, e.g., King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 738 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir. 1984); Ostroff v.
Employment Exchange, Inc., 683 F.2d 302, 304 (9th Cir. 1982) (result stipulated by parties); Nanty v.
Barrows Co., 660 F.2d 1327, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981). See also EEOC v. General Lines, Inc., 865 F.2d
1555, 1559-60 (10th Cir. 1989) (blurring approaches). Bibbs relies primarily on the statutory argument,
but the opinion also cites prior decisions. See 778 F.2d at 1323. Some of these decisions, we will see
subsequently, evoke considerations, largely ignored in later cases like Bibbs, that suggest a fuller account. See text infra at notes 166-193. For the Supreme Court's analysis rejecting Bibbs et al., see
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 244-45 n. 10. Court of appeals decisions anticipating Hopkins include, e.g., Fields
v. Clark University, 817 F.2d 931, 937 (1 st Cir. 1987); Haskins v. United States Dept. of the Army, 808
F.2d 1192, 1197-98 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 815 (1987); McQuillen v. Wisconsin Educ. Ass'n
Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 914 (1988). The leading academic
analysis supporting the Bibbs approach (and thus that of the 1991 Act) is Brodin, The Standard of
Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 292
(1982). Unfortunately for present purposes, Professor Brodin simply treats as given (e.g., in light of
legislative history and court of appeals precedent) the proposition that discriminatory motive is per se
violative of Title VII, see id. 317, 318 & nn. 105, 110, 17, and thus begs the question that Hopkins and
the 1991 Act taken together open up.
124. The Supreme Court has used the "private attorney general" label to characterize Title VII
plaintiffs in connection with questions of, e.g., attorneys fees, see Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,
434 U.S. 412, 416 (1978), and access to administrative records, see EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods
Corp., 449 U.S. 590, 602 (1981).
125. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a) (West 1986 & Supp. 1994); Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C.A. § 7604 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C.A. § 6972 (West 1983 & Supp. 1994); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2619 (West
1982 & Supp. 1994).
126. But other segments of the statutory text send mixed signals. Section 107(a) refers to a mixedmotive action as being brought by "the complaining party," which is a shorthand term defined by section
104 to refer equally to the EEOC, the Attorney General, or individual litigants. Section 107(b)(3), how-
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problem is not simply that the injunctive remedy is only available in cases
in which plaintiffs establish that discrimination was "a motivating factor,"
and not in disparate treatment and disparate impact suits, within which conclusions about motive per se play no necessary part. The 1991 Act elsewhere singles out intentional discrimination as especially pernicious in
section 102's provision for punitive damages. But why does such discrimination remain a remedial concern in cases in which the defendant's adverse
treatment of plaintiff turns out to be justifiable on other grounds? It is as
though the fact that the specific, individual plaintiff incurred no redressable
loss is accidental, an irrelevance from the perspective of statutory policy.
And yet, in cases in which it becomes apparent in the course of litigation
that a plaintiff engaged in conduct plainly justifying termination, but utterly
unrelated to the case at hand, courts hold that, at minimum, denial of injunctive relief is proper, and sometimes require termination of a Title VII
suit in toto. 127 How are these cases different from those falling within section 107(b)(3)?
D.

The Article III Case or Controversy Requirement as a Starting Point
for Statutory Interpretation

The private attorney general characterization of actions ending in exclusively injunctive relief also invites justiciability worries.' 2 8 In Gwaltney
of Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation,'29 the Supreme Court acknowledged Article III considerations in holding that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, it was sufficient, but also maybe necessary that, at the
pleading stage, a Clean Water Act citizen suit allege a continuing injury as
a precondition for injunctive relief. 3 ' More emphatically, the Court stated
ever, speaks of suit by "an individual," perhaps implying that the "individual" suit has a separate (e.g.,
injury-correcting) purpose.
127. E.g., Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 975 F.2d 302 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. granted,
113 S. Ct. 2991, cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993) (terminating lawsuit); Wallace v. Dunn Const.
Co., 968 F.2d 1174, 1181-82 (1Ith Cir. 1992) (denying injunctive relief but permitting some backpay);
Summers v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 700, 708-09 (10th Cir. 1988) (terminating lawsuit); see Cheryl Krause Zemdman, Note, The After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment Discrimination Claims: The Privatizationof Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 175 (1993) (collecting cases).
128. Compare Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1469 & n.2 (issue is existence of redressable injury) with Tyler v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1177, 1182 (2d Cir. 1982) ("there may be case-and-controversy difficulties with the remedial portion of this act which allows a plaintiff without a personal stake in litigation
to act as a private attorney general"). See also 136 CoNG. REc. S15,406 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1990)
(remarks of Sen. Hatch) (calling provision for injunctive relief in predecessor 1990 bill "a needless spur
to litigation" inconsistent with notion that legal duties are owed to "injured parties for injuries caused by
... wrongs").
129. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
130. See id. at 65-67. Defendant could test the factual basis for plaintiff's allegations via summary
judgment motion, id. at 66, or by seeking to have the case dismissed as moot, id. at 66-67. Thus, it was
clear from the Court's opinion that the allegation by itself was not the point, but the actual existence of a
continuing injury. See also id. 70-71 (Scalia, J. concurring) (noting Article III obligations).
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in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife' that congressional recognition of an
interest in law enforcement does not by itself justify an inference of injury
sufficient for case or controversy purposes.' 3 2 For Article 1II, thus, the "private attorney general" label becomes precisely the opposite of helpful.
It is possible, of course, to make too much of Lujan. Justice Scalia's
majority opinion stressed that the case at hand raised peculiar separation of
powers concerns because plaintiffs claimed the capacity to enforce against
federal officials an interpretation of statutes the officials were charged with
enforcing, despite the fact that the officials themselves had earlier rejected
the plaintiffs' statutory interpretation-the Take Care Clause of Article II
seemingly reinforced Article III concerns, justifying especially close scrutiny of the congressional grant of standing.' 3 3 The Supreme Court might
afford greater latitude, Scalia seemed to suggest, if litigation implicates only
the dealings of private parties.' 34 Title VII rights are enforceable both
through private suit and EEOC action. In any event, Lujan proceeds on the
assumption that Article III requirements define a model within the terms of
which all congressionally conferred causes of action must be expressible.
However loosely or innovatively, federal actions should identify a present
or imminent judicially redressable injury specific enough to statutorily identified plaintiffs to exclude the public at large.' 3 5
The section 107(b)(3) injunction, therefore, must be conceived as a
response to an injury more peculiar or individual to the plaintiffs bringing
suit. Presumably, this injury would be somehow an outgrowth of the circumstances that provoked plaintiffs to initiate litigation in the first place,
seeking the full range of compensatory remedies otherwise available if defendants had not shown that "the same action" would have been taken "in
the absence of the impermissible motivating factor." Because it is injunctive relief that plaintiffs are left seeking, we also know that the injury,
whatever it is, must be either continuing or at risk of recurring. Injunctive
relief is prospective.
Against this backdrop, it is useful to revisit the characterization of the
mixed-motive suit that I outlined and put to use previously. Evidence that
discriminatory motives prompted adverse action puts in question the structure of the firm. The considerations that the employer says inform decision131. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
132. See id. at 2142-46.
133. See id. at 2145. For criticisms of Justice Scalia's use of the Take Care Clause, see Cass R.
Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article i11, 91 MICH. L.REv.
163, 211-14 (1992) [hereinafter cited as Sunstein]; The Supreme Court, 1991 Term, 106 HARV. L. REv.
163, 314-18 (1992). Lujan is also discussed at length by several contributors to the Twenty-Fourth
Annual Administrative Law Issue, 42 DuKE L.J. 1141-42 (1993).
134. "[lit is clear that in suits against the government, at least, the concrete injury requirement must
remain." Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2146. But see Sunstein, supra note 132, at 231-32.
135. Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2145-46; See, e.g. Fair Employ. Council v. BMC Marketing Corp., 28
F.3d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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making within the enterprise, it appears, are either not accepted by all participants as always governing or, as articulated, leave space for unregulated
exercises of discretion. Success in showing that the same action would
have been taken regardless of any discrimination permitted the employer to
claim, within the Hopkins formulation, that the litigating employee had
failed to demonstrate that the working language of the firm was indeed
deficient. In the absence of a clear conclusion as to the employer's motivation, plaintiff lost. But the fact that plaintiff was able to point to "direct
evidence" of discriminatory animus remained. The congressional rereading
of Hopkins may be understood as recognizing that evidence that individuals
are in a position to act on the basis of discriminatory animus is by itself a
cause for concern. Because of the employer's showing, plaintiff is unable
to prove that the circumstances giving rise to the case warrant compensatory relief. Those circumstances may nonetheless suggest that the employer's work rules by themselves are not adequate to the task of deterring
discrimination-minded individuals. Injunctive relief is in order to prevent
1 36
repetition.
This account raises several questions. Initially, we might doubt the
plausibility of the conclusion that there is a real risk that discriminatory acts
will recur; some mixed-motive suits may call attention to repeated past incidents, but if injunctive relief is not to be simply a peripheral possibility, we
would expect it to be allowable even in cases in which plaintiffs prove the
statutory minimum of only one past act of discrimination. Is one past act
enough? EEOC pattern or practice suits are instructive. In these cases,
courts grant injunctive relief "even after apparent discontinuance of unlawful practices."'' 37 "[A] court cannot abdicate to defendant's good faith its
duty of ensuring removal of all vestiges of discrimination." '38 The risk of
recurrence, however, must be "more than the mere possibility."' 39 As the
"pattern or practice" formula itself implies, courts usually require more than
a single past incident as a basis for entering an injunction.t 4 ° Importantly,
however, proof requirements lessen in cases in which a defendant's practice
136. This analysis suggests that the after-acquired evidence cases, see supra note 127, might be
usefully subdivided. In cases in which plaintiffs can show an impermissible "motivating factor," the
existence of an additional proper reason for employer action-whenever discovered-is relevant under
the 1991 Act to questions of relief, not liability: whether or not the employer "would have taken the
same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor." Disparate treatment suits would
seem to make after-acquired evidence relevant to liability. For employers, the new information provides
a business reason for the action taken; the burden then shifts to plaintiffs to establish that the new
information would not ordinarily have resulted in the adverse action actually taken (perhaps because it
did not in other cases or perhaps because such information was not ordinarily discovered), thus raising
the question of pretext. See also supra note 106 (discussing theory of disparate treatment suit).
137. U.S. v. Gregory, 871 F.2d 1239, 1246 (4th Cir. 1989).
138. Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543, 550 (4th Cir. 1975).
139. EEOC v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 122, 463 F. Supp. 388, 431 (D. Md. 1978) (quoting
Hirsch v. Green, 382 F. Supp. 187, 192 (D. Md. 1974)).
140. See U.S. v. Lansdowne Swim Club, 713 F. Supp. 785, 805-07 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (public accommodations action).
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is open, even if not consistent."' In the section 107(b)(3) setting, if a court
concludes that an individual within a firm acted on the basis of discriminatory animus, we may ask whether the court is, of necessity, concluding that
this animus is open and conspicuous - is expressed somehow in a way
that is understandable to other individuals within the firm. How otherwise
would the court know about the individual's motivation? Even if proof is
circumstantial, and perhaps therefore off-limits under the former "direct evidence" locution, if it persuades a court, isn't it likely to be evidence that
the "real basis" of the adverse action was advertised within the firm? Even
if affirmative answers to these questions are not inevitable in the abstract,
were plaintiff's burden understood to be the equivalent of a requirement to
show that challenged acts are openly and conspicuously discriminatory
from at least some perspective within the firm a basis for moving from past
act to future risk would be at hand.' 42 There would be a structural cause
for concern: evidence not simply of individual motives, but evidence instead of an ability of individuals, notwithstanding firm efforts to focus attention along other lines, to act on discriminatory animus in ways apparent
enough within the firm to suggest that the possibility of acts so-motivated is
real.
Is this formulation an adequate response to the case or controversy
concern? Interestingly, in his concurring opinion in Gwaltney, Justice
Scalia suggested that a showing of past violation, unaccompanied by reform, might be a sufficient proof of continuing injuryl 3-a showing not far
different from the demonstration that the discussion above depicts as implicit in plaintiff's proof in a mixed-motive case. But what exactly is the
injury? If it is the future adverse action that the past discriminatory act
suggests is possible within the firm, it may seem necessary to come to some
conclusion about likelihoods. The population of a firm, of course, is several
orders of magnitude less than a large city, for example, and thus Supreme
14 5
Court opinions like those in Rizzo v. Goode'" and Los Angeles v. Lyons,
141. See U.S. v. Philadelphia Bd. of Educ., 911 F.2d 882, 892 (3rd Cit. 1990); see also King v.
General Elec. Co., 960 F.2d 617, 624 (7th Cir. 1992) (relating need for proof of multiple individual
instances to use of statistical proof and treating as touchstone "significant evidence of the alleged routine" or "substantial proof of the practice").
142. Cf SEC v. Pros Intem., Inc., 994 F.2d 767, 769 (10th Cir. 1993) (knowing single violation of
securities laws may be sufficient to justify injunction) (dictum); SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 648
(D.C. Cir. 1992) ("flagrant or deliberate" past violations as predicate for injunction against violation of
securities law in the future). A formulation like that advanced in the text has the advantage of substituting a model of inquiry rooted in substantive statutory concerns for the free-floating distinctions based on
types of evidence (e.g., direct, circumstantial, circumstantial-plus) courts frequently use in deciding
mixed-motives cases. See Note, supra note 126, at 980-81 (criticizing misuse of evidentiary
terminology).
143. "When a company has violated an effluent standard or limitation, it remains... 'in violation'
of that standard or limitation so long as it has not put in place remedial measures that clearly eliminate
the cause of the violation." Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 69 (Scalia, J., concurring).
144. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
145. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
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treating as de minimis the chance of repeated acts of police brutality directed against particular individuals, are not precisely on point. But still,
even allowing for a relatively small potential target population, the risk of
repetition might be hard to evaluate.
If the relevant injury is the creation of or failure to abate the risk itself,
however, actual injury is already at hand, even if too difficult to measure for
purposes of compensatory relief and therefore forecasting becomes unnecessary. Notably, several federal statutes treat various risks, standing alone,
as triggers for injunctive relief.'4 6 The idea that creation of risk may be
wrongful in and of itself is a live question in contemporary tort law. 147 The
48
hostile environment cases supply Title VII precedent, albeit extreme.
And yet, because the definition of injury in terms of risk per se, if generally
available, would empty almost all content from the Article III requirement
of present injury, we may suspect, especially after Lujan, that resort to this
approach to establishing a case or controversy would provoke considerable
149
judicial skepticism, and thus require some special sign of aptness.
There is, however, a second line of Article III decisions that may be
relevant here. Mootness inquiries also sometimes bring together the themes
of repetition and risk. "[V]oluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct,"
the Supreme Court has said, "does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear
and determine the case, i.e., does not make the case moot. ' ' 150 A case may
nonetheless be judged moot "if the defendant can demonstrate that 'there is
no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.' ""'
These formulae define the surface of a surprisingly rich jurisprudence.
The starting point sounds in abuse of process: a concern that, since federal
courts adjudicate only real controversies, a party aware of this constitutional
restriction might unilaterally choose to end litigation prematurely, short of a
final decision on the merits, for the moment ceasing challenged acts in order to remain free afterwards to resume or repeat the conduct at issue. To
avoid this manipulation of Article III requirements, therefore,, the courts
treat announcements of an end to challenged activity as occasions for scrutiny, investigating whether the dispute underlying the litigation is really
over. But "really over" is not an easy concept. The relevant inquiry may
address the persuasiveness of a party's claim to have broken with the past.
146. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C.A. § 2604(0 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300i(a) (West
1991 & Supp. 1994).
147. See, e.g., William K. Jones, Strict Liability for Hazardous Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REv.
1705, 1713 (1992); Glen 0. Robinson, Risk, Causation, and Harm, in LIABiLrrY AND RE sPONSIBiLrrY
317-47 (R. G. Frey & C. M. Morris eds., 1991).
148. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993); Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
149. But see Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that hostile environment
standard is not "very clear" and that it is "the test of whether legal harm has been suffered" but seeing no
basis for "limitation in the language of the statute").
150. United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953).
151. Id. at 633 (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2d Cir. 1945)).
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Thus, dissolution of an allegedly illegal association did not render a case
moot where defendants insisted that their combination had been "perfectly
proper, legitimate, and salutary," thus suggesting a motivation to try
again. 152 Often enough, though, the key question is not motive per se but
opportunity. Some feature of a given dispute, persisting even after a party
asserts cessation, that the party cannot or has not changed, may bias circumstances in a way pointing clearly to a likely renewal of hostilities. For example, the continuing mental illness of a person subject to commitment
suggests a sufficient likelihood that officials might in the future again administer psychotropic drugs, notwithstanding the conclusion of the course
of treatment provoking litigation.' 5 3 Or the claim of a business that it had
no choice other than to join a cartel if it were to trade in Europe, raises the
possibility that, notwithstanding the combination's wartime irrelevance, a
similar pressure might reassert itself in the future.' 5 4 Frequently, legal
forms constituting, organizing, or otherwise making possible past and perhaps future action define pertinent incentive structures. Thus, a complex
pattern of administrative regulations, because it excluded only some, but
not all, transactions of a particular type, seemed to the Supreme Court to
deny conclusiveness to the claim that economic rationality now cut against
resumption of contested dealings. t 5 Sometimes it is the transience or permanence of a legal obstacle that matters. Official compliance with lower
court rulings in the case at hand, for example, does not moot'higher review
inasmuch as officials would presumably reverse their course following an
ultimately favorable disposition.' 5 6
This mootness analysis reverses the bias of cases like Lyons. 15 7 Judicial skepticism now visits the claim of cessation rather than the allegation
of likely recurrence. What justifies-the shift? It is not enough to note that,
in cases in which mootness issues arise, a justiciable controversy existed at
an earlier stage in the litigation. Article Ill fixes jurisdictional requirements
equally obligatory at all stages of a suit; once satisfied, constitutional requirements do not thereafter disappear or diminish."5 8 Nor is it sufficient to
152. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 308 (1897).
153. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 218-219 (1990).
154. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 448; see also California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock
Co., 480 U.S. 572, 577-78 (1987) (fact that mining company has ceased current operations does not
moot case since company regards its "investments and activities" to date as dictating "continuing
operation").
155. See United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968).
156. See, e.g., Norfolk & Western Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 111 S. Ct. 1156, 1163
n.3 (1991); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982)
157. See Richard H. Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation: Notes on the
Jurisprudenceof Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 24-30 (1984). Mootness analysis may also be at odds
with Lujan. See Christian Knights of KKK v. District of Columbia, 972 F.2d 365, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1992);
Marshall J. Breger, Defending Defenders: Remarks on Nichol and Pierce, 42 DuKE L.J. 1202, 1215
(1993).
158. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136.
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point to the risk of spurious acquiescence. Various levels of abuse of process investigation are possible; notably, in mootness cases courts often
move well past a preoccupation with obvious indicators of duplicity, focusing not only on a defendant's more or less immediate objectives, but also on
possibilities inherent in a situation regardless of the defendant's current
aims. It is not the existence of concern about strategic behavior, but this
unusually elaborate investigation in particular, that requires explanation.
The key, I think, lies in recognizing that standing and mootness inquiries are in an important respect genuinely distinct. Judges investigate standing because of doubts about the coherence of an alleged case or
controversy. Plaintiffs, it seems, raise legal questions but present no sufficiently organizing factual backdrop. Scrutiny thus invokes notions like interest, imminence, causation, and redressability in order to test the claim
that a dispute exists possessing a form amenable to judicial resolution.15 9
Since the standing issue arises because courts are unsure of their jurisdiction (the necessary outlines are not clear), judges understandably put the
burden of proof on plaintiffs, the parties seeking judicial intervention.
Judges investigate mootness because of suspicions of transience. The outlines of a dispute are not in question, but rather the fixity of the outlines6
Because jurisdiction is given at the time a mootness issue arises (the outlines of the dispute are clear), judges understandably put the burden of
proof on whichever parties would now call jurisdiction into question. 161
I do not mean to suggest, however, that standing and mootness are
entirely independent ideas. The mootness analysis of fixity supposes injurious circumstances of some sort; injury implicitly assumes some limit on
transience. In this sense, there is a kind of co-dependency. Still, depending
upon circumstances, one or the other notion takes priority, seems to illumi159. A view of standing law understood in terms of a judicial need for a coherent dispute emerges,
almost as an aside, in two of Louis Jaffe's brilliant essays: "[T]he court should not intervene unless it
can see the law as reasonably clear." Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1265, 1305 (1961) (emphasis deleted); Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure
Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 HARV. L. REv. 255, 271 (1961) ("If the issue is not well focused,
if its significance and weight are closely related to the situation of absent persons, the court may properly abstain"). This perspective is greatly elaborated by my colleague Steven Winter in his well-known
article, in ways suggesting both the inevitability of some organizing prototype and the ready availability
of several such alternative models. See Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of
Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371 (1988). Professors Jaffe and Winter do not endorse the
Supreme Court's current formulations of standing rules-but these formulations, among others, fit
within their general approach.
160. Henry Monaghan's famous formula thus remains relevant: "Mootness is ... the doctrine of
standing set in a time frame... Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and
When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973). 1should note, however, that the argument here, set as it is postLujan, supposes that the specific contents of standing and mootness doctrines and thus the nature of their
interactions, are quite different from the contents and relationships Monaghan took as given in 1973.
161. E.g., Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1967, 1975-76 (1993); cf Renne v.
Geary, Ill S. Ct. 2331, 2338-40 (1991) (if case had become moot after suit, it would have been judged
capable of repetition but because case becomes moot before suit was brought case declared to be not
ripe because past acts provided no basis for judging future dispute).
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nate more elaborately the difficulty at the heart of a particular lawsuit. And
even though mootness and standing investigations at bottom take each other
as given, whichever inquiry takes precedence in the particular case also
possesses a relative autonomy-it is plainly through the one that we
glimpse the other.' 6 2
After Lujan, of course, these propositions are capable of another, albeit
equivalent, formulation. Mootness and standing concerns also describe
matters for congressional attention, at least in cases where statutory causes
of action are not grounded in the constitution; more precisely, we might
describe Article III requirements in a positive sense as defining justifications for legislative recognition of causes of action.1 63 A congressional en162. For example, in Associated General Contractors v. Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297 (1993), the
Supreme Court held that repeal of a minority set-aside ordinance and adoption of a new set-aside ordinance with significantly different terms did not moot plaintiff's reverse discrimination equal protection
challenge, see id. 2301; the Court also held that, even though the plaintiff association of contractors
could not establish that, absent a set-aside ordinance, one or more of its members would in fact receive
city construction contracts, the plaintiff nonetheless possessed standing to sue insofar as such an ordinance created obstacles to plaintiff's members obtaining such contracts, see id. 2303. As Justice
O'Connor noted in dissent, the mootness holding in Associated General Contractors is troubling to the
extent that, as the majority opinion of Justice Thomas declared, see id. at 2301, it is based on an application of the voluntary cessation doctrine-given that repeal was followed immediately by adoption of a
substantially changed ordinance, it is difficult to characterize the legislative action as strategic behavior
intended only to terminate litigation pending resumption of challenged conduct absent an added presumption of legislative bad faith, see id. 2309 (O'Connor,J., dissenting). But if the case is first read as a
standing case, the majority's conclusion that standing follows from the mere existence of obstacles
imposed on plaintiff's members not also imposed on other bidders may be seen as also resolving the
mootness matter without recourse to the voluntary cessation notion. Differences in detail in the two
ordinances do not matter so long as obstacles affecting only plaintiff's membership remain; given the
general terms the Court uses in characterizing the objection plaintiff raises to the ordinances and therefore the relevance of the ordinances to the interests of plaintiff's members, the two ordinances are
equivalent at least insofar as the standing issue is concerned-the only issue before the Supreme Court
because the new ordinance was adopted after the Court granted certiorari, see id. at 2300, and therefore
the only question that might be moot.
163. The notion that standing law in particular is concerned with the recognition or nonrecognition
of causes of action is not new. See, e.g., David P. Currie, Misunderstanding Standing, 1981 SuP. CT.
REV. 41; Lee H. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogatefor
Claimsfor Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974). There is also little novelty in the conclusion that the criteria
the Supreme Court currently uses in analyzing standing may be relevant in evaluating causes of action.
See, e.g., William H. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 272-76 (1988); Cass R.
Sunstein, Standing and the Privatizationof Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1432, 1462-69 (1988). It is
sometimes assumed, however, that the cause of action analysis of standing is inconsistent with recognition of an Article III limit on congressional conferral of standing-at least in cases in which Congress is
not acting to recognize a right of action vindicating constitutional claims. But even in these so-called
statutory cases, Congress must act on the basis of some sense of whether or not a particular matter is
amenable to litigation and thus judicial investigation and resolution. We may think that if Congress is to
act constitutionally in conferring standing it must take cognizance of all relevant constitutional texts-at
minimum, both its own subject-matter jurisdiction as defined by Article I and the Article III jurisdiction
of the courts to whom it would delegate responsibility. In other words, Congress becomes obliged to act
on the basis of some identifiable theory of both legislative power, see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 29-32 (1937); United States v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall) 41, 44-45 (1869), and
judicial power, see Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). On this view, Lujan is an easy case,
in which Congress refused to adopt any view of Article III whatsoever. If so, it becomes possible to
accept the idea of a constitutional requirement that Congress address Article III without necessarily
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actment, we suppose, is a response to circumstances within which lasting or
recurring injury to some person occurs, of a sort which might be plausibly
minimized or at least redressed by changes in conduct or payments of compensation by other persons.' 64 A particular statutory action, it follows, may
evidence an emphasis on one or more of the several starting points of justiciability analysis, depending upon which features of the circumstances
provoking legislation are seen to be most worrisome; the other Article I
16
elements figure in the background.
E. The Significance of the Mixed-Motive Cause of Action
We may now usefully revisit section 107(b)(3) of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991. The statutory language authorizing injunctive relief in the absence
of immediately compensable injury, I noted previously, traces to one of the
several approaches to the mixed-motive action that the various circuits of
the United States court of appeals developed prior to the Supreme Court's
temporarily clarifying ruling in Hopkins.'6 6 The cases developing this particular approach are therefore an equivalent of legislative history. As I also
indicated earlier, the last cases in the sequence are rather opaque, relying
either on glosses of statutory language or conclusory assertions.' 67 But ear68
lier cases, revealed in the citation lines, disclose a great deal.'
The first of these cases is Cypress v. Newport News General & Nonsectarian Hospital Ass'n. 6 9 The defendant hospital, hitherto conspicuous
in its practice of denying staff privileges to black physicians, suddenly offered staff membership to one of the plaintiffs during the pendency of the
appeal, and argued that the case was now moot since the plaintiff accepted
adopting in detail the Supreme Court's current view of standing, which remains controversial from a
constitutional perspective. See Sunstein, supra note 133, at 226-35. For constitutional criticism of the
Supreme Court's approach, see, e.g., Fletcher, supra, at 231-34 (injury in fact requirement as substantive
due process).
164. Professor Fletcher makes the point exactly, albeit in the course of arguing that standing ought
not to be a separate constitutional concern from the perspective of the judiciary:
I am not suggesting that the nature and degree of a person's injury should be irrelevant to a
determination of whether that person should have a cause of action to protect the asserted
right. Quite the contrary, for the nature and degree of injury are critical issues in deciding
whether to provide legal protection.... [I]t must be seen as part of the question of the nature
and scope of the substantive legal right-on which plaintiff relies.
Fletcher, supra note 163, at 232-33; see also id. 242 (causation and redressability as questions for
legislature).
165. This use of constitutional considerations to frame statutory elaboration differs from the familiar method of reading statutes to avoid constitutional difficulties insofar as the approach outlined in text
does not treat the constitutional criteria as descriptions of hazards to be avoided, but in the first instance
anyway, as a narrative and normative resource, as a language available for justifying and understanding
legislative action. Cf. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 211-12 (1824).
166. See text accompanying supra note 122.
167. See text accompanying supra note 123.
168. This line of cases formally becomes part of the pre-Hopkins case law per se chiefly through
citation in Nanty v. Barrows, 660 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1981), or through citation in cases cited in Nanty.
Nanty itself is treated as the point of departure in the cases that follow.
169. 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967).
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the offer. The Fourth Circuit panel hearing the case rejected the argument.
The court, after initially noting that other plaintiffs had not received and
accepted similar offers, proceeded to emphasize several points: 170 The case
was a class action;' 7 ' the "last minute change of heart" was "suspect, to say
the least";'7 the defendant's "persistent refusals" to open its facilities to
black physicians, its "continuing failure" to address the applications of the
other black doctors, and "the absence of any further action to remove segregation bars," in any event justified injunctive relief 73
Versions of these three points recur in other early cases. Jenkins v.
United Gas Corp.'74 involved a promotion offered and accepted within a
few weeks of the filing of suit, evidently before certification of a plaintiff
class. The Fifth Circuit saw no mootness bar, in part because the statutory
action "is perforce a sort of class action for fellow employees similarly
situated" given "the role of ostensibly private litigation in effectuating the
congressional policies";175 inpart because "in this David-Goliath confrontation economic pressures" raise the possibility that settling in the face of
litigation might be "equivocal in purpose, motive and permanence," and
thus no "protection against a repetition of such conduct in the future."17' 6
Changes in employer practices, however laudable, again failed to moot the
class action in Rowe v. General Motors Corp.,'" an opinion notable
throughout for its insistence that "any employment practices which operate
to prejudice minority employees must be eliminated and their consequences
eradicated,"' 78 and its suspicion in particular of ostensibly neutral employer
practices permitting racial discrimination to be "covertly concealed and, for
that matter, not really known to management."' 79 Johnson v.Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co.' 80 and Gamble v. Birmingham Southern Railroad
Co.' 8 1 made the same points, even more than Rowe, largely setting aside
mootness or class action analysis per se, restating the basic propositions in
statutory right/remedy terms. 8 James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings
Co."83 reduced analysis to formula, instructing the district court hearing the
170. See id. at 657-58.
171. Id. at 657.
172. Id. at658 (citing, e.g., United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632-33 (1953); United
States v.Oregon State Medical Soc., 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952)).
173. 375 F.2d at 658; see also id. at 658-59 (HEW certificate of compliance is "no assurance of
actual compliance").
174. 400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
175. Id. at 32, 33.
176. Id. at 33.
177. 457 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1972); see id. at 359.
178. Id. at 354.
179. Id. at 359.
180. 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
181. 514 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1975).
182. See id. at 682-83; Johnson, 491 F.2d at 1376-77 & n.36.
183. 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977).
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case at hand that, absent "evidence that there is no reasonable probability of
184
further noncompliance," a "broad injunction" should issue.
A sequence of government initiated pattern or practice suits constituted
a second Cypress branch. In these cases, new union or employer management teams came to power during the course of litigation, instituted reforms, and argued against the necessity of injunctive relief. In United
States v. Hayes International Corp.,"'5 a Fifth Circuit panel closely scrutinized reforms instituted by a new collective bargaining agreement, concluding that they amounted to "only a partial correction of past illegal
actions." 186 Ruling that statutory concerns supplanted traditional equity criteria, 8 7 the court held that "in order to insure the full enjoyment of the
rights protected by Title VII . .. affirmative and mandatory preliminary

relief is required."' 8 8 United States v. Electrical Workers Local No. 38189
did not find gaps, as such, in the remedial efforts of new union leadershiponly that "[t]he record of compliance is very brief" and "written under the
impact of this litigation." "9 An injunction was again in order:191
Assuming ...that the new leadership is in utter good faith, it has no mean

task ahead in eliminating ingrained discriminatory practices of past decades.
In many respects a more specific court order, plus retention of jurisdiction,
might serve to support the stated objectives of the new administration of
Local 38.
EEOC v. New York Times BroadcastingService 9 ' codified this analysis: if
"discriminatory... practices were employed by the defendant, at least as of
the time a complaint was brought before the EEOC, plaintiff is entitled to
injunctive relief prohibiting this conduct"; "apparent good faith efforts to
eliminate

. . .

discriminatory practices" do not moot the "right to relief" but

merely affect the scope of the injunction.1 93
Against the backdrop of these cases, four conclusions concerning section 107(b)(3) stand out:
First,the statutory injunctive action, we can now see, plainly harkens
back to an earlier era in Title VII jurisprudence, before the Supreme Court
began in Burdine its effort to separate and closely define the various Title
VII causes of action. Equally plainly, the cases that would become the
antecedents of the 107(b)(3) action are not marginal technical exercises, but
part and parcel of the central project of the period-the management of the
184. Id. at 355. In this case also, the point is treated as one of statutory policy, not mootness or
class action law. See id. 354-55.
185. 415 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1969).
186. Id. at 1044; see id. at 1043-44.
187. Id. at 1045.
188. Id.
189. 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970).
190. Id. at 151.
191. Id.
192. 542 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1976).
193. Id. at 361.
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transition away from overt workplace segregation. These cases reveal considerable variety: not just individual suits, but class actions; not just private
actions, but EEOC pattern or practice litigation. More importantly, this
early injunctive litigation displays an approach to Title VII that does not
draw the line between right and remedy as sharply as it is often drawn
today. In the cases arising against the backdrop of express segregation,
there was, for all practical purposes, no question but remedy. The issue was
not whether change would occur, but what form the change would take.
Perhaps as a result, courts (most famously, the Fifth Circuit) evidenced an
awareness that their decrees effectively replaced business as usual, that judicial process was now the source of workrules, and that the design and implementation of these workrules must take into account that their source is
alien to the workplace, and the resulting possibility of resistance and
rejection.
Second, the appearance and transformation of mootness analysis in the
early cases is precisely illustrative of the use of Article III case or controversy law as a starting point for elaborating the concerns justifying and
organizing a particular cause of action. The justiciability inquiry, beginning
with a suspicion of last minute conversions, quickly comes to extend beyond a review of defendant's past conduct, incorporating as well an awareness of structural dimensions of discrimination, in particular the
opportunities that certain modes of workplace organization may create for
biased individuals. The mootness discussions thus interweave two concerns-manipulative behavior within the litigation context itself and the
survival of systems of discrimination. Long-term segregation makes courts
suspicious of sudden conversions; indications of litigation game-playing reinforces the sense that real reform will not be easy. Mootness investigations accordingly merge with remedial judgments, ending up rephrased as a
constituent part of a substantive statutory analysis, ultimately relevant in
cases in which mootness per se is not directly in issue.' 9 4
From the judicial perspective, we can now see, section 107(b)(3) properly addresses Article III concerns. The injuries that are the ultimate target
of the legislative response are classically personal-at the extreme, dismissal or failure to promote or hire; short of that, the full range of consequences for individuals who bear the brunt of workplace discrimination.
Evanescence is also not a pertinent worry. The action originates in an
awareness of spaces that workplace rules and behavior patterns sometimes
define, spaces that leave room for action by discriminatorily motivated indi-

194. Later cases-the court of appeals decisions just prior to Hopkins-in effect sharpen and split
out the concerns interacting in the mootness cases. Some see manipulation as key and ultimately assimilate the mixed-motive and disparate treatment actions. Others see structure as crucial. The latter line
become the cases prefiguring section 107.
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viduals. 19 5 It tests, by gauging the obviousness of discriminatory motives,
whether such spaces exist in particular cases. The mixed-motive injunctive
action, in other words, keys its remedy to a very specific and concrete demonstration by plaintiff: proof that an employer's organizational structure
clearly leaves room for purposefully discriminatory acts, proof validated
through consideration of plaintiff's own situation. The cause of action,
thus, does not simply suppose the possibility of a risk of recurrence but
shapes an inquiry that puts the matter in question.196 This is the stamp put
197
on the action by its origin, in part, in the early Title VII mootness cases.
Possible disagreement with Congress about whether section 107(b)(3) is too
rough and ready in this regard does not rise to the constitutional level: Congress has plainly acted within the Article III framework-the statutory action possesses the shape of an Article III cause.1 98
In this setting at least, deference to a congressional identification of
imminent or present injury for Article III purposes is not much different
from acknowledgement of congressional power to redefine traditional equi195. Cf Associated General Contractors v. Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2301-2304 (1993) (contractors have standing to challenge minority set-aside program, even though contractors cannot show
that absent program they would be chosen by city, given obstacles program creates for nonminority
contractors only); see also Thomas v. Union Carbide Co., 473 U.S. 568, 581 (1985) (uncertainty occasioned by doubts about validity of statutorily mandated arbitration procedures justifies challenge to
procedures notwithstanding ripeness objection).
196. Cf. Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475 (1993) (Eighth Amendment supports cause of action
for prisoners protesting risk of future illness insofar as usual criteria for identifying cruel and unusual
punishment provide basis for identifying actionable risk).
197. Cf. SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 648 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting W.T. Grant Co. in course
of holding that "flagrant or deliberate" past violations justify injunction against future violations of
securities laws).
198. Remedially, the section 107(b)(3) injunction plainly is not a nullity: the decree "affects the
behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff" and thus represents "a proper judicial resolution of a
,case or controversy' rather than an advisory opinion," Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761 (1987)
(emphasis omitted), insofar as defendant comes under an obligation, on pain of contempt in case of
recurrence, to do something, to change the employment setting in some way, in order to reduce the
chance of repetition of the conduct triggering plaintiff's suit. See also Texas Teachers Ass'n v. Garland
School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989) (attorneys' fees in § 1983 suit turn on whether plaintiff is "able
to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal relationship between itself and the defendant"). Ruffin v. Great Dane Trailers, 969 F.2d 989 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1257
(1993), supplies an especially apt illustration. Plaintiff alleged the existence of "a racially hostile work
environment," id. at 991, and challenged as well specific promotion, job assignment, and disciplinary
decisions, see id. 990-91. The trial court concluded that business reasons supported these latter decisions, denying plaintiff's claim to compensatory relief, but found a hostile work environment to indeed
exist, issuing an injunction ordering the employer to "take active steps" to correct the situation, see id.
991. The Eleventh Circuit panel reversed the trial court's refusal to grant attorney fees:
By virtue of the court's grant of injunctive relief, Great Dane is now under a legal obligation
to correct the racist behavior at its jobsite. Accordingly, Ruffin may now protect his rights
Given the alteration of Ruffin's legal rights and
through a civil contempt proceeding ....
Great Dane's legal obligations that resulted from the court's grant of injunctive relief, there is
no question that Ruffin prevailed ....
Id. at 993; see also Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 574 (1992) ("No material alteration of the legal
relationship occurs until plaintiff becomes entitled to enforce a judgment, consent decree, or settlement
against the defendant").
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table limitations on the availability of injunctions. 199 Courts have accepted
this latter authority for at least a half-century. Statutes, it is taken for
granted, may resolve the question of the propriety of injunctions themselves, in which case relief follows automatically upon a finding of liability;
or statutory language may provide criteria to guide judicial discretion different in content from the standards of equity jurisprudence; or statutory terms
may invoke the traditional vocabulary. The issue is not one of power but of
interpretation. 2" Again similarly, courts do not any longer consult some
independent body of criteria to determine whether private causes of action
follow by implication given statutory prohibitions. Rather, in most cases,
the ultimate issue is one of statutory construction, an effort to tease out the
underlying conceptual apparatus of legislative action to determine whether
a logic appropriate to litigation is indeed evident.2 0 As in the case of section 107(b)(3), at least as I read it, there is in the full range of cases to
which I have just referred a repeated sense that statutory terms do not so
much license departure from judge-defined limits on litigation as substitute
new criteria for fixing both the opportunities and constraints that the parties
face. Article III concerns may be addressed through the process of statutory
elaboration as readily as, and indeed simultaneously with, matters of equity
or litigative architecture.20 2
Third, the Article III investigation makes clearer the place of the
107(b)(3) suit within the larger Title VII jurisprudence. The discriminatory
treatment action tests good faith-whether an employer complies with its
199. For an especially clear illustration of the use of a statutory injunction analysis to resolve what
otherwise might seem to be a mootness question, see SEC v. Pros Intern., Inc., 994 F.2d 767, 769-70
(10th Cir. 1993).
200. See, e.g., Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 541-44 (1987); Weinberger v.
Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 328-30 (1944); OwEN
Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 132-60 (2d ed. 1984); Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion, 70 CALIF. L. REv. 524 (1982).
201. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18-20 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 569-70 (1979).
202. There is one important issue pertinent to Article III that seems to be properly left to case-bycase adjudication under section 107(b)(3). The legislative language states that a court "may grant"
declaratory or injunctive relief. Read permissively, this formulation suggests that, given a showing that
unlawful discrimination was a motivating factor, it would be proper for the reasons set out above for a
court to order injunctive relief without an additional inquiry into irreparable injury or other traditional
equitable check-offs. At the same time, though, the nonmandatory cast of the wording plainly leaves
room for courts to refuse relief in particular instances-without, however, leaving the statutory context.
Specifically, this discretionary space seems helpful to courts working out the implications for section
107(b)(3) of the broad reference in section 107(a) to "any employment practice." I noted above that this
wording was plainly appropriate from the public attorney general vantage point. But if the prospect of
continuing individual injury is to be the emphasis, there seems to be obvious differences in the circumstances of not-hired or now-fired individuals, and still-employed persons. Only the last group, it would
appear, run the risk of repeated subjection to discriminatory decision-making. In particular cases,
though, it may be plausible to perceive not-hired (or even just-fired) individuals as likely to reapply; or
the discriminatory acts at issue might, because of their specific character, be equally relevant for current
employees, putting unemployed individuals in the position of de facto class representatives-all conclusions turning entirely on the features of the particular instance.
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own rules in taking adverse action against employees protected by Title
VII. It means, therefore, to work a form of corrective justice; in effect, to
restore entitlements already established by the employer's own practices,
and in effect wrongly appropriated by the employer's departure from those
practices. The discriminatory impact suit tests the justification of honestly
observed employer rules in light of their disparate effect on protected employees. This action, plainly, sounds in distributive justice: it determines
whether reason exists for departure from a presumptively appropriate pattern of equal receipt of benefits (for example, jobs, promotions, etc.). The
mixed-motive suit, finally, at bottom tests the texture of employer rules,
perceiving these rules not so much as entitlements or distributions but as
constitutive of an environment within which individuals are acceptably or
unacceptably able to pursue personal agendas of one sort or another at each
other's expense.2 3 The concern here derives from notions of fair gamesstrategic justice, as it were.
This strategic perspective, it should be clear, formally enters Title VII
jurisprudence precisely through the statutory repositioning, within the structure of the mixed-motive suit, of the question of whether the employer
would have acted similarly in any event. Insofar as this question is seen as
relevant to liability, it is quite plausible to characterize the action as evaluating rule-following, merely varying the structure of the discriminatory treatment suit somewhat by responding to plaintiff's stronger evidence via an
adjustment of the defendant's burden. But if evidence of an individual's
motivation is itself sufficient to establish liability, and thus a right to at least
injunctive relief, proof of motivation is most plausibly understood, however
seemingly paradoxically, as circumstantial evidence of the openness of the
setting in which the individual feels free to act-appropriately, therefore,
Congress abandoned the "direct" label for plaintiff's proof in the Title VII
mixed-motive suit. It is now the setting per se, features of the firm environment, or more precisely the risks that this environment is now seen to occasion, that is legally objectionable.
Fourth, in terms of characterization, therefore, as in terms of statutory
form, an important difference emerges after the enactment of section
107(b)(3), dividing the hitherto identical ADEA and Title VII mixed-motive suits. The ADEA mixed-motive suit, we have seen, sounds in good
faith, and ultimately focuses on questions of rule-following after the fashion
of the Supreme Court's Hopkins action. The revised structure and conceptualization that section 107(b)(3) brings about is not, within the terms of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, extended to cover ADEA cases. But is this differ-

203. Cf. Ohio Pub. Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 180 (1989) (pension plans
are "subterfuges" violative of ADEA if plan provisions provide means of accomplishing employer aims
otherwise in violation of ADEA).
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ence relevant as seen from the perspective of arbitrability? 20 4 Arguably,
nothing changes. Proof of motivation, whether or not it is called "direct
evidence" of discrimination, remains proof of motivation; "same result regardless" similarly seems to be the same question whether it goes to liability or remedy. This conclusion, however, ignores the dynamics of causes of
action, the ways in which elements of an action serve as contexts for each
other's elaboration. Thus, proof of motivation, if juxtaposed with proof of
"same result regardless" within the liability perspective, appears to lose significance-that is, it becomes less of a focus than the "same result regardless" question, which the good faith perspective marks off as central. In
contrast, if proof of motivation stands alone for liability purposes, or rather
is juxtaposed with the remedial concerns and values associated with the
injunctive relief it triggers, motivation itself now becomes the focus, and in
an important sense therefore is a different question.
More concretely: if injunctive relief follows directly from proof of
motivation, it must mean that the situation that proof of motivation reveals
to be the case is one amenable to address through an injunctive decree.
Crucially, the defendant in the action is not necessarily the discriminatorily
motivated individual, who may be a fellow employee or employee-supervisor, but the employer firm. The decree, therefore, must take a form capable
of generating a response by the employer, some change in workrules or
personnel or other features of the job environment likely to reduce significantly the likelihood of repeated incidents, perhaps not only involving
plaintiff but others similarly situated. These considerations, we may suspect, will influence, even if only implicitly, the factfinder's evaluation of
what counts as proof of motivation. (It is these considerations, ultimately,
that explain the conclusion that motivation here is circumstantial evidence
of gaps or other sources of strategic opportunities.) Alternatively, if courts
maintain a strong right/remedy separation, considerations like these might
cause courts to develop an elaborated body of remedial prerequisites separate from the liability trigger itself. Such interactions of remedy and right
suggest that, at minimum, the Section 107(b)(3) action is not, at least within
my terms, straightforwardly internal. The inquiry is not concluded by identifying, or failing to identify, a relevant employer practice, but by a double
account of alternatives-the improperly motivated conduct that is the focus
of the liability inquiry, and the revision in the employer's practice that the
injunctive decree requires. These alternatives, once finally framed, work
like photographic negatives and positives, oppositely describing a new em204. Arguments that age discrimination is in important respects different from race or sex discrimination, for example, are not implausible. See, e.g., Dennis McKerlie, Equality Between Age Groups, 21
PHIL. & Put. Aim. 275 (1992) (summarizing philosophical literature); Peter Schuck, The Graying of
Civil Rights Law: The Age DiscriminationAct of 1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27 (1979). Notwithstanding the
Supreme Court's practice of interpreting the ADEA and Title VII in parallel, there is no reason to insist
that the procedural concomitants of age discrimination statutes and other anti-discrimination legislation
are necessarily identical.
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ployer practice, legally required precisely because it reacts against, and thus
reflects, conduct originating outside the firm (motivationally) the liabilitytriggering acts. Because of this bracketing, the apt adjudicative perspective,
terms, is ultimately external, and arbitral disposition is therefore
within my
20 5
inapt.
F.

Generalizing From the Mixed-Motive Suit

Title VII disparate treatment suits, like ADEA disparate treatment actions, focus on questions of pretext and therefore exhibit a clear inside orientation. 0 6 We might conclude, therefore, that after passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 Title VII mixed-motive actions join disparate impact
claims in the not bindingly arbitrable category, but disparate treatment
claims remain proper subjects for arbitration. Arguably, 1991 Act willfulness suits are analogous to disparate treatment actions. The relevance of
these groupings, however, is a function of procedural mechanics. Courts
usually decide arbitrability questions early in the course of litigation, working off the face of the complaint. Later disposition would, plainly enough,
significantly reduce the appeal of arbitration as an alternative to often
lengthy adjudicative proceedings. In advance of discovery, within the general language of a notice pleading complaint, especially given alternative
205. Within the terms of Professor Fiss's famous characterization of injunctive remedies, the
mixed-motive decree is "structural" insofar as it rejects the assumption that "the wrong exists indepenwrong is the structure itself; the reorganization is
dently of the organizational structure ... The ...
" OWEN Fiss, THE CIVIL RiGrrs INJUNCTION 11
designed to bring the structure within.., bounds ..

(1978). Although the mixed-motive injunction may not embrace the complexity of, say, a school desegregation decree, it nonetheless works "as a means of initiating a relationship between a court and a social
institution," "a declaration that henceforth the court will direct or manage the reconstruction of the social
institution .... " Id. at 36-37 (emphases omitted).
206. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) is not inconsistent with a characterization of the disparate treatment action as focusing on pretext. In some cases, evidence in the record will
reveal either that an employer or its employees acted for statutorily forbidden reasons even though
legitimate firm-related reasons for action are also relevant, thus justifying the inquiry mapped by the
Supreme Court in Hopkins and modified by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In other cases, even though it
appears that firm-related reasons asserted by the employer are irrelevant, and thus pretextual, it may also
appear that the actual motives of the employer or its employers may not have been firm-related but also
were not prohibited by Title VII. Hicks was one such case. See id. 2748 n.2. Neither Hopkins nor
Hicks was thus a disparate treatment case as such in the end, although early in their course both cases
may have been litigated under this theory.
Professor Epstein argues that the disparate treatment action adopts the perspective of an "external
agent" insofar as the defenses available to an employer require articulation in some conventional form
and thus require more of employers than employment markets per se-which assume that "all elements
of gains and losses are subjective" and, therefore, that "explicit measurement by external parties is not
possible but is obtainable only by indirect reference." RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE
CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 163, 164 (1992). Interestingly, Epstein largely

discusses employment discrimination law without reference to any explicit theory of the firm, instead
drawing a contrast between markets and monopolies; in the latter context he thinks that employment
discrimination law is more clearly justified. See, e.g., id. at 59-87. The possibility that firms themselves
possess standard practices already articulated in advance of litigation receives only limited attention in
his discussion. See id. at 180. Standard practices therefore appear to be costly. See id. at 181.
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claims, a mixed-motive suit culminating in an injunction or declaratory
judgment is not only difficult to distinguish from a similar suit resulting in
an award of some form of retrospective relief; it is also hard to split off
from a punitive damages action charging willful discrimination.2 °7
Perhaps more significantly, the same initial allegations in a complaint
may generate either a mixed-motive or a disparate treatment action.208 In
principle, it is possible to imagine a pleading rule analogous to the "wellpleaded complaint" rule governing the availability of federal removal jurisdiction2 ° 9 -in order to show equal respect for arbitral and adjudicative
tribunals, federal courts will not dispose of statutory claims also subject to
arbitration unless it is apparent on the face of plaintiff's complaint that the
particular statutory claim at issue possesses the needed "external" focus.
But federal courts in arbitration cases are not, strictly speaking, ruling on
jurisdiction per se, and the constitutional values served by the well-pleaded
complaint rule are not relevant here. 2 t° An elaborated obligation to plead
statutory features would, in any event, fly in the face of the general hostility
to "theory of the pleadings" doctrines evidenced by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.2 The Supreme Court has recently held, albeit not in an
arbitration case, that usual notice pleading rules govern in civil rights actions."' "[Flederal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment
and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims ....
Against this backdrop, therefore, the significance of section 107 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 is great indeed. Because the mixed-motive suit is
indistinguishable from other Title VH actions at the procedurally pertinent
moment, section 107 closes off to arbitration, pulls outside the Gilmer circle, along with the disparate impact suit, all of the other principal Title VII
207. It may be necessary for plaintiffs to plead punitive damages claims specifically. See Campbell
v. Thornton, 644 F. Supp. 103, 105 (W. D. Mo. 1986). Nonetheless, in light of the opportunity afforded
plaintiffs to plead in the alternative, the requirement of a particular allegation is not, by itself, sufficient
to provide courts with a way to separate out (at the pleadings stage) willfulness suits, assuming such
claims were thought to be amenable to arbitration.
208. Nothing in this opinion should be taken to suggest that a case must be correctly labeled as
either a "pretext" case or a "mixed-motives" case from the beginning in the District Court;
indeed, we expect that plaintiffs will often allege, in the alternative, that their cases are both.
Discovery will often be necessary before the plaintiff can know whether both legitimate and
illegitimate considerations played a part in the decision against her.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 247 n.12 (1989).
209. See, e.g., Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank,
299 U.S. 109, 112-113 (1936).
210. See California Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9-10
(1983) (describing well-pleaded complaint role as "avoiding more-or-less automatically a number of
potentially serious federal-state conflicts").
211.

See 5 CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1219, pp.

188-95 (2d ed. 1990).
212.
213.

Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993) (§ 1983 claim).
Id. at 1163.
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actions. Gardner-Denver's result remains good law-inside and outside
collective bargaining.2 t4
IV
THREE PRESUPPOSITIONS

The distinction between internal and external perspectives is the theo-

retical starting point for the analysis of Title VII arbitration, and its relationship to ADEA arbitration, that I have developed in this essay. Earlier, I
summarized some of the considerations that I think show this distinction to
be plausible. But I did not attempt at that point to identify several important
assumptions that putting the distinction to work presupposes. By way of
conclusion, I note those assumptions here.
First, I have proceeded as though it were without question that statutory language and surrounding caselaw are always sufficiently rich resources for purposes of deciding whether a statutory action frames an inside
or outside perspective. I do not believe, as I indicated earlier, that there is
one right answer to the question of a given statute's perspective. Statutes
are models of conflict. Statutory language itself, and certainly judicial or
other glosses, may provide considerable room for choice, and thus a judge
does not proceed mechanically. Nonetheless statutes and pertinent interpretations must provide enough with which to work, in the sense of supplying
a language sufficiently elaborate to frame conclusions and supporting arguments. This assumption, however, may not always hold. If, for example, it
is glosses that chiefly add mass, a newly enacted statute, not yet a frequent
subject of interpretation, would, within my approach, suggest no answer
whatsoever concerning the relationship of litigation and arbitration. Perhaps appellate courts, or maybe only the Supreme Court, should refrain
from reviewing decisions about the preemptive impact of arbitrations of
statutory claims until the statutory gloss reaches the appropriate degree of
elaborateness. But in the interim, how would trial courts decide? Arguably,
therefore, my analysis implicitly presupposes an argument that statutory
language standing alone is rich enough.
Second, however much I have represented it as natural or easy, a sense
of artificiality runs with the distinction between statutes pointing inside,
toward arrangements as defined within the institution regulated, and statutes
214. Arguably, the Supreme Court's insistence on the generality of process, and on the autonomy
of its dynamic, illustrates precisely what I mean by the "exteriorizing" effect of litigation-civil procedure becomes a source of artifice: its own conventions dictate interpretation, and therefore block any
effort to depict actual institutional practice. This artifice is itself always a part of litigation, and therefore ought not to provide a basis, within litigation, for distinguishing cases. It is not process that is
ultimately decisive, however: the overlap of Title VII actions is the precondition for the process effect.
This overlap itself is substantive; it reveals at the level of legal technicality the multiple forms in which
discrimination manifests itself. Indeed, the persistence of this overlap as a fact of Title VII jurisprudence signals an unwillingness to overlook the more structural in the course of evaluating the more
personal, or vice versa, a crucial skepticism that we might see as lying at the very core of Title VII itself.
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bringing to bear an outside, unfamiliar vocabulary. The point is not that
statutes may mix both viewpoints. Notions of predomination provide a
means already in use for expressing judgements in close cases. 2 ' 5 Rather,
the oddity traces, I think, to the distinction's implicit claim of relative autonomy, an insistence that ideas of inside and outside, although obviously
and awkwardly metaphorical, remain a proper start for legal analysis, indeed a beginning preferable to discussions couched in terms of standard
characterizations of statutes as furthering public or private goals, or as
structural or corrective as a matter of remedial aspiration.2" 6
This insistence is in part epistemological. In the course of elaborating
statutory causes of action, the process through which we discover and state
our sense of the right priority of public and private interests, say, or the
scope of remedial measures, for example, may be one which works best by
working indirectly. Efforts to characterize statutes in terms that call attention to the question of whether a statute works to protect the normal state of
affairs within a given environment, or instead works to alter what was hitherto normal, might serve as especially productive starting points for analyses that end up proceeding in more usual vocabularies. But my claim is
also metaphysical. I assume that statutes are capable of figuring as real,
albeit complex, units of legal analysis. They are potentially ultimate subjects of inquiry; meaningfully prior to Hohfeldian or other conceptual descriptions of legal norms in terms of rights, duties, etc. Individual statutes
may be usefully investigated on their own, as it were; each statute in principle describes a field, or environment, or world within which legal arrangements are constituted or, more crucially, reconstituted. To be sure, this
state of affairs need not obtain. One way in which enacting conflicts play
out formally is through denials, as well as affirmations, of statutory independence. Statutory references to interior or exterior norms supply one set
of examples. Even to allow the option, however, supposes a strong assumption. It envisions at least the occasional reversal of a line of thinking
originating with Bentham which holds that statutes or other legal instruments are simply fragments of law, revealing parts of underlying legal concepts. On this view, although legal analysis cannot begin except by
assembling such fragments, the aim of the enterprise is to move as quickly
as possible through the archeological stage to consideration of concepts
themselves, obviously regarded within this perspective as more "real."2'17 I
215. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (if sole basis for class action, common question must
predominate).
216. On statutes as expressions of public or private interests, see Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV.4, 1418 (1984); Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-inthe Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 800, 818-20 (1983). The distinction between structural and regulatory remedies plays an
important role in, e.g., OWEN Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978).
217. See, e.g., JEREMY BENTHAM, OF LAWS IN GENERAL 156-83 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1970); JOSEPH
RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 70-92, 140-56, 168-86 (2d ed. 1980).
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would, it should be clear, at least sometimes treat fragments as themselves
organizational, as both beginning and end.2 t8
Third, in part in defense of, but perhaps also in tension with, the formal pluralism I have just sketched, I also suppose that there is normative
force in a notion of legal actors, in particular plaintiffs, identified in terms
independent of those fixed by either the institutional settings that are the
subject of suit, or the more or less different statutory terms brought to bear
in the course of suit. I do not argue that arbitration of statutory claims is
illegal, only that in some cases would-be plaintiffs should be seen as free to
choose between arbitration and litigation, even in the face of prior contractual undertakings. What is the significance of this sometime procedural
218. I do not mean to suggest, however, that the argument here is somehow entirely independent of
(or foreign to) familiar jurisprudential debates. Indeed, much of my argument is simply a variation on
notions owing to H.L.A. Hart. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPr OF LAw (1961). Hart's distinction between primary and secondary rules is both brought to bear and reinterpreted. Questions as to
the content of secondary rules are resolved by identifying features of primary rules. The choice between
arbitration and adjudication involves formulation of what Hart would call a "rule of adjudication," "secondary" in his terms; but the content of the rule depends upon the characteristics of statutes regulating
someone's conduct, "primary" rules in Hart's scheme. But are the pertinent features of statutes themselves "secondary?" They pertain to features of rules to be enforced, but also suppose a degree of selfconsciousness about the enforcing institutions. If the latter awareness is Hart's crucial marker, then the
inquiry here is secondary. But Hart seems to suppose that secondary features are in some sense independent of particular primary rules. See id. at 89-96. Put another way (again using Hart's sense of
the terms): Hart uses the notions of internal and external perspectives to describe orientations towards
law and legal institutions, see id. at 55, 56, after a fashion similar (I borrow from Hart) to my use of the
internal/external distinction to describe legal perspectives of other institutions. In effect, I restate the
idea of internal and external perspectives within Hart's internal perspective. But this means that internal
and external are relative terms: all of this inquiry is internal to legal discourse in Hart's sense, but only
sometimes is a legal feature acknowledged to be internal.
Raz reformulates Hart, limiting the significance of the distinction between primary and secondary
rules, emphasizing almost exclusively the internal perspective. See J. RAz, PRACtICAL REASON AND
NORMS 170-77 (2d ed. 1990). Norms are internally linked if the statement of norm A requires a reference to norm B. Norms include norms governing exercises of powers. As a result, invocations of
mandatory or permissive norms may incorporate references to power-conferring norms, and thus Raz is
able to build within the internal account something akin to Hart's distinction between primary and
secondary norms. But it is important for Raz that norm-applying institutions make use of the same
terminology, in working through the process of application, that ultimate subjects of norms would use
for the same purpose. See id. at 139. Internal/external distinctions by and large disappear. The possibility that Hart's formulation proposes (the possibility of Felix Frankfurter)-that institutional considerations will for judges shape the content of rules that primary addressees will interpret normatively-is
therefore absent (or at least harder to see) within Raz's construct.
Weinrib's notion of formalism is also implicated. E.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On
the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988). Weinrib sees secondary rules as illustrative
of forms of justice also implicit in primary rules-or rather, that neither primary nor secondary rules
make sense unless understood in terms that suggest each other: thus the power of the idea of corrective
justice. But my approach treats primary rules as disclosing another sort of form, as constitutive sometimes of the legislative process rather than the adjudicative. Statutes adopting the internal perspective
plainly treat the adjudicative form as primary, and by inviting injury into context, implicitly invoke the
corrective frame. But statutes displaying an external emphasis claim to establish legislation as itself
constituting the world: such statutes may or may not frame the world in corrective terms, and to the
degree that judges treat such statutes as decisive, the appropriate form for judicial process is that which
makes possible the articulation of the legislative claim. This is plainly not a possibility that Weinrib
would embrace. See id. at 956.
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freedom? Arguably, the option to litigate notwithstanding an agreement to
arbitrate is simply a by-product of judicial readings of statutes otherwise
motivated. There seems to be a need, however, for an account of why
judges should choose to read statutes as either reinforcing institutional
norms or instead imposing a new context. Statutes, after all, might provide
sufficient raw material for either gloss. My analysis of the appropriateness
of arbitration of statutory claims therefore in the end requires an explanation of itself; an account of the individual's option to choose between arbitration and litigation, as well as that option's only occasional availability,
in terms which themselves justify judicial effort, and which tie the exercise
of judicial office to some larger legal politics. An interpretation from the
perspective of the choosing individual, I think, meets this need.
I begin with an account of legal freedom-an account of at least one
sense in which it is valuable for an individual operating within a universe of
legal institutions to possess opportunities for choice. As much legally as in
other settings, we might think, an individual's capacity to control circumstances is tied to the individual's ability to arrange and rearrange the priority or proximity of the various contexts, posing various risks and
opportunities, within which she addresses her situation. Legally, these contexts present themselves as complexes of norms and associated institutions,
2 19
within which the individual might find it better or worse to maneuver.
Freedom in law, therefore, becomes at least in part a freedom to choose law.
This is not a new notion. The idea of freedom of contract, for example, in
its radical Jacksonian/Reconstruction versions, was plainly understood as a
freedom to fashion directly one's own sets of relationships; a freedom corrosive to relationships fixed by status. To be sure, it soon seemed obvious
to many that important contractual relationships are often enough at the
mercy of movements outside any one individual's control, at least past
certain quickly reached points. Statutory and common law arrangements
sometimes presented themselves as means through which individuals might
extend their control and freedom, either directly through litigative enforcement or indirectly through ultimately representative administrative
processes.
Of course, these alternative arrangements are vulnerable to the same
risk of truncation as freedom of contract, to substituting in place of intervention an elaborate apologetics for a prior status quo. Plainly enough,
legal freedom of the sort that I am describing is not the only project proper
to legal norms and institutions. Legislators, administrators, or judges need
not pursue interventionist goals. It becomes important to think hard when
219. See generally RAZ, supra note 218. It should be apparent that, for present purposes, I sidestep
the traditional question of the degree to which legal norms are in some sense extrinsic to the individual's
own perspective, or internal (and thus natural) to that perspective. I also mean to avoid the more recent
debate, owing chiefly to Derek Parfit, concerning whether it makes sense to speak of a unitary
individual.

264

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

[Vol. 16:209

interpreting statutory arrangements, for example, about the degree to which
given statutes further the project of legal freedom or some other agenda.
The key issue is still that raised by nineteenth century radicals: whether law
works to reinforce status or to break it apart-but now, even more clearly,
it is law itself that is the law's subject.
In some cases, therefore, in which applicable statutes are understood
accordingly, it is as though individuals bringing suit have the opportunity to
call into question, to repoliticize, usual patterns: the formalization of litigation has as its point precisely a highlighting, arguably an exaggeration of
triggering circumstances. Such statutes reopen the question of structure,
bring to bear again the concerns to which legislators initially responded by
enacting statutes, require judges and juries to resolve these concerns within
the setting of the particular case, and thus to reassert their relevance. Insofar as we associate litigation, and not arbitration, with enforcement of an
external perspective, it is this opportunity that for individuals gives meaning
to, as well as fixes the limits of, the procedural freedom that this essay
defends. This conception of the role of statutes and therefore statutory litigation bears an obvious family resemblance to Bruce Ackerman's view of
constitutional politics.220 But there is also a crucial difference-the "constitutional" moments recur, and do not become the "normal" working out of
past crisis and resolution, but instead re-instantiate the original crisis, inserting past politics into present practice. There is no bright line between
either past and present or ordinary and constitutional politics.22 Equally
clearly, this reading suggests an at least partial rejection of the famous argument of Roscoe Pound and his heirs 22 2-some statutes at least do not fit
220.

See generally I BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).

221. Professor Ackerman's effort is too important, elaborate, and ingenious to be addressed adequately by way of summary characterization or footnote discussion. For present purposes, however, two
points are sufficient. First, my analysis diverges from Ackerman's insofar as I treat constitutional moments in law as frequent rather than few (Ackerman asserts that there are only three-Founding, Reconstruction, New Deal). Id. at 34-57. In part, the increased number of constitutional events that I would
imagine is the result of an altered definition of "constitutional." I would count statutes (for example)
that serve to replace the ordinary norms of institutions as constitutional even if such statutes address
only a limited range of activities; Ackerman continues to associate "constitutional" with the Constitution
(even as he divides that document and recognizes at least one undocumented alteration), with norms
informing or regulating in general the efforts of (mostly) political or governmental institutions. Second,
Ackerman relies heavily on an idea of normalcy that represents the usual business of legislatures or
courts as preoccupied with the application or synthesis of the three sets of constitutional norms that he
recognizes. He therefore tends to treat his constitutional norms as resolutions of conflicts, and the
normal work of legislatures and courts as the elaboration of these resolutions (although he also leaves
room for disagreements). Id. at 58-80. By contrast, I treat conflict as ubiquitous in law, not merely
simple disagreement but frequent and repeating differences concerning fundamentals (including the
identification of constitutional texts).
222. For Pound's views, see, e.g., Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908).
Successor efforts, differing in detail but sharing with Pound's work an effort to treat statutes as a piece
of law generally, include, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 313-54 (1986); HENRY M. HART &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS:
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comfortably into an overall legal scene: they are best understood instead to
call into question precisely that which, legally, is ordinarily validated.
But most importantly for present purposes, this account of the meaning
of legal freedom vis-A-vis statutory litigation points up a sequence of correspondences, links between the politics of legislation and the politics of statutory interpretation. Ratification or challenge, as responses to conventional
practices, are organizing terms within which either legislators or observers
may evaluate the case for legislation,2 23 as well as descriptions of statutory
results. The images of internal and external orientations that provide working terms for statutory interpreters function likewise. The process of identifying the relationships of statutes to other legal orders implicates precisely
the defining earmark of judicial office I identified earlier.224 As a result, in
the course of characterizing statutes, judges not only give specific content
to the idea of legal freedom that from the litigant's perspective justifies,
when it is directly applicable, the preference for litigation over arbitration.
Judges at the same time justify, and therefore motivate, their own exercise
of office.225
APPENDIX A:
THE INTERNAL/EXTERNAL DISTINCTION IN OTHER STATUTORY

CONTEXTS
A re-reading of the Supreme Court's decisions outside the ADEA and
Title VII settings, I think, confirms the usefulness of the approach that I
have just outlined. As we will see, it becomes possible to frame justifications for the differences in results in the cases, and in the process identify
easier and harder questions. I should emphasize that the discussions that
follow are intentionally one-sided. They aim to highlight features of particular statutory regimes that are of a piece with the conclusions that the
Supreme Court has reached concerning arbitration of statutory claims. Particular statutes may also possess features that point to opposite conclusions.
Within the capsule accounts here, I do not explore these reverse possibilities. To some degree, therefore, the descriptions of particular statutes I offer are incomplete, and should be understood as illustrations rather than
definitive summaries. At the same time, I do not mean to minimize the
persuasiveness of these capsule accounts. I think that in fact the Supreme
Court has decided its cases rightly-as my approach shows, in some in1218-26, 1410-17 (1958) (unpublished manuscript); L. James MacCanley Landis, Statutes as Sources
of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934).
223.

Cf Henry Hart, The Relations Between State and FederalLaw, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489 (1954)

(federal law as reaction to state law).
224. See text supra at notes 62-69.
225. Cf Kahn, supra note 65 (undertaking an effort at harmonization differing chiefly in its defense
of a sharp law/politics divide).

266

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

[Vol. 16:209

stances squarely in step with central statutory themes; in other instances,
consistently with current judicial glosses.
A.

Section 1983 Arbitration

Sometimes, from the new perspective, it is especially easy to see the
independence of the federal action, and thus the inappropriateness of according arbitration contracts preemptive force. Legislative history and judicial glosses, it may appear, clearly indicate that the precise point of
recognizing a right to sue is to permit plaintiffs to extract certain issues
from within their usual context in order to allow a more distanced evaluation. For example, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, the origin of the cause of action at
issue in McDonald v. City of West Branch,2 26 on its face draws a distinction between the legal rules putting defendants in position to act detrimentally to the interests of plaintiffs-"color of law"-and the sources of law
("Constitution and laws of the United States") that courts are to consider in
evaluating such acts.22 7 Post-Civil War resistance to emancipation, tolerated or even aided and abetted by state and local officials, we all know,
explains the congressional suspicion evident in this sharp statutory division. 22 8 The external perspective, therefore, expresses itself here, in choice
of law terms, established in advance of the question of the point of view of
particular constitutional or other federal rights.
Section 1983 jurisprudence is more complicated than statutory language alone suggests insofar as modem judicial interpretations show no
similar sense of crisis; 2 29 nonetheless, important parts of the original statu226. 466 U.S. 284 (1984). McDonald, a police officer, brought suit under § 1983 alleging that the
City of West Branch, Michigan, his employer, fired him in violation of constitutionally-recognized free
speech guarantees. Prior to resorting to federal court, McDonald had obtained arbitration, pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement, of his claim of improper dismissal, but the arbiter ruled in favor of the
city. See id. at 286.
227. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 1981). The notion of "color of law" extends the reach of the statute beyond
official acts authorized in fact by state law to acts office makes possible but state law may ultimately
prohibit. In this way, the statute may be seen as recognizing the unresolved character of much official
action-the ex post nature of full legal specification. Plainly consistent, the statute points to independent federal criteria for fixing proper official conduct, and independent institutions, federal, or at plaintiff's choice, state courts, within which such focusing occurs. See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (West
1981); Texas Teachers Ass'n v. Garland School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792 (1989) (attorney fees in § 1983
suit turn on whether plaintiff is "able to point to a resolution of the dispute which changes the legal
relationship between itself and the defendant"). For the crucial link between "color of law" and the
unresolved quality of state action, see Steven L. Winter, The Meaning of "Under Color of" Law, 91
MICH. L. REV. 323, 396-404 (1992). Given this reading of § 1983, it is not surprising to discover that
courts do not recognize a converse "color of law" doctrine with respect to federal law: federal law, if it
is to govern the conduct of state officials must be in some sense "clear." See, e.g., Lividas v. Bradshaw,
U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 2068, 2083 (1994); Elder v. Holloway, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 1019 (1994).
228. See, e.g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240-41 (1972).
229. E.g., Heck v. Humphrey, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 2374 n.10 (1994).
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tory plan remain visible within the caselaw. For example, plaintiffs are said
to be free to bring suit in federal court in advance of exhausting state administrative remedies.2 30 The possibility that state law does not in fact
authorize the challenged acts is no bar to suit; at most, federal courts may
direct a temporary recourse to state courts.23 t The Supreme Court, however, also reads the Supremacy Clause as justification for treating state
courts as constitutional equals of federal courts with respect to protection of
federal rights; as a result, the onset of state judicial proceedings frequently
bars a federal section 1983 suit.2 32 "Judicial proceedings" include at least
some state administrative hearings.2 33 Against this backdrop, why not proceed by analogy and group arbitral decisionmaking with adjudication also?
McDonald, suddenly, comes into question. The Supreme Court has held
that administrative processes that are legislative in nature do not bar section
1983 actions, although finality concerns may remain relevant. 234 The Court
has also indicated that administrative actions, however judicial in appearance, pose no barrier if state law treats such actions as imposing no constraint on subsequent state judicial rulings.23 5 Other federal courts have
ruled that state administrative procedures that appear to be too informal do
not block federal litigation-what constitutes "too informal" is not clear.23 6
These last cases, seemingly, are the most pertinent for purposes of characterizing arbitration. Recognition of state proceedings as Supremacy Clause
"equals," however, turns on a second consideration as well. In both judicial
and administrative settings, the Supreme Court requires that significant
230.
231.

Patsy v. McDonald, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).
See, e.g., Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383 (1988); See generally Rail-

road Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); PAUL M. BATOR, DANIEL J. MELTZER, PAUL J.
MISHKIN & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYS-

1358-59 (3rd ed. 1988).
232. See, e.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). In
principle, at least, state courts must provide litigants with adequate opportunities to raise federal claims.
See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108 n.9 (1975) (under Florida law pretrial issue could not be
raised in defense to criminal prosecution). The Supreme Court has read narrowly this limit on the
application of the Younger doctrine. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1987);
Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430-32 (1979). The related precept that bad-faith conduct by state officials justifies federal intervention also has only limited scope. See, e.g., id. at 432; Juidice v. Vail, 430
U.S. 327, 338 (1977).
233. See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627-29
(1986); Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm'n v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982).
234. New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. New Orleans City Council, 491 U.S. 350, 370-73 (1989).
235. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1984).
236. Compare Telco Communications, Inc. v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1228 (4th Cir. 1989) ("informal fact finding conference" not formal enough to mandate abstention) with Phillips v. Virginia Bd.
of Medicine, 749 F. Supp. 715, 722 (E.D. Va. 1990) (license revocation proceedings that are "manifestly
formal and adversarial" and provide a "full panoply of proceedings and safeguards," are "judicial in
nature" and support abstention) and Kim-Stan, Inc. v. Department of Waste Management., 732 F. Supp.
646, 649-50 & n.2 (E.D. Va. 1990) (regulatory agency's hearing requirements including right to a record, issuance of subpoenas and application of evidentiary rules were sufficiently "trial like trappings" to
warrant abstention.).
TEM
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state interests be at stake.23 7 In this respect, the key here as elsewhere ultimately may be the presence of "difficult questions of state law bearing on
policy problems of substantial public import whose importance transcends
the result in the case then at bar."-23 8 This focus, we can see, suggests a
proper concern underlying the informality cases. If so, it plainly marks, by
way of emphasis, a perspective not only peculiarly apposite to section 1983
litigation, given its Reconstruction anti-discrimination origins, but also entirely consistent with the differentiation of adjudication and arbitration proposed by this essay. The result in McDonald follows.
B.

Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) Arbitration

Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell 39 requires a closer analysis. Buell involved an FELA suit based on allegations of job triggered
emotional distress, an injury claim also subject to "minor dispute" arbitration pursuant to the Railway Labor Act. Insisting, unsuccessfully, that arbitration was the only remedy available to the plaintiff, the defendant also
argued substantively that "purely emotional injuries" fell outside the scope
of the FELA. 24 ° "[M]any workers alleging emotional injuries are really
complaining of unhappiness arising out of everyday workplace disputes."2 4
Explaining why the question should be left for remand, the Supreme Court
responded at great length, noting the elaborate and varied formulas state
courts have used to confine the emotional distress action. 4 2 The Court also
observed, however, that "whether one can recover for emotional injury
might rest on a variety of subtle and intricate distinctions related to the
nature of the injury and the character of the tortious activity."24' 3 Plainly
enough, it would seem, context counted. We may wonder, therefore, at the
Supreme Court's decision to accord injured employees the option of pursuing FELA actions over and above RLA arbitration rights. The FELA, it
may appear, is among the least independent of federal statutes. Seemingly,
it does little more than guarantee railroad workers a federal damages remedy in cases of injury actionable at common law. 2" To be sure, as the
237. See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Auth., 467 U.S. at 237-38.
238. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 112 S.Ct. 2206, 2216 (1992) (quoting Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)).
239. 480 U.S. 557 (1987).
240. Id. at 567.
241. Id. at 566.
242. See id. at 568-70.
243. Id. at 568. Subsequently, in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 114 S.Ct. 2396 (1994), the
Court addressed the issue of the specific contours of the emotional distress cause of action, holding that
the FELA incorporates the common law zone of danger test-allowing "recovery for emotional injury
to those plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant's negligent conduct, or who
are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct." Id. at 2406.
244. See 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 (West 1994).

1995]

TITLE VII ARBITRATION

Court emphasized, the statute limits certain employer defenses. 4 5 Arbiters,
however, could easily take such limits into account.
FELA jurisprudence today looks most notable for what is sometimes
portrayed as a procedural quirk-its extraordinary solicitude for plaintiff
jury trial rights.2 4 6 Perhaps this vagary reflects an effort by the Supreme
Court to confer upon railroad workers the benefit of workers compensation
schemes by other means. 4 7 But it is more plausible, I think, to read the
statute and surrounding caselaw as a surviving fragment of the elaborate
body of workplace tort law whose contours federal and state courts jointly
worked out mostly in the latter part of the nineteenth century. 48 Certainly,
this was the understanding of Justices Black and Douglas, the chief framers
of the FELA pro-jury bias. 49 Within this pre-workers compensation tort
law, courts closely scrutinized workplace structures of authority, contrasting "fellow servants" (no employer liability) and "vice-principals" (employer held liable);25 0 substantively, courts enforced employer obligations
to promulgate work rules and evaluated the reasonableness of rules in effect.2 5 ' Especially with respect to substantive questions, the point of view
245. Buell, 480 U.S. at 561. The Court also observed that "[t]he Act expressly prohibits covered
carriers from ... entering into any contract ... to limit their FELA liability." id. The actual statutory
language, however, voided "[a]ny contract ... the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any
common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter ... " 45 U.S.C.A. § 55 (West
1994). Even if, in a sense, a collectively bargained grievance procedure is a "limit" on FELA liability
insofar as it blocks access to federal judicial remedies, such a grievance procedure plainly does not
"exempt" an employer from liability, notwithstanding remedial variations, so long as its provisions
overlap the substantive terms of the FELA-at least unless FELA remedial provisions are understood to
be part and parcel of the substance of the Act.
246. See, e.g., Buell, 480 U.S. at 562 n.8; Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R, Co., 342
U.S. 359 (1952) (federal not state law controls allocation of responsibility between judge and jury in
FELA case); Bailey v. Central Vt. Ry., 319 U.S. 350 (1943) (reversing state supreme court's order
directing a verdict in favor of original jury finding of negligence); see generally - Green, Jury Trial
and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482, 488-94 (1956). For famous criticism of the FELA cases, see
Hart, supra, note 223, at 508 ("a phase of the phantasy, which for fifteen years has bemused the Justices
.... "). Hart started from the assumption that "federal law takes the state courts as it finds them," id.,
echoing Justice Frankfurter's dissent in part in Dice, 342 U.S. at 365, 367-69. For a recent effort largely
working within Hart's and Frankfurter's premise, although apparently endorsing at least some FELA
results, see Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of FederalRights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1213,
1142-45 (1986).
247. See Edward H. Cooper, Directionsfor Directed Verdicts: A Compass for FederalCourts, 55
MINN. L. REV. 903, 926-27 (1971).
248. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of IndustrialAccidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 65 (1967).
249. See, e.g., Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 318 U.S. 54 (1943) (Black, J.); Bailey v. Central
Vt. Ry. Co., 319 U.S. 350 (Douglas, J.).
250. See, e.g., Chicago, Mil. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Ross, 112 U.S. 377, 390 (1884); Hough v. Railway
Co., 100 U.S. 213, 218 (1879). For cases hostile to the vice-principal doctrine, see, e.g., Northern Pac.
R.R. v. Hambly, 154 U.S. 349, 359-60 (1894); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 382-84,
389 (1893). Justice Field's dissent in Baugh illustrates the controversial character of this area of law.
See id. 405-11 (Field, J., dissenting). See generally 4 C. B. LABATr, MASTER AND SERVANT 4141-4665
(1913).
251. For a late contemporary summary, see H. GERALD CHAPIN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
175-86 (1917). My colleague Jonathan Simon has revealingly discussed this body of law in For the
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of the legal inquiry was not that of the employer, but of the community at
large.2 5 z Not surprisingly, within this body of law, the allocation of responsibility between judge and jury was chronically controversial. 253 The
FELA, it was understood, reflected, or required, a choice within that
controversy.2 5 4

Ordinarily, the existence of a jury trial right would not resolve the
arbitration question. A jury may as readily evaluate claims concerning an
organization's own practices as bring to bear an external perspective. But
here, precisely because of the unusual emphasis, and its history, the FELA
action acquires an added dimension.25 5 In particular cases, as Buell itself
shows, the content of the substantive law applied may subtly but decisively
vary depending upon whether, for example, emotional distress is a jury
question or a matter for arbitral inquiry. If plaintiff's allegations are
judged, inter alia, against a standard of what is "normal" in the workplace,
significant differences might result if what is normal is a question of what is
ordinary within the particular work setting or rather what is ordinary within
a larger community.2 56 If the point, more precisely, is to bracket "the law
of the shop," to evaluate how far it diverges from social expectations, to
provide injured workers therefore with a way to challenge the legitimacy of
the routine, recognition of a jury trial right plainly follows. It is a jury trial
right, above all, that the FELA supplies: against this backdrop, the reason
Government of its Servants: Law and Disciplinary Power in the Workplace, 1870-1906, 13 STUD. IN
LAW, POL. & Soc'Y 105 (1993).
252. If the general practice of such corporations in the appointment of servants is evidence
which a jury may consider in determining whether, in the particular case, the requisite degree
of care was observed, such practice cannot be taken as conclusive upon the inquiry as to the
care which ought to have been exercised. A degree of care ordinarily exercised in such matters may not be due, or reasonable, or proper care, and therefore not ordinary care, within the
meaning of the law.
Wabash Ry. Co. v. McDaniels, 107 U.S. 454, 461 (1882). See generally Simon, supra note 251.
253. For criticism of juries and calls for closer judicial supervision, see comments collected in The
Abuse of PersonalInjury Litigation, 18 THE GREEN BAG 193 passim (1906). A more positive view of
juries is evident in, e.g., Washington & Georgetown R.R. v. McDade, 135 U.S. 554, 571-73 (1890)
(collecting cases).
254. See Tiller, 318 U.S. at 68 n.30. Earlier FLSA cases placed greater emphasis upon judicial
control. See, e.g., Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R.R. v. Koske, 279 U.S. 7, 11 (1929); Toledo, St. Louis
& West. R.R. v. Allen, 276 U.S. 165 (1928).
255. The Supreme Court, it should be noted, gave little attention to the possible relevance of jury
trial rights. See Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 565 (1987).
256. A difference in perspective might matter greatly, for example, in defining the content of the
zone of danger approach to emotional distress that the Supreme Court has held applies in FELA suits.
See ConsolidatedRail Corp., 114 S. Ct. at 2411. "[I]mmediate risk of physical harm" is a notion that
might easily accommodate either workplace conceptions of usual or ordinary or background and thus
not immediate risks or alternative accounts emphasizing concatenating hazards. The choice of a baseline, moreover, may be decisive not only in emotional distress cases, but in all suits in which some
notion like due care, for example, is pertinent. See also Hirras v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 39
F.3d 522 (5th Cir. 1994) (in sexual harassment case "outrageousness" defined by community rather than
workplace standard and therefore Railway Labor Act grievance procedures do not pre-empt state cause
of action).
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for permitting the worker to retain FELA rights in the face of arbitration is
apparent.25 7
C.

FairLabor Standards Act (FLSA) Arbitration

FLSA caselaw, the Supreme Court noted in Barrentine v. ArkansasBest Freight System, underscores "the nonwaivable nature of an individual
employee's right to a minimum wage and to overtime pay under the
Act." 258 But why does arbitration constitute a waiver? Presumably arbiters
will take FLSA claims seriously. Barrentine, like Buell, at first appears
clearly to beg the question. Importantly, however, the decisions to which
the Court referred, dating from the first years after the statute's enactment,
insist that wages and hours standards are not matters of industry custom,
even custom acknowledged in collective bargaining agreements. 259 The
FLSA itself, through criteria drawn from statutory language, is to be the
source of wage and hour standards. This basic proposition shaped not only
the cases Barrentine cites, but the larger cascade of Supreme Court FLSA
decisions in the 1940s, a surprisingly little noted but remarkable effort to
reframe basic categories of workplace compensation. 260 Accompanied by
allusions to a political economy of labor surplus and demand stimulation,2 6 t
the principal theme in the Court's opinions was the need to fix uniform
257. Note that this reasoning does not suggest a preference for federal courts vis-A-vis states courts,
and the FELA indeed confers jurisdiction on state courts, but it does suggest that state courts ought to be
subject to federal jury trial rules, as the Supreme Court indeed held in Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R, Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
258. 450 U.S. 728, 740 (1981).
259. See Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173, 177-78 (1946); Walling v.
Harnischfeger Corp., 325 U.S. 427, 430 (1945); Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Mine Workers Local No.
6167, 325 U.S. 161, 167 (1945). Justice Jackson, concurring in the result in Walling v. Portland Term.
Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947), but disagreeing with the prevailing methodology, clearly understood that the
Supreme Court's general approach was not merely an accident of statutory construction, but a matter of
substantive choice:
[T]he complex labor relations of this country, which vary from locality to locality, from industry to industry, and perhaps even from unit tounit of the same industry, were left to be regulated by collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. . . . Organized
employees on one side, free of employer domination or coercion, and employers on the other
side best know the needs and customs of their trades; they know something of the strain their
industry can stand; and after all, it is they who feel the effects. Given thus the machinery to
change customs that had outlived their time or, in the alternative, to adjust wage rates to take
account of these customs, it was, I think, our duty to pay at least some deference to the
customs and contracts of an industry and not to apply the Fair Labor Standards Act to put
industry and labor in a legal strait jacket of our own design.
Id. at 154. See also, e.g., Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 477-95 (1948) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
260. For surveys, see E. Merrick Dodd, The Supreme Court and FairLabor Standards 1941-45, 59
HARV. L. REv. 321 (1946); Comment, Overtime Provisions of the FLSA: Unexpected Liability and
Windfall Recovery, 12 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRAc. & PRoc. 581, 586-90 (1979).
261. See, e.g., Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. 572, 577-78 (1942); see generally
Benjamin Kline Hunnicutt, The End of Shorter Hours, 25 LAB. HisT. 373 (1984).
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standards in terms independent of employer definitions or demands.2 62 One
motivation, obviously, was to minimize opportunities for circumvention, a
goal especially pressing in a regime lacking free-standing administrative
the ssame problem of variation and revision
enforcement capacities. 263 But th
lay at the base of traditional employee complaints, in the nineteenth century
often framed in anti-slavery terms and in the early twentieth century voiced
as a critique of perpetually tinkering scientific management. 2" From either
perspective, the question was whether specifications of wages and hours
were variables always at issue in a continuous competition for control or
rather a more or less fixed language outside and therefore regulating terms
of workplace bargains.2 6' Against this backdrop, the possibility that arbitration, even if competently undertaken, might bring to bear the perspective
of the jobsite, because that viewpoint is exactly that which the statute rejects, plainly justifies the decision to deny arbitration processes' preclusive
effect. In Barrentineas in Buell, the option the individual employee retains
is the choice whether to challenge local consensus. The Supreme Court's
conclusion in each case seems precisely right within the perspective we are
exploring.

262. "[Slpread of employment is not the sole purpose of the forty-hour maximum provision... Its
purpose is also to compensate an employee in a specific manner for the strain of working longer than
forty hours." Bay Ridge Operating Co., 334 U.S. at 470 (emphasis added). "The regular rate by its very
nature must reflect all payments which the parties have agreed shall be received regularly during the
workweek, exclusive of overtime payments. It is not an arbitrary label chosen by the parties; it is an
actual fact." Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 424 (1945).
Initially, it appeared that the Supreme Court would by and large respect contractual categories in
enforcing the FLSA, developing independent criteria only in gap-filling cases. See Walling v. A.H. Belo
Corp., 316 U.S. 624, 634-35 (1942). Wage contracts were associated with "common sense" and held to
be "proven mutually satisfactory"; in contrast, the effort to develop free-standing statutory criteria
amounted to "an inflexible and artificial interpretation of the Act." Id. at 635. By Walling v. Helmerich
& Payne, Inc., 323 U.S. 37 (1944), however, the polarities were reversed. Contractual terms were now
"twisted," "fictitious," and "illusory"; statutory criteria invoked "only" a "simple process," directly identifying "wages actually received" and "hours actually and regularly worked." Id. at 40, 41; see also, e.g.,
United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 364 (1945); Dodd, supra note 260, at 357-64.
263. See, e.g., Helmrich & Payne, 323 U.S. at 41, 42 (characterizing contract terms as derived "not
from the actual hours and wages but from ingenious mathematical manipulations, with the sole purpose
being to perpetuate the pre-statutory wage scale"; contrary result "would exalt ingenuity over reality and
would open the door to insidious disregard of the rights protected by the Act"). Concerning problems
created by the absence of independent agency enforcement, see Dodd, supra note 260, at 346-50, 370.
The problem of circumvention in the context of wage and hour standards is, of course, chronic. See,
e.g., I KARL MARX, CAPITAL 231-302 (trans ed. 1887) (European experiences); Ronald G. Ehrenberg &
Paul L. Schumann, Compliance With the Overtime Pay Provisions of the Fair Labor StandardsAct, 25
J.L. & ECON. 159 (1982).

264. On nineteenth century hours arguments, see David Brody, Time and Work During Early
American Industrialism,30 LAB. HIsr. 5 (1989); David Roediger, Ira Steward and the Anti-Slavery
Origins of American Eight-Hour Theory, 27 LAB. HIST. 410 (1986).
265. On this view, the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and its construction by the Supreme
Court, precisely achieved the objective of hours reforms, thus solving "the end of shorter hours" puzzle;
for other explanations (and formulation of the problem), see Hunnicutt, supra note 261.
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D. Antitrust Arbitration
There are also clear cases pointing to the opposite conclusion. In
these, the statutory claims at issue reveal an internal preoccupation, a focus
on expectations, relationships, or norms constitutive of an organization or
practice. Adjudication and arbitral process thus become interchangeable;
there is no reason not to give effect to an arbitration agreement.
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. ,266 for example, depicted Sherman Act protections of market integrity as losing their "constitutional" character in the
international setting. 267 Blackmun also noted that the antitrust challenge at
issue concerned the propriety of a vertical restraint, a contractual regulation
of the behavior of a retailer by a supplier effectively limiting the ability of
the retailer to compete directly with either the supplier or other retailers.
Resolution of this sort of case, he observed, did not involve any special
complexity; as the court of appeals below had demonstrated, the vertical
restraint question turned on some of the same questions raised by the
dealer's obviously arbitrable contract claim against Mitsubishi.2 68 This last
point is the crucial one for the approach I am applying. Vertical restraint
cases are generally analyzed in terms which suppose an initial, and usually
decisive, inquiry into the dynamics of the relationships between a supplier
and a complaining dealer, and the supplier and other dealers, whether or not
those relationships are described explicitly in written contracts or instead
manifest themselves in courses of dealing.2 69 Plaintiffs typically assert the
existence of a conspiracy between the supplier and some dealers to fix resale prices, and an effort to punish plaintiffs for breaking with the scheme,
all in violation of a traditional per se prohibition first announced in the Dr.
Miles decision.27 But courts give great weight, even in the face of effects
on price competition, to regulatory efforts undertaken by the supplier vis-Avis the dealer that appear to reflect the logic of the relationship itself.2 7 '
Relevant supplier and dealer practices consistent or inconsistent with objectives of the relationship other than price control per se include, for example,
266. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
267. See id. at 629-31, 634 n.18, 634-36. For references to antitrust law as "constitutional" vis-hvis market transactions, see, e.g., United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933), overruled on other grounds, 467 U.S.
752 (1984).
268. See id. at 633, 621-22 & n.9. See also Donald I. Baker & Mark R. Stabile, Arbitration of
Antitrust Claims: Opportunities and Hazardsfor CorporateCounsel, 48 Bus. LAW. 395, 398-99, 404-

05 (1993) (Mitsubishi as classic case of "partnership" dispute amenable to arbitration).
269. Thus Professor Areeda, in his elaborate treatment of the topic, begins his discussion by sensitizing readers to the range of possible reasons explaining challenged restraints; legal argument per se
proceeds in particular cases by identifying the relevant parts of the range. See 8 PHILLIP E. AREEDA,
ANTrrUST LAW 2-243 (1989).
270. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
271. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 n.23 (1977); Seagood
Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555, 1558-62, 1569-73 (1lth Cir. 1991).
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supplier efforts to regulate the quality of dealer service in order to protect
the supplier's reputation with ultimate customers, and dealer efforts to minimize such quality control. z72 The decisive question, as the courts see it, is
frequently whether such business needs explain challenged supplier acts,
such as terminating a dealer, thus blunting the force of conspiracy charges,
or whether evidence of supplier relationships vis-t-vis other dealers justifies
a conclusion that supplier regulatory concerns were a mere pretext.27 3 The
inside perspective, obviously, dominates either way. It is the pattern of
relationships as the parties themselves construct it that a court must tease
out and characterize; once the pattern is characterized, decision follows
readily.2 74 To this extent at least, arbitration becomes nonproblematiceven, it would appear, in purely domestic vertical restraint cases, a question
Justice Blackmun purported to leave open. 7 5
272. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 52; Business Elec. v. Sharp Elec., 485 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1987);
Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1984). Business Electronics, in particular illustrates the extent to which contemporary antitrust law protects supplier regulatory efforts-the
burden is put on plaintiffs to show plain evidence of a price-fixing conspiracy; ambiguous circumstances
preclude any further analysis. Id. at 726, 722; see, e.g., Ben Elfman & Son, Inc. v. Criterion Mills, Inc.,
774 F. Supp. 683, 685-86 (D. Mass. 1991).
273. See, e.g., Monsanto Co., 465 U.S. at 763-64; Parkway Gallery Furn. v. Kittinger/Pennsylvania
House, 878 F.2d 801, 805-06 (4th Cir. 1989); Chicago Prof. Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d
667, 674-76 (7th Cir. 1992); City of Long Beach v. Standard Oil Co., 872 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir.
1989); see also, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc, 112 S. Ct. 2072, 2091 (1992)
("valid business justifications" as defense to monopoly charge); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith
Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 593-98 (1986).
274. See, e.g., United States v. All Star Indus., 962 F.2d 465, 469-75 (5th Cir. 1992), overruled on
other grounds, United States v. Calvertey, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 29266 (5th Cir. 1994); Bailey's Inc.
v. Windsor Am., Inc., 948 F.2d 1018, 1020-32, 1030 (6th Cir. 1991). If facts support a claim of a
conspiracy to fix retail prices, the per se rule against price fixing applies. If facts suggest that supplier
regulatory concerns underlie challenged action, a rule of reason analysis may be appropriate; but the
general thrust of that analysis suggests an inquiry not very different from the investigation already
undertaken to bring into focus the dealings of the parties, see National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978) (rule of reason analysis applies to "agreements whose competitive
effect can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint,
and the reason why it was imposed"). But cf note 275 infra (discussing role of market models in rule of
reason cases).
275. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629. It is difficult to read Justice Blackmun's restraint as anything
more than pro forma after McMahon, a purely domestic case in which passages from the Mitsubishi
opinion figure prominently. See Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226-27,
229-30, 232, 239-40 (1986). And indeed, although mostly in dicta, lower federal courts have repeatedly
declared that Mitsubishi applies in domestic antitrust cases-in all cases, the underlying antitrust claims
challenge "vertical" arrangements. See, e.g., Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441-42 (9th
Cir. 1994); Swensen's Ice Cream Co. v. Corsair Corp., 942 F.2d 1307, 1310 (8th Cir. 1991) (dictum);
Kowalski v. Chicago Tribune Co., 854 F.2d 168, 173 (7th Cir. 1988) (dictum).
To be sure, the propriety of arbitration of antitrust claims may be less clear, even in vertical restraint cases, where the decisive issue is the anti-competitive effect of the restraint, and analysis therefore focuses on, e.g., definitions of relevant markets-matters turning in part on lessons to be learned
from the parties' own arrangements, but also in part on across-the-board, and thus fundamental statutory, assumptions about market dynamics. See, e.g., Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 952 F.2d 715,
722-29 (3rd Cir. 1991); Cranfill v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 773 F. Supp. 943, 953 (E.D. Tex. 1991). In
addition, in cases where a picture of actual market behavior must be built up by examining the behavior
of third parties, as in cases turning on allegations of the existence of a cartel, if the focus therefore shifts
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E.

Securities Arbitration

ShearsonlA merican Express Inc. v. McMahon276 and Rodriguez de

Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, InC.2 7 7 invite a somewhat closer
analysis. Notwithstanding Mitsubishi, arbitration of antitrust claims occurs
only infrequently. Arbitration of securities fraud claims, by contrast, has
quickly become commonplace. Within the terms of the argument of this
essay, the Supreme Court's conclusion that the securities fraud allegations
at issue were appropriate for arbitration is plainly defensible. The approach
I take here, however, ultimately suggests that the matter is rather more fact
sensitive, and that securities fraud statutes are rather more limited in their
than the opinions in the cases themselves might
amenability to arbitration,
2 78
suggest.
to
seem
McMahon involved a suit by customers of a brokerage firm alleging
excessive trading and various misrepresentations, all in violation of SEC
rule lOb-5. 2 79 1lOb-5 suits take as their model the common law fraud action.28 But the focus of litigation may vary significantly, depending upon
the background of the particular suit. A plaintiff must prove some version
of scienter, nominally an inquiry into the willfulness of a defendant's misrepresentations or omissions, but in litigation involving bureaucratic or professional defendants in fact usually an investigation into the magnitude of a
defendant's deviation from established norms of investigation and reporting.28 1 Plaintiff, however, must also supply a basis for inferring that the
from courses of dealing among particular market participants to an account of a given market's dynamics taken as a whole, arbitration again may be less appropriate. In this respect the analysis of Messrs.
Baker and Stabile, supra note 268, is especially interesting: writing as experienced antitrust counsel
proceeding from the point of view of drafters of arbitration agreements, they distinguish between "partnership" cases, turning mostly on the direct dealings of plaintiff and defendant, which they see as easy to
handle within arbitral process, and "third party" cases-typically, horizontal conspiracy cases, which
they believe require careful procedural design in advance if arbitration is to work well, or else exclusion
of such cases from within the scope of the arbitration agreement. See id. 425-26, 421-23. Baker and
Stabile also recommend that courts "develop some useful rules in this area, rejecting petitions to compel
arbitration when arbitration appears unlikely to vindicate federal statutory rights." Id. at 422. It appears
that the approach developed in this essay, distinguishing "internal" and "external" antitrust actions,
would separate cases more or less along the lines that Baker and Stabile urge.
276. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
277. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
278. I do not discuss in text the Supreme Court's holding in McMahon that the RICO claims
brought along with the rule lOb-5 action are also arbitrable. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238-42. RICO
suits require as a predicate the existence of independent violations of federal or state law.
" '[R]acketeering activity' consists of no more and no less than commission of a predicate act ......
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985); see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1) (West Supp.
1994). The approach of this essay thus suggests that the arbitrability of the RICO claims depends on the
arbitrability of the predicate claims.
279. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 222-23; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1994).
280. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 471-74 (1977).
281. In Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), the Supreme Court defined scienter, for
purposes of the rule 1Ob-5 cause of action, as referring to "a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud," id. at 194 n.12. The Court left open the question of whether reckless conduct
might count as scienter, see id.; however, most circuits of the U.S. Court of Appeals have subsequently
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misleading conduct of defendant affected plaintiff's decision-making. If
the transaction in question is a market transaction, if defendant did not deal
with plaintiff personally but rather disseminated or failed to disseminate
information available to a universe of buyers and sellers of securities, courts
treat proof of the materiality of the misstatement or omission as presumptively sufficient: absent rebuttal there is no need for a plaintiff to prove
reliance or to reconstruct the actual decision-making process.2 82 Judgements about materiality derive from a model of a reasonable investor. 8 3
This model, it is easy to see, is the device through which courts legally
constitute and thus seek to regulate securities markets, acting on assumptions about the characteristics of ordinary market participants, gauging the
costs and benefits of changes in available information.28 4 In cases in which
plaintiffs and defendants do transact directly, however, proof of reliance per
se frequently remains necessary. 8 5 Here the inquiry ultimately investigates
particular relationships, testing the degree of a plaintiff's dependency on

answered the question affirmatively. See, e.g., Van Dyke v. Coburn Enters., Inc., 873 F.2d 1094, 1100
(8th Cir. 1989) (collecting cases). The prevailing definition of recklessness derives from Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977), and
Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp. 719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976), vacated on other
grounds, 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980):
[Rieckless conduct may be defined as a highly unreasonable omission, involving not merely
simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of misleading buyers and sellers that is either known to
the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it.
Sundstrand Corp., 553 F.2d at 1045; see, e.g., Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 n.8
(9th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (collecting cases). In cases involving organizational defendants, obviously, the
question of whose intent is always present; at least where rules of respondeat superior, for example, are
not relevant, see id. 1576-78, plaintiffs typically attempt to meet their scienter obligations by seeking to
show clear departures from standard practices and thus recklessness, and courts analyze the issue similarly. See, e.g., Ambrosino v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 972 F.2d 776, 788 (7th Cir. 1992) (defendant's
care "higher than the custom and practice of the industry at that time"); SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636,
642 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (like defendant, independent auditor "who had substantial experience in mutual
fund accounting" did not question attorney's (erroneous) advice). See also McGonigle v. Combs, 968
F.2d 810, 819 (9th Cir. 1992) (no showing of falsity and thus no predicate for scienter inquiry where "no
industry standards ... serve as a basis for an attack" on defendants' representations).
282. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247 (1988).
283. See id. at 246-47; TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445, 452-53, 460 (1976);
Shapiro v. UJB Fin'l Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 281-82, 283 (3rd Cir. 1992). For an especially clear illustration, see Jonathon Macey, Geoffrey Miller, Mark Mitchell and Jeffrey Netter, Lessons from Financial
Economics: Materiality, Reliance, and Extending the Reach of Basic v. Levinson, 77 VA. L. REV. 1017,
1022-28 (1991).
284. See, e.g., Roots Partnership v. Lands' End, Inc., 965 F.2d 1411, 1419, 1420 (7th Cir. 1992).
285. See Citibank, N.A. v. K-H Corp., 968 F.2d 1489, 1494 (2d Cir. 1992). In rule lOb-5 cases
chiefly involving omissions, even if transactions were face-to-face, the difficulties involved in proving
reliance on what was not stated have led courts to treat proof of materiality as equivalent to proof of
reliance. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972); Akin, 959 F.2d
at 529; Litton Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 747-48 (2d Cir. 1979) (collecting
cases).
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defendant, the resulting division of labor, and the expectations built along
the way.2 86
This brief account suggests four possible combinations of require28 7
ments organizing rule lOb-5 litigation:
Case 1:

Case 3:

scienter turns on individual
defendant's knowledge;
reliance to be inferred from
characteristics of personal
relationship of plaintiff and
defendant

scienter turns on individual
defendant's knowledge; reliance
to be inferred from materiality
of misrepresentations or
omissions, as judged in light of
market characteristics

Case 2:

Case 4:

scienter turns on degree of
organizational defendant's
departure from standard
practices; reliance to be
inferred from characteristics
of personal relationship
of plaintiff and defendant

scienter turns on degree of
organizational defendant's
departure from standard
practices; reliance to be inferred
from materiality of
misrepresentations or omissions,
as judged in light of market
characteristics

The first sort of case, we may suppose, is most obviously amenable to
arbitration-both questions at issue are likely to be resolved through evaluation of the details of the relationship of plaintiff and defendant.28 8 The
fourth category of cases would appear to describe a variant of the basic
cause of action unlikely to be appropriate for arbitral process. Particularly
if defendant is a professional organization such as an accounting firm, and
thus standard practices are obviously fixed at least in part by outside norms,
decisions in such cases will turn to an important degree on judgments about
286. See, e.g., Milton v. Van Dorn Co., 961 F.2d 965, 970-72 (lst Cir. 1992); Wright v. National
Warranty Co., 953 F.2d 256, 261-62 (6th Cir. 1992); McGonigle v. Combs, 968 F.2d 810, 817 (9th Cir.
1992).
287. Obviously, I do not mean to suggest that scienter and materiality/reliance are the only elements of securities causes of action. Even if these requirements are met, plaintiffs may still need to
show, for example, the existence of a duty, often conceived as originating outside securities law per se,
running from defendant to plaintiff. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653-54 (1983); Chirella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-29 (1980); Glazer v. Formica Corp., 964 F.2d 149, 156-57 (2d Cir.
1992). I focus attention on scienter and materiality/reliance because these two investigations describe
the primary attributes of (mis)communications in connection with securities trading that securities law
marks as problematic; analysis of duty, by contrast, tests whether a particular (mis)communication,
concededly a matter of concern for securities law, is an appropriate subject for civil suit. Duty per se,
thus, is an issue unlikely to arise in securities cases concerning the availability of arbitration: the agreement incorporating the arbitration clause establishes the necessary relationship.
288. See, e.g., Litton Indus. v. Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb Inc., 967 F.2d 742, 748 (2d Cir. 1992)
("all the proof it needs of its own reliance lies in its own hands").

278

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

[Vol. 16:209

the content of standards regulating both organizational and market practices, and thus will presuppose adoption of an entirely outside perspective. 8 9 In any event, in such market cases, it is difficult to discern how an
arbitration agreement might come into existence in the first place. The second and third cases are obviously mixed. Arguably, the third type is less
important for present purposes, since, like the fourth variant, it seems not to
be the sort of securities action for which an arbitral forum would be available in any event. The second version is more interesting: the key here,
with regard to arbitration, may well be the extent of the overlap between the
organizational norm questions presented and the principal regulatory concerns of securities law. Thus, for example, if the auditing practices of accountants were a traditional focus of SEC attention in the course of that
agency's implementation of its statutory agenda, the scienter inquiry should
perhaps be understood as an occasion for articulating and enforcing public
standards rather than for simply testing the degree to which an accounting
firm is consistent in its own practices.2 9 °
McMahon is a case of either the first or second sort. Brokerage firms
like Shearson/American Express are traditional targets for close regulatory
scrutiny within the terms of administrative, judge-made, and statutory securities law. If the acts of individual brokers at issue implicated Shearson/
American Express policies, we might conclude that the cases were sufficiently part of the process through which courts or administrators elaborate
securities trading rules; as a result, arbitration agreements should not preempt. But if the responsibility of Shearson/American Express was purely. a
matter of respondeat superior, if employees acted within a zone of discretion properly conferred, then disposition of the cases would depend upon
the dealings in the particular instances and, notwithstanding the dense regulatory environment, an arbitration agreement should be enforceable. 29 ,
Alternatively, if the SEC retains jurisdiction to enforce rule lOb-5 notwithstanding arbitration agreements, the need to draw a bright line between the
two categories for purposes of private litigation may diminish; we might see
the SEC as assuming responsibility for defining regulatory norms.292 The
court of appeals and Supreme Court opinions in McMahon did not approach
289. See, e.g., Warren v. Reserve Fund, Inc., 728 F.2d 741, 745-46 (5th Cir. 1984) (disclosure
complying with SEC recommendations not reckless even if misleading; disclosure also consistent with
industry practice).
290. See, e.g., Akin, 959 F.2d at 527-528 ("repeated violation of accounting principles" is evidence
of recklessness and thus scienter); Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 946 F.2d 38, 41 (6th Cir. 1991) (no
inference of recklessness given industry practice of nondisclosure and no contrary regulatory requirements); Hollinger,914 F.2d at 1570-72 (NASD disclosure requirements permit defendant broker-dealer
not to disclose eleven-year old forgery conviction of employee and thus omission was not reckless).
291. Cf Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51, 354-5, 357 (1974).
292. Cf. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28 (dictum) (EEOC retains power to bring ADEA suit despite arbitration agreement). See generally Appendix B, infra notes 303-346. Or the SEC might use its power to
regulate arbitration agreements to make clear which rule lOb-5 suits are not arbitrable. See generally
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233-34 (noting SEC supervisory responsibility).
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the arbitration issue in the way I am exploring here, and therefore it is not
easy to fix the case categorically; both statements of facts are extremely
abbreviated. The available clues, though, point towards a conclusion that
employee conduct per se was all that was at issue. If so, the Supreme
Court's conclusion, if not its opinion, is in accord with the overall analysis
here.
Rodriguez de Quijas also arose in the context of a broker/customer
dispute culminating in charges of fraudulent transactions, in this case in
violation of section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.293 Unlike the rule
lOb-5 suit, the section 12(2) action establishes liability for "misleading"
material statements or omissions without requiring plaintiffs to prove scienter; 2 9 4 instead, the statute affords defendants the opportunity to show that
they did not know, or in the exercise of reasonable care could not have
known of, an asserted untruth or omission. 295 Thus, while the section
12(2) action fits within the larger fraud model, 296 its specific template is the
negligent misrepresentation suit. The concern with departures from usual
standards of investigation and reporting, obviously, is even more evident
here than in the rule 1Ob-5 cases. 297 Section 12(2), like rule lOb-5, imposes
liability only for material misstatements or omissions. The question of reli29 8
ance, however, is irrelevant.
Section 12(2) cases, thus, will differ among themselves chiefly with
respect to the relevant sources of the standard of care against which litigation measures the seller's claims of reasonableness. If the standard derives
from industry practice or regulatory dictates,29 9 we might within the terms
of this essay see a strong outside perspective organizing the inquiry. If the
standard originates in the defendant's own usual practice, and absent some
link to outside sources, we might see the investigation in inside terms, a
version of a traditional search for signs of good faith or its absence. Rodriguez de Quijas like McMahon discloses very little factual background. It
293. 15 U.S.C.A. § 771 (2) (West Supp. 1994).
294. If section 12(2) governs offerings of shares specifically addressed by a prospectus, but not
routine trading, this statutory provision is pertinent in only a subset of market transactions generally.
Compare Ballay v. Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 925 F.2d 682 (3rd Cir. 1991) (section 12(2) does
not apply to routine trading), with Pacific Dunlop Holdings, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 993 F.2d 578 (7th Cir.
1993) (disagreeing) and Louis Loss, The Assault on Securities Act Section 12(2), 105 HARV. L. REv.
908, 911-17 (1992) (criticizing Ballay reading). Another important difference distinguishing the lOb-5
and 12(2) actions is irrelevant for present purposes: section 12(2) addresses only misrepresentations by
sellers; rule l0b-5 includes no such limitation, although plaintiffs must be either purchasers or sellers.
295. See Ballay, 925 F.2d at 687-88 (3rd Cir. 1991); Loss, supra note 294, at 911.
296. See Shapiro v. UJB Fin'l Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 287 (3rd Cir. 1992); 9 Louis LOSS AND JOEL
SELIGMAN,

SECURrIEs REGULATION 4206 (1992).

297. See, e.g., Ambrosino, 972 F.2d at 788-89 (rule lOb-5 scienter analysis incorporating § 12(2)
finding of due diligence predicated in part on compliance with industry standards).
298. By its terms, section 12(2) requires proof of materiality only; courts have refused to add a
reliance requirement. See, e.g., Caviness v. Derand Resources Corp., 983 F.2d 1295, 1304 (4th Cir.
1993).
299. See, e.g., DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 842 (2d Cir. 1968).
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would not be surprising, however, if the conduct of a particular Shearson/
Lehman employee were at issue, 3° that usual company practice fixed the
pertinent background for evaluating the employee conduct.3 °1 On this assumption, within the approach of this essay, arbitration of the section 12(2)
claim would be in order.3 °2
APPENDIX B:
301 AND FAA

IMPLICATIONS FOR SECTION

PREEMPTION AND

FOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

This appendix broadens the discussion further. Initially, it brings to
bear the analysis that I have developed in this essay for purposes of considering state statutory causes of action. In many cases, federal courts have
held that state actions are inconsistent with collective bargaining arbitration
regimes, and therefore preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act. In other cases, the courts have read provisions of the Federal
Arbitration Act as blocking state actions. There are exceptions, however, in
both lines of cases. I argue here that the internal/external distinction readily
explains these diverging decisions. I also briefly consider the usefulness of
the distinction in connection with questions about the impact of arbitration
clauses on the power of administrative agencies to enforce statutory
provisions.
A.

Section 301 Preemption

Section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 declares that "[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce ...may be brought in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties .... 3 0 3 The Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that this provision, however modest in form, is strongly preemptive: it utterly obliterates state legislative jurisdiction with respect to matters within
300. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 490 U. S. 477, 478 (1989).
301. Employer liability would follow, given employee departure from usual practice, as a matter of
respondeat superior. See Loss, supra note 294, at 913.
302. Since McMahon and Rodriguez de Quijas, SEC-backed changes in arbitration rules have exempted claims involving persons who are members of certified or putative classes participating in securities litigation. See, e.g., Rule 12(d)(3) NASD Code of Arb. Proc. (1994). This differentiation of

individual securities fraud claims and class-wide claims may significantly limit the Supreme Court arbitration decisions. In any case, it roughly parallels the approach that this article proposes. Securities
class actions are not appropriate, as a matter of civil procedure, unless common questions predominate
vis-a-vis matters peculiar to the circumstances of individual class members. See FED. R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3). Almost invariably, such "predomination" is not evident unless the principal issues in dispute
concern general practices of a defendant, and thus possess some regulatory (and therefore public)
dimension.
303. 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a) (West Supp. 1994).
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its compass.3 °4 On its face, section 301(a) does not refer directly to arbitration but to collective bargaining agreements, although these agreements frequently provide for grievance arbitration." 3 As a practical matter, thus, the
section 301(a) preemption caselaw often concerns itself with the conflict, or
lack of conflict, between arbitral processes subject only to federal law, and
litigation seeking to enforce state common law or statutory rights. The
Court has said, in fact, that "It]he need to preserve the effectiveness of arbitration" is one reason for 6the aggressive approach to preemption evident in
30
section 301(a) doctrine.
There is an elaborate caselaw concerning the impact of section 301(a)
on state law. 30 7 For present purposes, it is sufficient to note four Supreme
Court decisions, focusing attention on the two most recent. In Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck30 8 and in Electrical Workers v. Hechler,3° the Court
held that state common law tort suits were barred by section 301(a) because the success or failure of the actions turned in part on conclusions
drawn from the content of collective bargaining agreements. Nonetheless,
in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. 310 the Court ruled that litigation seeking to enforce an Illinois statute prohibiting retaliatory discharge
for filing a workers compensation claim might proceed in parallel with arbitration challenging the dismissal as in violation of a collective bargaining
agreement. Invoking the Gardner-Denver line of cases dealing with the
coexistence of federal statutory actions and collective bargaining arbitration,311 the Court concluded that "separate fonts of substantive rights
remain unpre-empted" insofar as questions concerning the content of these
rights can be resolved without "construing the collective-bargaining agreement." 3 12 Subsequently, however, Steelworkers v. Rawson 313 appeared to
undermine or at least limit Lingle. The Idaho Supreme Court had ruled that
an employee could bring a common law action against a union alleging
negligent inspection of a mine, reasoning that the union's duty of care de304. E.g., Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). Because section 301(a) entirely displaces overlapping state causes of action, claims falling within the federal statutory scope are treated as
federal, even if alleged to sound in state law, for purposes of the removal jurisdiction of federal district
courts. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
305. See Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987).
306. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219 (1985).
307. For a recent survey, see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of IndustrialPluralism: The
Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective BargainingSystem, 59 U.
CHt. L. REv. 575, 593-620 (1992).
308. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
309. 481 U.S. 851 (1987).
310. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
311. See id. at 411-13.
312. Id. at 411, 407; accord, Hawaiian Airline, Inc. v. Norris, 114 S. Ct. 2239, 2246 (1994) (state
cause of action protecting whistleblower from retaliatory discharge not preempted by RLA because state
cause of action stands "[wiholly apart from any provision of the [collective bargaining agreement]").
313. 495 U.S. 362 (1990).
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rived not from the collective bargaining agreement, but solely from the fact
that the union had undertaken inspections.3 14 The United States Supreme
Court, without even citing Lingle,3 t5 concluded that the common law action
was preempted. The action at issue, the Court thought, did not mark out as
illegal "an act that could be unreasonable irrespective of who committed it
and could foreseeably cause injury to any person who might possibly be in
the vicinity."'316 The union's acts in inspecting the mine, therefore; could
not be evaluated, notwithstanding the contrary claim of the Idaho Supreme
Court, without taking into account the further fact that "the [u]nion's representatives were participating in the inspection process pursuant to the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement, and that the agreement
determined the nature and scope of the [u]nion's duty."3 ' 7 Federal law

governed.3t8
Lingle and Rawson are in fact consistent. The Supreme Court's
method in both cases, it is plain, reveals an important linguistic preoccupation: if the language through which a state statutory or common law cause
of action works itself out is, even in part, the same language as the language
used in a collective bargaining agreement, the state action cannot proceed. 319 The Court in Lingle carefully examined the format of both the
plaintiff allegations and defendant responses posited by the cause of action
at issue in order to be sure that disputed factual questions "can be resolved
without interpreting the [bargaining] agreement itself., 32 0 It is not enough,
however, that state actors simply announce, as in Rawson, an intention not
to use collective bargaining language. Federal law requires a reason for
believing that the state action is not simply a relabeling; the different terms
used in the state cause of action cannot simply act as stand-ins or indirect
references to bargaining agreement formulas.3 2 ' This was the problem in
Rawson: after initially acknowledging that the suit for failure to inspect
imposed on the union a duty derived from language in the bargaining agreement, the Idaho Supreme Court subsequently sought to portray duty as fol314.
315.
316.

See Rawson v. Steelworkers, 770 P.2d 794, 795-96 (Idaho 1988).
The Idaho Supreme Court had expressly relied on Lingle. See id. at 797.
Rawson, 495 U.S. at 371.

317.

Id.

318. The Supreme Court ultimately held that, although section 301(a) in principle allowed employees to enforce bargaining agreement obligations against unions (whether or not the unions had breached
the duty of fair representation), see id. at 372-74, in the case at hand the bargaining agreement afforded
employees no basis for suing as third-party beneficiaries because the agreement imposed upon the union
no duty enforceable by the employer, see id. 374-75.
319. See also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 114 S.Ct. 2068, 2079 (1994) (need to refer to bargained-for
wage rates to compute remedy irrelevant to substance of underlying dispute).
320. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410; see id. 406-07, 407-08 n.7.
321. On this view, there is room (at least) for the view that section 301 preemption law supplies
resources available not only for defending collective bargaining regimes, but also for justifying causes
of action that would protect the interests of workers without regard to collective bargaining outcomes.
But see Stone, supra note 307 at 620-38 (section 301 preemption as chiefly apologetics for collective
bargaining).
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lowing directly from union actions without explaining how the relevant acts
could be described, criticized, or justified (acts do not speak for themselves)
entirely without reference to the bargaining agreement.3 22
Obviously, in their linguistic emphasis Lingle and Rawson evoke Archibald Cox's famous discussion of labor law preemption generally.32 3 But
Rawson's handling of the problem of translation in particular is also notable
insofar as the inquiry into forms of words tends to resemble the mode of
analysis proposed by this essay. The Supreme Court concluded that the
Idaho court had accomplished nothing more than relabeling only after addressing the question of point of view, the field of reference assumed by the
state action. In the end, the Court thought, Idaho law was not enforcing a
norm capable of elaboration and application without reference to the facts
of workplace relationships; 324 since such relationships, and the expectations
of reasonable conduct that they generate, are defined in part by collective
bargaining agreement provisions, preemption follows. 325 Lingle, by contrast, highlights a difference between the section 301(a) setting and the statutory frames organizing the main body of my analysis. It was not the case
that the Illinois action's perspective was one independent of the workplace-"outside" in my terminology. It was enough, rather, that the action
merely adopted a point of view different from that of the collective bargain322. The tact shown by the United States Supreme Court in discussing the Idaho Supreme Court's
changing views is notable: it is not that the Idaho court fails to understand its own tort law-rather, the
two courts simply "see it" differently, see Rawson, 495 U.S. at 371. There is, nonetheless, at least a
suggestion in the United States Supreme Court opinion that the Idaho court might be disingenuous:
"Pre-emption by federal law cannot be avoided by characterizing the Union's negligent performance of
what it does on behalf of the members of the bargaining unit pursuant to the terms of the collectivebargaining agreement contract as a state-law tort." Id. at 371-72; see also id. 379 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The Court reaches a different conclusion because it doubts that the Idaho Supreme Court means
what it seems to have said").
323. Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337 (1972).
324. For cases in which a court concluded that there was no preemption because a state-law right
could be understood as indeed independent of workplace references, see Lopez v. Continental Can Co.,
961 F.2d 148, 149 (9th Cir. 1992); Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195, 198-99 (9th Cir.
1989).
325. A parallel analysis is evident in Stikes v. Chevron USA, Inc., 914 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1990),
holding that a California law right of privacy, even though recognized in the state constitution, did not
provide a basis for a cause of action falling outside the scope of federal preemption:
Here, the district court could not ascertain Stikes' expectations of privacy at the workplace
without considering the conditions of his employment enumerated in the collective bargaining
agreement ... By the same token, it could not assess whether Chevron's search of the car
constituted an unreasonable intrusion without understanding the scope of Chevron's powers
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 1269; accord, e.g., Jackson v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111, 117 (1st Cir. 1988) ("A
[privacy] right subject to a balance involving the needs and interests of the parties is, almost of necessity, defined by the parties themselves"); see also Mock v. T.G.&Y. Stores Co., 971 F.2d 523, 530 (10th
Cir. 1992) (similar analysis of various Oklahoma law tort claims); Perugini v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 935
F.2d 1083, 1087-89 (9th Cir. 1992) (somewhat conclusorily differentiating preempted job assignment
and not-preempted sexual harassment emotional distress claims on basis of whether reference to bargaining agreement is needed to determine whether employer's "conduct exceeded all bounds usually
tolerated in a civilized community").
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ing agreement: in this case, by keying on questions of employer motivations, either too subjective or implicitly too managerial to be true
bargaining agreement topics. 326 Because the language of section 301(a)
and therefore preemption analysis makes the collective bargaining agreement the point of departure, "outside" includes parts of "inside. 3 2 7
B.

Federal ArbitrationAct (FAA) Preemption

Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act states that "[a] written provision in

. .

.a contract

. .

to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter

arising out of such contract... shall be valid, irrevocable and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.- 328 The Supreme Court has held that state statutes which in effect
sever arbitration clauses from other provisions in a contract and "take...
meaning precisely from the fact that a contract to arbitrate is at issue" 329 are
in conflict with FAA section 2, and are thus preempted. 330 The Court has
326. See also Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, - U.S. -, 114 S. Ct. 2239, 2251 (1994) (applying
Lingle in Railway Labor Act context). The subjectivity of employer motivations was crucial in Bettis v.
Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 878 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1989), in which a court of appeals panel held that
Lingle governed a workers compensation retaliatory discharge case even though the employer argued
that the challenged furlough was justified by a provision of a collective bargaining agreement. Because
the issue was motive, the court ruled, it was enough, if the employer were to prevail, to determine "that
the motive was something other than the filing of a workers' compensation claim": if such a motive
existed, it would not matter "whether, as a matter of law, the collective bargaining agreement justifies
such a motive." Id. at 197. Another Seventh Circuit case, In re Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 964
F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1992), makes explicit the significance of background definitions of appropriate bargaining topics in applying Lingle. There, an employer defending video surveillance of employee locker
rooms argued that the practice fell within a zone of discretion recognized by a management-rights clause
in a collective bargaining agreement, and thus section 301(a) preempted an employee invasion of privacy suit. Read broadly enough, management-rights clauses might seem to bring within collective bargaining agreements all matters not directly addressed in the agreements, thus radically expanding the
scope of section 301(a) preemption. In Amoco Petroleum, however, Judge Easterbrook carefully noted
that "[pirivacy in the workplace is an ordinary subject of bargaining," id. at 710, before ruling that in the
case at hand the management-rights clause did indeed trigger preemption: "Even agreements that do not
mention surveillance expressly may deal with the subject by implication." Id. Thus, it was not the
management-rights clause alone that mattered, but a sense of the usual topics collective bargaining
agreements address.
327. Section 301(a) thus may not preempt state actions whose inquiries would be appropriate for
arbitration within the terms of the main analysis of this essay. See, e.g., Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 879
F.2d 1326, 1334 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (no preemption under Lingle of Michigan statutory handicap
discrimination claim turning on employer motivation in much the same fashion as ADEA age discrimination claim). The different results, obviously, are entirely a function of starting points. Preemption
analysis takes its cue from the principal concern of the relevant federal statute, here section 301(a); that
concern focuses on the integrity of the text of the collective bargaining agreement. The analysis in this
essay in cases dealing with the interaction of arbitration agreements and federal statutory actions, by
contrast, emphasizes the implications of the relevant statutes without directly considering arbitration
agreement terms.
328. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2.
329. Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 493 n.9 (1987).
330. Id. at 489-90; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). Parties may by contract
agree, however, that the arbitration procedures that they wish to be followed in case of dispute are to be
taken from state law arguably less supportive of arbitration than the FAA itself. See Volt Info. Sciences
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noted in dictum, however, that "state law, whether of legislative or judicial
origin, is applicable if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally."' 33 ' But the
Supreme Court's decisions themselves do not indicate, apart from a casual
example,3 32 how to identify "issues concerning the validity.., of contracts
generally."
A short but provocative line of decisions from other courts, however,
does address the matter. The leading case for present purposes is Supak &
Sons Mfg. Co. v. Pervel Industries, Inc. 33 3 There, a Fourth Circuit panel
held Uniform Commercial Code section 2-207, regulating the applicability
of non-negotiated terms in form contracts, did not conflict with FAA section 2, and therefore might be invoked to block enforcement of a form arbitration clause. Section 2-207, Judge Winter wrote, "is a general rule of
contract formation"; it "does not apply only to arbitration clauses" but
"merely applies to arbitration clauses the traditional common law rule that a
term does not become part of the contract unless accepted by both parties." 33' 4 The Supak opinion, insofar as it depicts UCC section 2-207 as "a
general rule," plainly anticipates the Supreme Court's subsequent reading
of FAA section 2.11 5 But the real significance of the Fourth Circuit analysis
lies elsewhere, ironically in its least persuasive aspect. Supak is difficult to
follow, to say the least, insofar as it portrays section 2-207 as simply a
"traditional common law rule" concerned with what the parties actually accepted. If an arbitration clause included in a contract form is not deemed to
be a material alteration, it becomes legally enforceable pursuant to section
regard to whether the parties in some sense actually
2-207(2)(c) without
"accepted" it. 336 The UCC provision itself, and not the agreement of the
parties, determines the applicability of the arbitration clause.
v. Stanford Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1989). But cf. id. at 476 n.5 (state arbitration rules at issue
"generally foster the federal policy favoring arbitration").
331. Perry, 483 U.S. at 493 n.9 (emphasis in original).
332. "We agree, of course, that a party may assert general contract defenses such as fraud to avoid
enforcement of an arbitration agreement." Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 n.11.
333. 593 F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1979).
334. Id. at 137.
335. There is a real question, however, whether Supak's application of section 2-207 is consistent
with the Supreme Court's FAA jurisprudence. Judge Winter, following North Carolina and New York
law, ruled that "an arbitration clause constitutes a per se material alteration of the contract" excludable
under section 2-207(2)(b). Id. at 136. This reading seemingly remains the New York interpretation.
See F.N. Wolf & Co. v. Brothers, 613 N.Y. Supp.2d 319, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1994); Marlene Indus. Corp. v.
Carnac Textiles, Inc., 408 N.Y. Supp.2d 410, 413-14 (Ct. App. 1978). Federal courts, though, have
judged this singling out of arbitration as always material to be at odds with the Supreme Court's demand
that only "generally" applicable rules govern the enforcement of arbitration agreements. See Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. C.A. Reaseguradora Nat'l, 991 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir. 1993) (treating question as one
of burden of proof and applying usual New York preponderance standard); Hatzlachh Supply Inc. v.
Moishe's Electronics, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 178, 183-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (applying case-by-case test of
materiality as better interpretation of UCC in light of FAA).
336. See Bergquist Co. v. Sunroc Corp., 777 F. Supp. 1236, 1243-47 (E.D. Pa. 1991).

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW

286

[Vol. 16:209

Subsequent cases are indeed more explicit. Recold, S.A. de C.V. v.
Monfort of Colorado, Inc.33 7 addressed an attempt to invoke UCC section

2-318, in a case in which appellee was concededly a third-party to the
agreement to arbitrate that appellant sought to enforce; the statutory provision, allegedly, was the source of an arbitration right otherwise growing out
of a " 'legal relationship' created by statute." 338 Unimpressed by the reading of section 2-318 that this argument urged, the Eighth Circuit panel deciding Recold held that appellant was hoist on its own petard: the UCC
provision applied "independent of any contract" and therefore did not depend for its definitions of warranty remedies on the content of the agreements among some of the parties to the pertinent transaction. 339 W.M.
Schlosser Co. v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd.3 ' held the Dillon Rule, limiting
the recognition of "governmental powers by implication," 34 1 was a fundamental principle of Virginia law and as such " 'a general rule of contract
formation' "342 invalidating a school board arbitration agreement as ultra
vires notwithstanding the FAA. The court, not surprisingly, undertook no
effort to relate the relevance of the Dillon Rule to the terms of the parties'
dealings.
Is it the case, therefore, that the FAA does not preempt if state law
simply treats contract terms as irrelevant, including, but importantly not
exclusively, arbitration terms, supplying instead independent criteria regulating matters at hand?343 If so, in such cases arbitration agreements would
be legally irrelevant, and therefore irrelevant in particular to the assertion of
litigation rights. If so as well, we may conclude that the emphasis on state
law "independent of any contract" is entirely of a piece with the emphasis
on external versus internal perspectives suggested by this essay. I do not
mean to make too much, however, of the implications of the Supak line.
Article 2 of the UCC is famously difficult to categorize as entirely either a
strongly regulatory statute or simply a point of entry for norms fixed by the
parties themselves. Questions of ultra vires or capacity, even if also implicating state constitutional law, remain recognizably contractual. But at
least in the absence of further pronouncements from the United States
Supreme Court, the thrust of these no-preemption cases is intriguing.

893 F.2d 195 (8th Cir. 1990).
338. Id. at 197. The case arose under section 202 of the Federal Arbitration Act, see 9 U.S.C.A.
§ 202 (West Supp. 1994), part of the statutory implementation of Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, see Recold, 883 F.2d 195.
339. Id. at 199; see id. at 198-99.
340. 980 F.2d 253 (4th Cir. 1993).
341. Id. at 255.
342. Id. at 259 (quoting Supak, 593 F.2d at 137).
343. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1121 (1st Cir. 1989) (dictum).
337.
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C. Arbitration and Administrative Action
There remains the question of the relationship of administrative action
and arbitration. In Gilmer, the Supreme Court indicated without much discussion that the arbitration agreement in question would not block the
EEOC from investigating the matters at issue. 3" How is it possible, within
the terms I have outlined, for a court to conclude that private litigation but
not agency action must give way in the face of an arbitration agreement? It
is enough, I think, to note that statutory schemes might assign very different
roles to agency action and litigation. Responsibility for general considerations of public interest, the external perspective, could be the exclusive
business of the agency; litigation would then serve simply to protect the
expectations of individuals within the structures the agency supervises.
This distribution of roles, of course, is not necessary: litigation might parallel agency action in concern for structure.34 5 But in at least some cases, the
Analysis of particular cases, therefore,
Gilmer result may be appropriate.
follows the usual form. Thus, in Farrel Corp. v. ITC34 6, a Federal Circuit
Court panel reversed an International Trade Commission decision to terminate an investigation because of an arbitration agreement binding the disputing parties. 34 7 Relying heavily on the Gilmer dictum 348 , the court also
pointedly noted:
The ITC, through its staff, conducts the investigations independently of the
wishes of the parties, and in reaching its final determination on an alleged
violation must consider factors that may or may not interest the parties: the
"public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United States
economy, the production of like or directly349competitive articles in the
United States, and United States consumers."
of the ITC
This is, in essence, the approach of this essay. Continuation
35 °
justifiable.
readily
been
have
to
proceeding appears
344. See 111 S.Ct. at 1653.
345. Or agency action might resemble adjudication and arbitration insofar as all, under particular
statutes, might be concerned chiefly with the contours of the dealings between plaintiff and defendant,
and thus adopt an inside perspective. See, e.g., Olde Discount Corp. v. Tupman, 805 F. Supp. 1130,
1133, 1139-40 (D. Del. 1992) (state securities law administrative proceeding does not take precedence
over arbitration and is thus preempted by the FAA in part because claims at issue do not involve technical matters invoking doctrine of primary jurisdiction but rather "are within the conventional experience
of... judges").
346. 949 F.2d 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
347. See id. at 1149-50.
348. See id. at 1156.
349. 949 F.2d at 1152 (quoting 19 U.S.C.A. § 1337(c)) (emphasis in original).
350. In contrast, in Olde Discount Corp. v. Tupman, 1 F.3d 202 (3rd Cir. 1993), a state administrative agency initiating processes to require a securities broker-dealer to rescind particular transactions
was arguably a mere surrogate for individual purchasers of securities who were parties to an arbitration
contract, and who claimed securities fraud grounded in face-to-face dealings. The badly-split Third
Circuit panel held that the FAA pre-empted the state proceeding, but agreed that in a case where regulatory concerns were more apparent, state action might continue. See id. at 210-11 (Greenberg, J.); Id. at
216 n.1 (Rosenn, J., concurring); Id. at 217-219 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).

